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Given the dual role played by the govenmment  as  * A cash-flow and withholding-tax system,
resource owner and tax collector in many Sub-  initially for the mineral sectors and eventually
Saharan economies, it is important to separate  for other sectors of the economy. The cash-flow
"resource factor payments" from taxes through  tax would capture a share of the "economic rent"
the use of different instruments. The instru-  from each sector and be neutral across sectors.
ments to be considered are:  The withholding system would enable applica-
tion of an income (as opposed to a consumption)
A factor payment system that includes "ad  tax base at the individual level.
rem" or "ad valorem" royalties.  Production
sharing, resource rent schemes, and fixed fees  * 1  depletion account to preserve the
could also be used, but someform of unit  economy's capital stock.  Natural resources are
payment is necessary and justified, because  part of an economy's i-apital stock, which will
natural resources in the ground are inputs into  fall unless "replacement investment" is made as
the production process.  Determined in a reason-  the resource is depleted.  To ensure adequate
able manner, such a royalty would signal the  saving for this "replacement investment," the
opportunity cost of extraction and development,  account can be funded by the value of depletion
capture the "natural resource rent" and offer an  each year, equal to the minimum amount neces-
acceptable level of risk to the country.  sary to keep the aggregate capital stock constant.
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics
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Referenceshantr  1:  MINERALS  IN  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA:
A SURVEY  OF FISCAL TRENDS  AND  REVENUE  POLICIES
I.  CONTRIBUTION  OF MINERALS  TO THE ECONOMIES  SURVEYED
1.1  Two major benefits accr-  - to developing economies from the
presence  of major mineral  resources:  foreign  exchange  and revenue (via
taxes and other  mineral  payments). 1 Downstream  linkages  to diversified
modern .- snufacturing are largely absent in many developing  countries
because  of the  enclave  nature  of most  mineral  investments.  Domestic  demand
for finished mineral products is generally insufficient to justify
extensive capital-intensive  downstream  developments  for local markets.
Thus, mineral products are generally exported, generating  substantial
foreign  exchange  earnings.
1.2  Government  revenues  from  the  mineral  sector  include  income  eaxes,
indirect  taxes and mineral factor  payments  which may vary from a fixed
percentage  of gross  revenues  to  complex  production  sharing  agreements  where
state  owned  enterprises  either  own  the  operations  completely  (e.g.,  Zambia)
or  work in  conjunction  with foreign  investors  (e.g.,  Cameroon). 2
A.  Share  of  Mineral  Output  to GDP
..3  The  mineral  share  of Gross  Domestic  Product  for  a sample  of Sub-
1/  A  distinction  will  be made  between "taxes" and  other payments
throughout  this report.  The major  justification  for this  distinction
is found  in  Chapter  3.
2/  Other benefits to the economy include transfer of technology  and
employment. Because  of the  high capital  cost per job the employmsnt
effects  are  generally  minimal.  Transfer of technology can be
important. However,  these  benefits  accrue  only  after  a long  period  of
time and most operations  in the countries  under investigation  still
rely on foreign  skilled  labor  for  both design  and operations. For a
more extensive  discussion  of the benefits  of the mineral sector  to
developing economies (including  a comprehensive  definition  of the
concept  of "Retailed  Value")  see  Gillis,  et.  al. (1978).-2-
Saharan  economies  is  presented  in  Table  1.1. These  shares  vary  both  across
countries  and through  time  within  a country. Cameroon's  increasing  share
is an indication  of its recent  oil development  which has just reached
potential. A similar  trend  is found  in Botswana  with respect  to diamonds
and  other  industrial  minerals. The  declining  shares  for  Liberia,  Zaire  and
Zambia  reflect  the maturity  of the industry,  declining  ore quality (and
consequent increasing  costs),  depletion  and the recert decline  in real
mineral prices.  Only Zlibabwe  has had a relatively  constant  share of
mineral  value  to GDP over a significant  period  of time.  Zimbabwe  is  also
the only country  where the share  of minerals  in GDP is consistently  less
than 10 percent reflecting  Zimbabwe's  more diversified  domestic  economy
relative to other mineral producers  in the region.  Thus other things
equal, Zimbabwe may be able to withstand changes  in the international
market  for  minerals  without  large  disruptions  in  the  domestic  economy.
Table  . 1 :  Share  of  Minerals  in  GDP
(percent)
Year  Botswana Cameroon Gabon  Liberia Nigeria Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe
1970  10.85  0.30  30.70  29.46  7.58  21.74  36.03  6.58
1971  10.77  0.65  29.65  29.03  11.63  18.59  23.14  5.79
1972  10.81  0.22  30.39  30.46  13.08  16.98  24.07  5.36
1973  10.82  0.30  30.85  26.35  18.04  22.39  32.36  6.70
1974  8.50  0.37  50.12  25.74  32.88  22.03  32.61  7.31
1975  8.45  0.40  44.44  31.93  22.01  14.74  13.59  6.56
1976  12.27  0.30  33.76  23.97  25.18  12.70  17.97  7.02
1977  13.33  0.41  39.52  17.62  24.98  11.22  11.77  6.78
1978  15.49  0.52  43.10  13.80  24.85  11.66  12.74  6.60
1979  22.75  2.80  49.15  11.88  27.99  16.09  17.64  8.00
1980  30.04  7.24  49.89  13.70  31.23  21.78  16.38  8.29
1981  26.14  11.09  49.17  21.71  25.13  15.75  14.01  5.68
1982  16.60  11.68  52.81  20.82  21.83  11.55  11.03  4.21
1983  27.83  14.76  45.63  20.01  17.03  16.63  15.34  6.iK
1984  31.69  15.72  49.87  18.37  18.,?  29.48  13.66  6.82
1985  36.30  17.22  46.17  17.99  21.48  28.05  12.79  6.49
1986  46.87  NA  24.41  17.98  16.65  NA  24.62  6.25
.Note: Blank  entries  imply  lack  of data--Minerals  produced  by country--
Botswana:  diamonds,  copper;  Cameroon:  petroleum;  Gabon:  petroleum,  uranium;
Liberia:  iron;  Nigeria:  petroleum;  Zaire:  copper,  petroleum;  Zambia:  copper;
Zimbabwe:  gold,  asbestos,  nickel,  copper.
Sources: See  references.3-
B.  Share  of  mineral  eagorts  in  total  exports
1.4  As shown in Table 1.2, the share of mineral exports in total
exports  far  exceeds  the  share  of mineral  value  added  in GDP  and  of mineral
revenue  in total  revenues. Fo  instance,  more than  a third  of Zimbabwe's
export earnings accrue from to  *'ral  exports.  A number of factors  are
responsible  for  this trend. First,  most  mineral  output  is  exported,  while
a significant  proportion  of output  from  other  sectors  is  used for  domestic
consumption. Second,  with the exception  of minerr.'s,  the export  base of
most of these economies  is small. 3 The major non-mineral  exports  are
either agro-based or more traditional manufactured exports, such as
textiles. The figures  highlight  the importance  of mineral  development  in
terms  of foreign  exchange  earnings  in  these  economies.
Table  1.2: Share  of  Mineral  exports  in total  exports
(percent)
Year  Botswana Cameroon Gabon  Liberia Nigeria Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe
1970  14.8  NA  39.9  83.2  57.6  NA  95.3  17.7
1971  17.5  NA  55.8  85.0  73.7  NA  92.8  20.2
1972  43.5  NA  55.5  88.1  82.0  NA  90.6  16.6
1973  33.8  NA  65.1  75.9  83.2  NA  94.2  10.9
1974  46.8  NA  94.2  73.0  92.6  NA  92.7  17.2
1975  51.5  NA  94.4  79.2  94.0  72.27  90.4  22.0
1976  58.3  NA  81.6  75.1  91.8  74.55  91.6  20.0
1977  57.1  3.4  70.3  65.9  92.7  53.68  91.2  23.5
1978  68.4  14.1  87.7  60.5  89.6  56.6  87.0  20.0
1979  68.7  29.6  68.9  61.4  93.3  85.41  82.6  22.8
1980  81.5  53.0  86.9  57.2  96.1  87.57  98.5  26.3
1981  64.6  63.8  77.1  66.5  96.9  88.82  93.3  18.3
1982  65.8  66.9  78.2  70.7  95.4  92.53  92.3  26.5
1983  76.0  67.1  77.6  66.6  97.8  87.75  88.4  NA
1984  79.9  68.2  90.2  64.1  97.3  NA  83.8  NA
1985  84.5  NA  NA  65.2  97.1  NA  79.9  NA
S2urce: See  references.
3/  With the  exception  of Zimbabwe.-4
C.  Share  of  Mineral  Revenue  in  Goverrnent  Revenue
1.5  Table 1.3 contains  a computation  of the proportion  of mineral
revenue  in total  government  revenues. The  shares  for  Botswana  and  Liberia
do not include  the income  from  production  sharing  contracts  or other  taxes
which might be mineral-specific,  leading  to an underestimate  of the true
share. 4 The figures for these two countries  would be closer to the
gineral  trends  representid  if the  data  were  available. If this  adjustment
is made,  then,  with the  exception  of Zambia,  the  share  of mineral  revenues
in total  revenue  is  close  to  or exceeds  the  share  of mineral  value  added  in
GDP.
Table  1.3: Share  of  Mineral  Revenue  in  Total  Government  Revenue
(percent)
Year  Botswana Cameroon Gabon  Liberia Nigeria Zaire Zambia
1972  NA  NA  15.2  17.4  55.0  NA  NA
1973  NA  NA  17.6  15.6  67.9  NA  NA
1974  NA  NA  43.4  12.8  81.2  NA  56.8
1975  NA  NA  58.9  13.0  79.1  26.9  15.2
1976  NA  NA  54.8  13.0  78.1  26.3  3.0
1977  NA  5.3  56.3  17.2  74.0  26.,  0.0
1978  28.4  5.8  61.1  7.6  67.4  15.0  0.0
1979  36.1  9.4  54.6  5.2  82.6  36.9  0.0
1980  37.5  39.8  60.4  4.3  81.5  28.3  5.9
1981  27.3  46.3  66.5  3.4  76.8  21.4  0.1
1982  28.7  53.8  65.5  2.1  65.6  10.5  0.0
1983  37.6  41.8  64.6  NA  61.2  NA  5.6
1984  49.3  44.1  NA  NA  74.5  NA  8.7
1985  56.8  NA  NA  NA  72.2  NA  12.9
1986  60.3  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Note:  Zimbabwe  is  excluded  due  to lack  of  data.
Source: See  references.
1.6  It appears  that  Zambia  is an  exceptional case.  Zambia's
proporcion  of mineral revenues  in total government  revenue  is below the
4/  No zomputation includes indirect taxes (e.g.,  import  duties)  which
could  not  be specifically  identified.values  of  other  countries  and  this  revenue  share  is significantly  below  the
mineral  sector's  share  in  GDP.  A number  of factors  may  be responsible  for
this outcome.  First,  the fall in mineral  prices  combined  with the large
share of debt service  paid by Zambia  led government  to restrict  foreign
exchange  allocations  to the  state  mining  company. This led  to a decrease
in  maintenance  and  plant  expansions  which in turn led  to Zambia's  current
position  as one of the  world's  highest  cost  producers. 5 Second,  direct
budgetary  subsidies  were made to the state  owned  enterprise  which reduce-
-or eliminate--the  net taxes paid by the enterprise  to the government.
These factors  (combined  with the  elimination  or royalties  and  the  need to
reorganize  the  mining  operations)  have  led  to  a significant  decrease  in  the
sector's  contribution  to  government  revenue.
II.  REVENUE  INSTRUMENTS
1.7  A combination  of revenue  generating  devices  are  employed  by each
country. A general  description  of these  instruments  is contained  in this
section.  A  detailed description  of the instruments  employed by each
country is contained  in Appendix  1.  The distinction  between "tax"  and
"factor  payment"  will not be made for present  purposes.  The distinction
will  become  important  in  later  chapters.
A.  Income  R,elated  Pavments
1.8  Major  provisions  of the combined  corporate  and mining  income  tax
laws for the Sub-Saharan  countries  are found in Table 1.4.6  There is
considerable  variance  in  the  tax  rates. The  countries  with  tax  rates  above
5/  World  Bank  Report,  Zambia  1985.
6/  Details  of these  laws  are  found  in  Appendix  1.- 6 -
55 percent  tend to  be petroleum  producers  (e.g.,  Cameroon  and  Gabon),  with
the exception  of Zambia.  However,  Zambia's  syw.t.em  is a two-tier  system.
One  payment  is the  generally  applicable  income  tax  law  which  applies  at the
lower  rate of 50 percent. The second  payment  Is the "Mining  Income  Tax".
This payment is progressive;  is computed  in a manner identical  to the
corporate  income  tax,  and  is  deductible  from  the  corporate  income  tax. 7
Table  1.4: Income  Taxes  on  Mining  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa
Tax  Expensing  of  Expensing  of  Deplet
Country  Rate  Exploration  Development  Allowaxze
Botswana  35%  No  No  No
Cameroon  57.5%  Yes  Yes  No
Gabon  73%  Yes/No  Yes/No  Not  Known
Liberia  50%  Not  Known  Not  Known  Not  Known
Nigeria  45%  Yes  Yes  No
Zaire  50%  Yes  Yes  Percentage
Zambia  Max 76%  a/  Yes  No  No
Zimbabwe  51.75%  Yes  Yes  No after
1982
-/  Combined  rate  cf Hining  Tax and  Corporate  Tax  on Copper. Rate  varies
for  other  minerals.
Source: Appendix  1.
1.9  Immediate  expensing  of exploration  costs is generally  allowed  by
all Sub-Saharan countries. S- h  expensing is also general practice
7/  Prior to the early 1980s  there  were no output  taxes  on minerals  and
thus  the  Mining  Tax  was  considered  the  tax  which  collected  the  resource
rent  (see Garnaut  and Clunies  Ross, 1983).  However,  since the tax
base is identical  to the income  tax both taxes  are combined  for the
present  anialysis.-7-
througho't  the world. 8 One justification  commonly  given for immediate
expensing  of exploratio-.  expenses is the risk associated with  the
exploration  state  of the  mining  process. Immediate  expensing  is perceived
as a means  of allowing  firms  a  zero  effective  tax  rate on this  proportion
of the investment  and thus serves  as an incentive. 9 However,  for new
operations  (or for new firms  operating  in a country)  immediAte  expensing
provisions  may be of little  value  since  there  is  no income  to  be offset  by
the  deduction. Therefore,  unless  the  tax  system  is indexed  and loss  carry
forwards  are generous  immediate  expensing  may  be offset,  at least  in part,
by the  time  lag  necessary  to realize  the  deduction.
1.10  Immediate  expensing  of development  cost is generally  allowed  by
the countries under study.  Like exploration,  expensing  of development
expenditures  is standard  international  practice. 10 Development  expenses
(intangibles,  in particular)  are economically  speaking  self-constructed
assets  with little  or no salvage  value:  i.e.,  development  expenses  are
costs associated  with the sinking  of shafts,  removal  of overburden,  etc.
Under  standard international conventions,  development  expenses are a
residual category being defined as capital expenditures  which are not
8/  In the  United States  domestic  exploration  expenses  are allowed  to  be
expensed subject to recapture.  However, in most other developed
economies  expensing  of exploration  expenses  without  recapture  is  fairly
standard  practice.
9/  It is well known that immediate  expensing  of asse=s  on a 100 percent
equity  investment  makes  the  effective  tax  rate  zero.  Since  exploration
is  considered  risky  it is generally  assumed  t;.at  equity  investments  are
used  at this  stage  of the  mining  cycle  (to  the  extent  that  debt  can  be
attributed).  Thus the statement in the text is based on these
assumptions. If investment  is financed  by debt and interest  can be
deducted  when computing  taxable  income,  then  the combination  of full-
e-jp-nsing  plus interest  deduction  can lead to negative  effective  tax
rates,  that  is  investment  is  subsidized.
10/  The  U.S. law  restricts  this  expense  for  "major"  oil  producers  but  other
mining  operations  are  not  so restricted.-8-
classified  under other depreciation  categories  (e.g.,  machines).  There
appears  to be two  reasons  for  this type  of expensing. First,  development
expenditures  in large measure  are made before  the mineral is extracted.
Granting  a zero effective  tax on this  expenditure  (assuming  it is an all
equity  investment)  is consistent  with the  notion  of offsetting  some  of the
risk  of these  large  up-front  expenses. The  second  justification  is  largely
administrative.  A  large  comronent  of development  expenses  include  labor
and  variable  materials  expenditures  which  are  used to construct  assets  and
there  is an administrative  problem  in determining  what part of labor  and
materials should be  capitalized and what part should be allowed as
deductions  for  ordinary  operations. 11
1.11  Prior to 1982 only Zaire and Zimbabwe  allowed a deduction  for
depletion allowance and these allowances were computed according to
percentage  depletion.  In theory, depletion  allowances  are similar  to
depreciation.  The owner  of an "economic  interest"  in the  mineral  resource
should receive a deduction  for the "user cost" of capital:  i.e., the
reduction  in the present  value of the mine from depleting  the resource.
Under  western  legal  concepts  the term "economic  interest"  extends  both to
the owner  of the resource  and the  op3rator. 12 Most developing  countries
have not  followed this logic and thus depletion allowances are not
generally  granted  to operators.
11/  This  problem  is  present  with all  self-constructed  assets. One solution
to this  problem  would  be to state  that  all  expenditures  made  before  the
date of commercial  operations  are development  expenditures  and can  be
capitalized.  However,  this  system  would  work  only  for  new  developments
for  firms  which  have no  other  operatiocii  in the  country.
12/  For  example,  if a producer  pays  a bonus  to  the  resource  owner  of 1,000
and the  ciner's  cost  basis  of the  property  is 9,000  then  the  depletion
deduction would be  split between the producer and  the owner in
proportion  to their  ecoivomic  interest: i.e.,  10 percent  to producer
and  90  percent  to  owner.9-
B.  Output  TaLxu
1.12  The general  structure  of output  levies  for each  country  is found
in Table 1.5.  Payment schemes based on output vary from country to
country.  In oil producing  countries  (Nigeria,  Cameroon  and Gabon) the
output  payments  are called  production  shares  and are based on contracts
with the foreign  operator.  In Gabon  and Nigeria it appears  that these
payments  are determined  on a contact  by contract  basis.  In Cameroon  the
output share  is thought to be progressive and based  on  cumulative
production.13  Output  levies  are  generally  flat  rate  with the  exception  of
Liberia and Cameroon.  Thus, these countries  have not adopted  windfall
taxes and other progressive  revenue  devices  which have become somewhat
popular  in other  countries  (e.g.,  Indonesia  and some  provinces  in Canada)
and in  the  economic  literature  (Conrad  and  Hool  (1984a)).l 4
C.  Other  Revenue  Instruments
1.13  Mineral  producing  countries  obtain  additional  revenues  via equity
participation in projects.  Paid equity is included as part of the
production  sharing  contracts  in Cameroon, while  free  equity  was
historically  part of the concession  agreements  in Liberia.  State  owned
enterprises  are responsible  for  the  industry  in  Zambia  and  Zaire  (with  the
exception  of petroleum). Thus any fiscal  residual  after  tax also  accrues
to these countries.  Zaire also receives  15 percent  of the net of tax
13/  The actual  form of the production  sharing  arrangements  in Cameroon  is
not  known  with certainty. The information  contained  in Table  1.5  and
in  Appendix  3  are  based  on the  World  Bank  staff's  ir.formation  about  the
form  of the  contracts.
14/  The distinction  between an output levy and export levy is largely
semantic in the present context, since most of the output from
operations in these countries is exported.  That is, the economic
incentives  created  by either  instrument  are  identical  if 100  percent  of
the output  is exported.  Thus,  both types  of levies  have been group
together  in table  5.- 10  -
profits from petroleum operations (a type of free equity) and Gabon
recelves  10  percent  free  equity  in its  petroleum  operations.
Table  1.5: Royalties,  Output  and  Export  Taxes  on  Mining  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa
Country  Name  Base  Rate
Botswana  Royalty  Value  Varies  with  mineral
Cameroon  Productior.  share  Value  60%  1st  15  mb
65%  2nd  15  mb
70%  excess  A/
Gabon  Production  Share  Value  Varies  with  contract
Liberia  Export  Volume  &  $US  0.05/ton
Value  base tax  plus  1%  of
excess  value  above
administered  price
Nigeria  Royalty  Value  Varies  with  contract
Zaire  Royalty  Value  7%  base  plus
progressive  rates
from  4 to 40%
Royalty  Value  12.5%
Zambia  Exports  Value  10%  plus
3%  surtax
Zimbabwe  Not  Known
a/  mb  - million  barrels  of cumulative  production.
Somrce: Appendix  1.
1.14  The use of equity  participation  can be justified  on the grounds
that the country  and the investor  bring  two  different  but necessary  types
of capital  into  the  operation: the  country  brings  the  resource  itself  and
the firm  brings  physical  capital  and expertise. However,  this  analogy  is
limited. The investor  sees "free  equity"  as a reduction  of his return  on
the  physical  capital  above  the  reductions  already  incurred  via income  and
output payments.  In effect, free equity is perceived as a means of- 11  -
increasing  the country's  returns  beyond  those  generated  via other fiscal
instruments.  Equity (either  free or paid) also may not generate  the
returns  one expects.  The investor  will have an additional  incentive  to
transfer  price income  out of the country  via excessive  debt,  management
fees,  royalties  for technical  know-how,  etc.,  if free  equity  is employed.
Finally,  the  returns  from  equity  participation  on  any specific  project  will
accrue,  if at all,  only after  considerable  period  of rime.  In general,  a
significant  portion of the physical  capital  must be recovered  and debt
repaid  before  any  significant  dividends  aro  declared.
III. THE  COSTS OF  MINERAL  DEVELOPMENTS
1.15  Significant  mineral  discoveries  in a developing  economy  are not
free of economic  costs.  At least four economic  costs are part of the
mineral  development  process. First,  governmental  administrative  costs  are
increased  with  mineral  discoveries.  The  size  of the  these  costs  depends  on
the nature of the fiscal arrangements  and how the country  chooses to
organize  the sector's  activities. Most countries  have chosen  to organize
the sector  via state-owned  enterprises  (SOE's).  Contract  negotiations,
fiscal arrangements  and mining policy decisions are part of the SOEs
mandate.  The labor and capital  employed  by the SOE must come at the
expense  of  other  sectors  incurring  an  opportunity  cost  for  foregone  output.
1.16  Second, the return to mineral ownership is uncertain.  This
implies  that  the  economy  may  bear additional  risks  as a consequence  of the
mineral  discovery  in exchange  for the rewards  of mineral  ownership. The
extent  of risk  bearing  will  be determined  (either  explicitly  or implicitly)
by the manner in which the  government  structures  the  mining  sector.  For
instance,  if the  government  sells  rights  for  a flat  fee  and  allows  private
investors  to  make all  decisions  then  there  is little  risk  borne  by society- 12 -
from  the  minerals  per se. 15 Most countries  do not follow  this  strategy.
Rather  mineral  contracts  contain  various  payments  which  vary with income,
output  or value  and thus the  society  is exposed  to the risks  of relative
changes  in  mineral  production  and  profitability.
1.17  The third  cost,  related  to risk  bearing,  is the  cost  of portfolio
diversification.  A resource  rich  economy  is  by definition  relatively  poor
in other assets.  Governments  in this type of economy  must decide the
extent  to which  diversification  of the  economic  base should  be undertaken.
Portfolio  diversification  can be difficult  because  minerals  in the ground
are .ot fungible  (as the discovery  of a $1,000  in cash would be).  In
addition,  the  country  may  not  have  complete  access  to international  capital
markets which makes it difficult to diversify _he asset base without
physically extracting  and selling the resource. 16 This implies  that
diversification  may only occur  through  time  as the  asset  in the ground  is
extracted  and  sold  making  diversification  a costly  and  dynamic  process.
1.18  The final  cost which may be imposed  on the economy is the so-
called  "Dutch  Disease". 17 The causes  of this  phenomenon  are now fairly
well known.  The discovery of significant  enclave resource  deposits
increases  the  wealth  of the  economy  by the  present  value  of the  flow  of net
15/  There  is  still  some  residual  risk  if  mineral  prices  are  correlated  with
other  prices  in the  economy. However,  the  statement  above  relates  only
to the  risk  of direct  ownership.
16/  If capital  markets  were perfect,  costless  and  developing  economies  had
complete  access  to these  markets  then  the  country  could  sell  shares  in
the  mineral  discovery,  engage  in  various  hedging  strategies,  etc.  which
would diversify  the asset  base to accommodate  a particular  level of
risk.
17/  For an extensive discussion  of Dutch Disease  see Harberger  (1984).
Benjamin  and Devarajan (1885a,  b), Benjamin  et. al (1985)  and van
Wijnbergen  (1984).- 13 -
revenues. 18 If tradables  and non-tradables  are  normal  goods,  the increase
in wealth  will increase  the demand  for both types  of goods,  as well as
increase  the  opportunity  costs  of production  in the  traditional  sectors  of
the  economy.  If non-tradables  are  not in perfectly  elastic  supply  and/or
the  increase  in  wealth  increases  the  real  wage then  the  real  exchange  rate
will  rise  (i.e.,  the  price  of tradables  in terms  of  non-tradables). 19
1.19  An increase  in the real exchange  rate combined  with a change  in
comparative  advantage  created  by the mineral  discovery  and the capital-
intena 1ive  nature  of mineral  production  will force  the  economy  to  adjust  to
a new combination  of output  and a new wage-rental  ratio (assuming  capital
is in perfectly elastic supply  at the world rate of return).  This
adjustment  may make traditional  exports  non-competitive  at world prices
creating structural  unemployment  and capital losses  in the traditional
export  sector. 20
-.20  "Dutch Disease" may also work  in reverse as the mineral is
depleted. Eventually,  extraction  will  create  an  erosion  of the  comparative
advantage  in minerals  creating  the need for the economy  to adjust  once
again  to a  new  equilibrium.  Thus  "Dutch Disease"  and  portfolio
diversification  may  be interrelated  in the  sense  that  a change  in mineral
prices  may be negatively  correlated  with the  value  of traditional  exports
18/  Net revenues  will  be a function  of contract  arrangements.  Thus,  risk
sharing  will  necessarily  not  be a part  of the  process.
19/  Real effects are discussed exclusively in this section.  For a
discussion  of the  monetary  effects  of "Dutch  Disease"  see  Lewis  (1984).
20/  It is not necessary for the real exchange rate to rise for Dutch
Disease to occur.  The structural changes may be induced by the
properties underlying the Rybczynski Theorem  (1955).  A  natural
resource  discovery  may  shift  the  economy's  transformation  curve  in  such
a manner that the production of minerals will increase and the
production  of other  tradables  will  fall  given  world  prices.- 14 -
via  the real exchange rate.  Such a correlation  could be a desirable
portfolio  strategy  (i.e., it could  be a hedging strategy) if the
traditional  sectors  survive  the  transition  and  adjustment  costs  are  kept  to
a  minimum.
1.21  It should  be noted  that "Dutch  Disease",  is a problem  created  by
an increase  in the economy's  wealth.  It is impossible  to eliminate  the
problem. 21 However,  the  problem  can  be divided  into  two  components: (1),
who gets the  benefits  and  who bears  the  cost of mineral  development?;  and
(2)  what should  the  government  do  to prepare  the  economy  for  the  transition
=  MA fro  a relatively  mineral-intensive  economic  base?
1.22  The  distribution  issue  involves  consideration  of  who  benefits  from
the increased  price  of non-tradables,  the  distribution  of mineral  revenues
and who bears the cost of the transition.  Government  expenditure  and
revenue  policy could be designed  to compensate  for these adjustments. 22
Government  policy  will depend  on whether  the  mineral  find is perceived  to
be permanent  or transitory.  The need for stabilization  of traditional
exports, etc., will be more important if resources are planned to be
21/  Any comparative-static  or dynamic  change  in the  nature  of comparative
advantage  in  an economic  system  will  necessitate  adjustments.  The  only
way to avoid  these  costs  is to leave  the  resources  in the  ground. But
as long  as the  increase  in  wealth  is greater  than  the  adjustment  costs
it would not be  in the interest  of the economy to follow such a
strategy.
22/  Technically speaking, the creation of new wealth via  a mineral
discovery  is not a real  but a  pecuniary  externality. Abstracting  from
risk bearing,  efficiency  issues  are not a concern.  Furthermore,  if
those adversely affected by  Dutch Disease were all wealthy with
diversified  portfolios  then  there  would  bo little  justification  for  any
government action.  The  real issue is the cost borne by poor,
nondiversified  individuals  in the  traditional  sectors  whose  welfare  may
fall  if  no compensation  is  made.- 15  -
exhausted  in ten  years  rather  than  one-hundred  years. 23
1.23  For  any  single  country,  resource  endowments are generally
perceived  as temporary.  Thus,  it is  advisable  for  governments  to  make  both
short-term  and long-term adjustments.  Short-term  adjustments  include
assistance  to those  hurt by the change  in relative  prices.  Long term
policies  revolve  around  the  use  of mineral  revenues  so that the  transition
both to and from the new comparative  advantage is made as smooth as
possible.
1.24  An implication  of this  discussion  is that revenue  and  expenditure
policy  in the  natural  resource  area  might  be  more inrimately  linked  than  in
other  sectors. The timing  of revenue  flows  and the  method  used to accrue
revenue may affect the government's  flexibility,  the size of the total
benefits  (in  present  value  terms)  which  will  accrue  and the  nature  of risks
borne  by the  economy. Government  policy  should  be designed  to account  for
these  factors  by  using  as  many  tools  as  possible  and  thus
revenue/expenditure/savings  policies  should  be coordinated.
IV.  SUlKARY
1.25  The preceding discussion contains a number of  implications.
First,  the importance  of mineral  revenue  in total revenues  should  not  be
considered an indication of  "over taxation" in the mineral sector.
23/  This problem is similar to a professional  athlete who knows that
his/her  playing  days  are  numbered. If  his/her  wealth  from  athletics  is
high  than development  of alternative  types  of human  capital  may  not  be
necessary.  A  good  financial plan will ensure high steady-state
consumption. However,  a player  who is not paid a great  deal during
his/her  playing  days  must  be  concerned about  employment after
retirement  from  athletics. This  may require  human  capital  investments
in alternative  jobs skills,  etc.,  skills  which are not necessary  for
the  super  star.- 16 -
Government  receives  payment  of both taxes  and "royalties"  for the mineral
rights.  Thus it is expected  that "total  revenue"  (return  for mineral
interests  plus  taxes)  would  meet  or exceed  the  share  of revenue  from  other
sectors  in  which  the  government  does  not  have  an ownership  interest. Large
shares  of  mineral  revenue  to total.  government  revenue  may indicate  either  a
narrow  revenue  base from  other  sectors  or reduced  rates  of taxation  (and/or
enforcement)  on other  sectors. 24 The importance  of minerals  in GDP and
government  revenue  also indicates  that the economies  may be subject  to
variability  resulting  from changes  in market  conditions.  In particular,
Zambia, Zaire and Nigeria have experienced  recent difficulties  which
resulted  in part because  of their dependence  on minerals  for government
revenues.25
1.26  Second,  the structure  and level  of taxes  and  other  levies  on the
minerals sector in Sub-Saharan  Africa (with the possible  exception  of
Zambia)  are similar  to other  mineral  exporting  countries. 26 Both output
and income  related  levies  are used.  Profit  sharing  is also common  where
minerals are extracted under contract.  The computation  of income  for
either  tax or profit  sharing  purposes  is similar  to definitions  used in
most  countries  and  thus the tax systems are  subject to the usual
administrative  problems of transfer  pricing, thin capitalization,  etc.
24/  This phenomena  appears  often.  For instance,  there  was a significant
drop in tax effort  in Indonesia  after  the increase  in  world  petroleum
prices. (Conrad  1984).
25/  Expenditure policy may play an important role in diversification
efforts  and  buffering  shocks. This issue  will  be discussed  in Chapter
4.
26/  See Gillis (1978),  Gillis  and Beals (1980),  Conrad  (1980)  and Conrad
and  Cotxvery  (1981). The fact  that  the  taxation  of copper  in Zambia  is
high may be irrelevant  since  the industry  has paid little  or no taxes
in recent  years.  It is not  clear  whether  the  lack  of taxes  is caused
by the  high  rate  of taxation  or  other  factors.- 17 -
which  are  part of any  system  where  the  objective  is to  measure  the  base  on
an accrual  basis.  Output  levies  are based on value,  not volume (except
Liberia),  and this practice  requires  a determination  of output  prices  for
commodities  which  are  not  homogenous  in the  world  market.
1.27  Third,  even  though the  levy structures  are  comparable  to
international  standards,  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that improvements
are  not  necessary  with respect  to structure  or intent. In particular,  the
costs of mineral development do not appear to have been adequately
addressed. For instance,  the  inclusion  of all  mineral  levies  in government
revenues  makes the distinction  between  tax  and factor  payments  impossible
to identify. The role  of risk sharing  with respect  to both contracts  and
tax  policy  may  be equally  ambiguous. 27
1.28  At least three costs have been discussed for a mineral rich
economy: (1)  the  intertemporal  opportunity  cost  of extraction  (or  scarcity
value of the resource); (2) risk and portfolio  effects;  and (3) Dutch
Disease  (which  may  be related  to  point  2).  These  costs  do  not  require  just
"tax  policies",  but also sound  policy for government  as resource  owner.
Compensation  for these  costs  should  be part of efficient  resource  and/or
contract  policy.  Economic  costs  and  tax  policies  can  become  confused  when
the  mineral  owner  is also  the  tax  collector. However,  clear  identification
of objectives  and instruments  is essential  for  a thorough  understanding  of
the  development  of rational  alternatives.  For this  reason,  the  subsequent
chapters  will be divided  so that  a separation  of tax from  factor  payment
policy  will  be maintained.  Traditional  "tax  analysis"  will  be contained  in
27/  it is impossible to second guess the policymakers  in each country
responsible for developing  mineral policy.  However, actions and
policies such as nationalization,  windfall profits shares, etc.,
indicate  that risk sharing,  Dutch  Disease,  have not received  adequate
attention  in  policy  planning.- 18 -
Chapter  2.  Contract  policy  will  be discussed  in  Chapter  3.  Chapter  4 will
contain  an evaluation  of current  policies  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  based  on
the  discussions  contained  in the  previous  chapters. Alternative  strategies
are  also  discussed  in  Chapter  4.- 19  -
Chapter2:  MINERAL  TAXATION:  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES
I.  INTRODUCTION
2.1  Taxation,  as opposed  to factor  payments 1 ,  of the  minerals  sector
may create  incentives  on  all  margins: exploration,  development,  extraction
and domestic processing (see Section II).  This chapter contains a
description  of these  allocative  effects. Tax instruments  included  in the
discussion  are:  output  taxes (both  per unit or "specific",  and per unit
price  or "ad valorem")  which  have either  flat or variable  rates;  profits
taxes  (either  flat  or  variable  rate);  and  special  types  of so-called  "wind-
fall"  profits  taxes  or resource  rent  taxes.
2.2  Mineral tax analysis applied to most developing  countries is
complex  for a number  of reasons.  First,  the government  must play a dual
role  because  the  mineral  rights  are  often  held  by the  state. In this  role
government  is responsible  for reasonable  mineral  development  and ensuring
it (the  government)  receives  payment  for  an input  which  it  owns (i.e.,  the
mineral  in the  ground). Thus,  it  may  be difficult  to separate  the  role  of
resource owner from tax collector in practice.  Tax analysis  will be
examined  below  by  assuming  that  all  factor  payments  are  exogenous. 2 This
assumption  will facilitate  the  discussion  since  all additional  payments  to
the  government  are  clearly  defined  as  taxes  and  thus  allocative  effects  can
be examined.
1/  An analysis  of factor  payments  is  contained  in  Chapter  3.
2/  Alternatively,  it could  be assumed  that the  resource  producer  is also
the  resource  owner.20
2.3  Second, minfral development  is conducted primarily by either
multinational  enterprises  or  state-owned  enterprises,  particularly  in  early
stages  of development.  International  tax  issues  are  raised  by the  presence
of  foreign firms, whereas tax analysis of public sector enterprises
requires  an analysis  of the behavioral  and institutional  constraints  in
which  these  entities  operate. 3
2.4  The  analysis  will  proceed  as follows. Section  II  contains  a  brief
description  of the mineral  extraction  process.  Traditional  tax analysis
under conditions of perfect certainty is contained in Section III.
Uncertainty  is introduced  in  Section  IV.  Taxation  of foreign  investors  and
SOEs is found in Section  V.  Section  V also contains  a tax analysis  of
various  contract  terms.
II. THE  _INING PROCESS
2.5  The  mining  cycle 4 includes  the  following  four  general  components: 5
(1)  EuploratioJ: Exploration  is generally  composed  of two
parts.  Wide areas are  examined to determine the
presence  of  geological  anomalies  and  promising
formations in the initial stage.  The second  phase
involves intensive efforts in promising areas via
drilling  and sampling,  to determine  the extent  of the
mineralized  area  and  the  area's  particular
geophysical/geological  properties.
3/  Gillis  (1977)  and  Gillis  et. al (1980). The  discussion  of state  owned
enterprise  is  deferred  until  Chapter  4.
4/  The  description  provided  below  is  based  on Conrad  (1978a,  b, 1981a,  b,
1982,  1984),  Conrad  and  Convery  (1981)  and  Conrad  and  Hool (1980,  1981,
1984a,  b).
5/  A more  detailed  description  of this  process  is  contained  in  Appendix  2.21 -
(2)  Pro-Development  Plannlng  and Development: PrelLminary
financial  and engineering  analysis  is conducted  during
this phase.  Alternative  plant sizes and extraction
methods  are developed  given  the  geological  information
obtained  during  exploration.  These  studies  are  used to
determine the potential  profitability  of development
and extraction  under a variety  of circumstances. At
the  development  stage  financing  is obtained  and
construction  begins.
(3)  Extraction:  Once  extraction  begins the  firm is
constrained  by  all  prior  decisions.  Short-run
xtraction  decisions  are limited  to  currently  developed
areas.  Quantity  and quality  extracted  are determined
relative  to  fixed  capacity  and  the  design
characteristics  of the downstream  activities,  if any.
For instance,  concentrators  in metallic  minerals  are
designed to make "runs"  assuming  a constant  average
grade of ore  (within a  range) and adjustments to
changes in the ore quality  are timing  consuming  and
costly. 6
(4)  Processin2: Different  degrees  of processing  can take
place close to the ore or closer to final markets
depending  on transport  costs  and the type and size of
market  served.
2.6  These components lead firms to form a series of  sequential
problems. That  is,  exploration  decisions  are  made  whicb  impose  constraints
6/  See Conrad (1981),  and Gillis  and Beals (1982)  for a description  of
this  process.- 22 -
on development  and  development  decisions  impose  constraints  on extraction.
The cash flow  generated  from  extraction  (and  the  ability  to raise  outside
funds)  feed  back onto future  exploration  decisions  and impose  a constraint
on the  number  of  plays  which  the  firm  can take  in  any time  period. 7
2.7  Taxation can have different  effects  depending  on the stage in
which  the  firm is  operating. For  instance,  a severance  tax  which  rises  at
thb  rate  of interest  given  exogenous  recoverable  reserves  can  be neutral  if
the  ore  body is developed  and  the investment  made. 8 However,  if such  a tax
is imposed  during  exploration  the firm  may reduce  the  number  of promising
exploration  areas and/or reduce the investment for areas with proven
reserves. An understanding  of the  effects  of taxes  at different  stages  in
the mineral cycle is particularly important for countries which must
compete  in international  markets  for  both  capital  and  for sales  of output.
A  country can change the relative profitability of deposits in its
jurisdiction  by tax  policy. Such  policy  could  result  in a reallocation  of
development  and extraction  both within  and between countries.  For this
reason,  the analysis  summarized  below  will be based  on the assumption  of
price taking behavior.  This assumption  will allow a more re2i.stic
analysis  of the  effects  of taxes  on the  countries  under  study. 9
7/  It should  also be noted that  the structure  of information  flows  imply
that  all  decisions  are  interdependent.  The  firm receives new
information  about the structure  of reserves  during  extraction  (i.e.,
extraction  has an  exploration  component).  This  information  will affect
future  development  plans  within  the  same  deposit.
8/  See  below  for  further  discussion  of this  type  of tax.
9/  This statement  means that a country  may have a monopoly  on its own
resources but  it does not have a monopoly with respect to close
substitutes.  In such cases,  price taking  behavior  is a reasonable
assumption.  For analyais  of non-price  taking  behavior  see Peterson
(1976).- 23 -
III. TAX INCENTIVES  UNDER  PERFECT  CERTAINTY
2.8  The imposition  of a tax can  have at least three  effects:  (1)  a
tax can change the tima when particular  ore quality  and quantities  are
extracted  (e.g.,  high grade  ore could  be reallocated  in time);  (2)  a tax
can effect  the  time  profile  of extraction  (,iven  an ordering  of grades  and
total quantity to produce); and  (3) a  tax can  affect the level of
economically  recoverable  reserves. 10 The level  of reserves  in non-fuel
minerals  are determined  relative  to the "cut-off  grade'.  Cut-off  grades
are  a function  of  many geological  variables. 11 However  the  concept  can  be
reduced  to the  following  simple  form  for  present  purposes:
Mc
a  -
where  a  - cut-off  grade,  measured  as a  proportion  of metal  in  a
tone  of "ore"
MC - marginal  cost  of  extraction
P  - price  of output
2.9  Zero marginal  profit  with respect  to ore quality  is implied  by
this  expression. Qualities  above  the  cut-off  grade  accrue  profits  (given
marginal  cost),  while  ore qualities  below  this  value  would incur  marginal
losses  and thus will not be extracted. A tax that changes the cut-off
grade  will  change  the  level  of  recoverable  reserves  in  the  present  context. 12
10/  See  Appendix  2 for  a more  complete  analysis.
11/  See  Thomas  (1976).
12/  A tax  can affect  the level  of recoverable  reserves  in cases  where the
grade  is  uniform  but the  miner  must  dig  "deeper"  to  get  reserves;  i.e.,
if marginal  cost is an increasing  function  of the  depletion. This is
simi'ar  to the effect  described  for petroleum  [see  below].  In the
present  case  all  these  affects  can  be represented  via the  cut-off  grade
with  no loss  of generality.- 24
2.10  Hydrocarbon deposits are generally considered  homogenous and
therefore  grade  effects  may  not  be present. However,  a tax  may  affect  the
time profile of extraction  and the level of economically  recoverable
reserves  in a manner  similar  to that  for  non-fuel  minerals. Costs  are  an
increasing function of depletion in hydrocarbons since pressure is
inversely  related  to reserves;  i.e.,  an increase  in output  this  year  will
shift the marginal  cost curve in the future to the left.  A  tax that
affects  this  margin  will  affect  the  level  of  recoverable  reserves. This is
analogous  to the  cut-off  grade  described  above.
2.11  The incentives  created by each tax are described  below.  The
results  are  summarized  in  Table  2.1.
A.  Per  Unit  Outout  Tax
2.12  This tax  may be imposed  on either  extraction  of ore or metallic
content.  However the general  nature  of the incentives  are the same. 13
Also this tax may not be mine-specific  but might  be imposed  as an export
tax. 14 The clear  benefit  of this tax is administrative.  No measure  of
value or costs has to be computed  since the tax is related  only to the
volume  of production. If this  tax remains  constant  in either  nominal  (or
even  in  net-of-price  inflation)  terms  then  the  present  value  of the  tax  per
unit  will be lower  in the future. ThIat  is,  the  firm  will  pay a lower  tax
in present  value terms  by deferring  extraction. Thus, the  miner has an
incentive to reduce the present  value of taxes  by changing  either  the
quality  selection  profile,  the  extraction  profile  or both from  the  present
to the  future. That is,  the  miner  prefers  to  pay  a fixed  amount  of  nominal
13/  See  Conrad  and  Hool (1981)  for  a development  of the  difference  between
these  two  taxes.
14/  See  Conrad  (1984)  for  the  application  of this  tax  ir.  Jamaica.- 25  -
Zable  2.1  Suary  of  Allocative  Incentives  Created  by  Various  Mineral
Taxes
Tex  Grade  Selection  Recoverable  Extraction
Instruments  Profile  A/  Reserves  Profile
Taxas  Based  on  Outout
Per  Unit  of Final  Output:
Flat  Rate  Present  to  Future  Decreased  Present  to Future
Progressive:
Base  Rate:  kI/  Function  of  Dis-  Decreased  Function  of  Rate
counted  Price  Path  of  growth  of  Tax
and Rate  of  Growth
of  tax
Rate  of  Growth  Same  as Base  Rate  Decreased  Future  to Present
Taxes  Based  on  Value  of  Outouut
Ad Valorem:
Flat  Rate  None  Decreased  Function  of  Dis-
counted  Price  Path
Progressive:
Base Rate:  _  Function  of  Rates  of  Decreased  Function  of  Rate  of
Growth  of  Prices  and  Growth  of  Prices  and
Tax Rate  Tax  Rate
Rate  of  Growth  Same  as Base  Rate  Decreased  Generally  Future
to  Present
Taxes  Based  on  Income
Profits  Tax:
Flat  Rate  None  None  None
Flat  Rate  with  Cost  Future  Increased  Future  to Present
Depletion  Present
Flat  Rate  with Percent-  None  Increased  Function  of Dis-
age  Depletion  counted  Price  Path
Progressivo:
Base  Rate:  k/  Function  of Time  Path  Function  of Time  Function  of Time
of  Discounted  Prices  Path  of Nominal  Path  of Nominal
and  Profits  Profits  Profits
Rate  of  Progression  _/  Same as Base  Rate  Same  as Base  Rate  Same  as Base  Rate
a/  In hydrocarbons grade is not an  important  factor.  Thus,  e  column "Grade
Selection  Profile"  does  not apply  for  this  case.
_/  In cases  where  the effect  of the taxes  have the  same  general  effect  (e.g.,  the
base  rate  and  rate  of progression  of the  progressive  income  tax),  the  magnitudes
of the effects  will  be given. The table  above  should  therefore  be interpreted
with  respect  to  directions  of change  and  not  the  size  of the  allocative  effect.- 26 -
taxes  further  in the  future,  given  an exogenous  reserve  base,  and  this tax
reduction  is  accomplished  via a reallocation  of extraction  to  the  future.
2.13  Economically  recoverable  reserves  are also affected  by this tax
via an increase  in the cut-off  grade.  That is, this tax may induce  the
miner to "high-grade"  the deposit  since the tax reduces  the net of tax
revenue  each  period,  i.e.,:
a*  _MC
P - T
where: T  - the  per  unit  tax.
2.14  An increase in the cut-off grade can lead to premature mine
closure  depending  on the  quality  distribution  in the  deposit. Exploration
and  development  are  also  reduced  since  the  tax  reduces  the  present  value  of
all future  exploration  and development  leading  to an increase  in the  cost
of the  marginal  play  or marginal  development  well.
B.  Ad  Valorem  Output  Tax
2.15  This tax is a fixed  proportion  of the  mineral  output  price.  The
tax  may be on exports,  on industry-wide  production,  or on a mine-specific
basis,  like the  per unit tax.  The similarity  of this levy to ad valorem
sales  taxes  is  one  source  of its  popularity. The  administration  difficulty
with this  tax  is  determining  the "arms-length"  price  of output. Hany  mines
sell output to related  parties (both domestically  and internationally).
Thus, a quality  adjusted  arms-length  price for the output  of a specific
mine may not be available. Schemes  such as "net-back"  pricing  have been
developed  to  determine  the  f.o.b.  value  of the  material  in  such  situation. 15
15/  Net  back  pricing  is  a  method  of computing  the  mine-mouth  (or  well  head)
value  of output.  Generally,  the  net back is computed  by subtracting
transportation  and processing  from the first  arms-length  price.  The
residual  is defined  to be the f.o.b.  value  .of  output  at the  point  of
extraction.- 27 -
2.16  In the case where total  mineral  yield is exogenous,  the nominal
(or net-of-inflation)  tax payments  are a function  of the time path of
output  prices.  Thus,  the  miner  has an incentive  to reallocate  extraction
to periods  with lower discounted  prices  in order to reduce  the present
value  of the  tax  payments. For instance,  if  discounted  prices  fall  through
time, the  allocative  effect  is similar  to the  per unit tax (i.e.,  present
to future).  However,  there  is no incentive  for the  miner to change  the
intertemporal  ordering  of the grades,  since the tax is proportional  to
value.  rinally,  recoverable  reserves  are  reduced  since  the  cut-off  grade  is
increased:
- MC .a*  Mc
P  (l  -,)
where:  B  - tax  rate
C.  Profit  Tax
2.17  It is well known that pure rent taxes are neutral  in cases of
perfect  certainty. Under an income  tax regime,  it is immaterial  how the
rent  accrues. Rents  could  arise  via  market  power,  non-constant  returns  to
scale in the long-run,  or from the scarcity  value of the  resource. The
difficulty  with this tax is administration.  Profits  must be measured
relative  to empirical,  not theoretical,  standards  and  profits  which  accrue
to  particular  deposits  must  be "sourced"  in  the  country  or  even  to  specific
deposits.
2.18  The administrative problems of  the income tax are known. 1 6
Income  taxation  of mineral  production  generates  additional  administrative
16/  The problems  include  depreciation  rules,  and indexation. See Conrad
(1984)  for  a more  complete  discussion.- 28 -
difficulties. First,  accounting  for exploration  and development  must be
addressed.  The costs are "capital"  expenditures  since  the  benefits  from
each  activity  accrue  over  more  than  one  period  of time. The administrative
difficulty  arises in defining  the exact nature  of each expenditure  and
determining  the  amortization  period.
2.19  Exploration  expenditures  are  relatively  easy  to  define  if  the  mine
has not  been developed. However,  once the mine is developed  exploration
generally continues.  The determination  of exploration  costs in this
context  may be arbitrary.  There  are also alternative  accounting  methods
for pre-production  exploration  costs including  immediate  expensing,  or
capitalization  with amortization  for  successful  exploration  and  subsequent
expensing  for  unsuccessful  exploration. The appropriate  method  should  be
determined  relative  to the  overall  objectives  of tax  policy. For  instance,
if cash-flow  accounting  is used then immediate  expensing  is appropriate.
If accrual  concepts  are employed  then one type of capitalization  method
should  be used.
2.20  Development  expenditures  are  part  of the  general  classification  of
self-constructed  assets.  A significant  proportion  of these  expenditures
include  "intangible  costs",  including  costs  for  shaft  construction,  wells,
access roads, etc.  Either immediate  expensing  or capitalization  (with
amortization  over  some  specified  period)  may  be used for  income  accounting.
The appropriate  method  to employ  will depend  on the  overall  objectives  of
the policy, like the methods for exploration  costs; i.e., immediate
expensing (capitalization) is appropriate under cash-flow (accrual)
methods.
2.21  Immediate expensing of exploration  and development  expenses  is
generally allowed in Sub-Saharan  Africa and the rest of the world. 17
17/  See  Chapter  1 and  Appendix  3.- 29 -
Other assets are not afforded the same treatment.  Thus, there is
inconsistent  treatment of different asset classifications  resulting  in
lower  effective  tax rates  of exploration  and development. Such treatment
may  decrease  the  overall  effective  tax  rate  on  mineral  investments  relative
to other economic  sectors.  Administrative  difficulties  and/or explicit
policy intended  to favor  mineral  development  may be responsible  for such
non-neutral  treatment. Regardless  of the  motivation,  such  policies  create
potential welfare costs resulting from intersectoral  reallocations  of
capital. That is,  capital  may flow  from  other  sectors  to mining  lowering
the value of the marginal  product  of capital  in mining  below its social
value.
2.22  A second mining-specific  income tax administration  difficulty
relates  to "so-called"  depletion  allowances. A resource,  like a machine,
loses value with use and  it is appropriate  to recognize  this type of
economic  "depreciation"  under  accrual  accounting  concepts. 18 While  sound
in principle  two issues  arise.  First,  there is the issue  of "who" is
entitled  to this  depreciation.  With  respect  to a  machine  the  answer  is the
"owner",  not the renter  since  the depreciation  reflects  the reduction  in
the value of the machine  to the owner.  However,  western  economies  (and
some developing  economies  (e.g.,  Zaire))  allow  the  owner of the "physical
capital"  and  the  lessee  the  allowance. 19
2.23  Part of the difficulty  is attributed  to the concept  of "economic
interest"  and is related to exploration  and development  expenses.  Two
18/  For  present  purposes  depreciation  is  measured  as the reduction  in the
present  value  of the  deposit  via  extraction.
19/  It is not  clear  whether  the  incidence  of this  allowance  is independent
of who legally  gets the  allowance. However,  from  a legal  perspective
some countries allow depletion when producers have an "economic
interest"  in the producing  property  even though  they do not own the
reserves.- 30 -
generic types of capital are required to extract minerals:  physical
capital  and the resource  in the  ground.  If the  owner  of these  assets  are
separate  persons  then  each  person  should  compute  their  respective  basis  (or
economic  interest)  in the property. The resource  owner's  basis  would  be
the  value  of the  land  and  mineral  rights. The  lessee's  basis  would  include
exploration,  development,  other  intangibles  and  any  prepaid  rental  payments
(e.g.,  bonuses). 20 Each  parcy  could  then  amortize  their  respective  basis
through  time  once  the  basis  are  computed.
2.24  Practical and/or political problems may make  this separate
determination  difficult. First,  the  common  use of immediate  expensing  for
exploration  and development  significantly  reduces the lessee's  basis.
Second,  determining  the value  of the  owner's  interest may be  difficult
because  market  values  far  minerals  in  place  are  not  available.
Furthermore,  the use of historical  cost accounting  will underestimate  the
true  value  of the  mineral  rights  since  the exchange  price  was based  on an
uncertain  capital  gain  from  discovery. 21 Third,  the  amount  to amortize  in
any  period  and  the length  of time  over  which  the  basis  should  be amortized
is  uncertain. 22
20/  Royalties paid on production are economically  equivalent to wage
payments  and  should  be deducted.
21/  An additional  difficulty  is created  when the lessee (an exploration
company  for example)  either  leases  or sells its interest  to another
person  k.e.g.,  a production  company). Three  separate  interests  must  be
computed in this case.  It should be noted that none of these
difficulties  would be present  under cash flow accounting  since all
expenditures  would  be  immediately  expensed  making  depletion
unnecessary.
22/  None of these  problems  are unique  to minerals.  Machines  can change
value  through  time  creating  capital  gains  and  loses.  In  addition,  the
economic  life of a machine is not known with certainty.  Thus, the
problems discussed above are  inherent in any accrual accounting
framework.- 31 -
2.25  Cost depletion is one solution to the third difficulty.  An
estimate of recoverable  reserves is made and each party's interest  is
amortized  in proportion  to extraction  relative  to reserves;  e.g., if 10
percent  of remaining  reserves  are extracted  in the  current  period  then  10
percent  of the remaining  basis is deducted. 23 Adjustments  to the  basis
can be made via open ended accounting  where additional  exploration  and
development  expenses  for the  operator  are added  to the  basis  as incurred.
Reserve  estimates  can  be periodically  revised  to accommodate  changes  in the
size  of recoverable  reserves  relative  to extraction. 24
2.26  A second solution is to determine the basis relative to the
proportion  of total revenues attributable  to each party and to employ
percentage  depletion. For instance,  if the  resource  owner  were paid  a 12
percent  royalty  and no bonus payments  were  made then  the resource  owner's
economic interest  would be 12 percent and the producer's  88 percent. 25
Whether these proportions  reflect economic reality and the incentives
created  by this attribution  rule depend  on the facts and circumstances.
Thus,  the  effects  on investment  car.no  be predicted. The  use  of percentage
depletion also creates allocative  incentives  which are equivalent  to a
negative  ad  valorem  output  tax.  The  deduction  is computed  by
23/  This  procedure  is  equivalent  to the  unit  of production  deprecietion  for
machines.
24/  Allocative  incentives  may remain.  If there  were perfect information
then the values for cost depletion would be exogenous from the
perspective of owners and operators with no allocative effects.
Without  perfect information  the present  value of the deductions  for
cost depletion  become an enidogenous  variable  with incentives  like a
negative  per  unit  output  tax.
25/  If constant  returns  and perfect  competition  prevailed  then 12 percent
would be the correct  figure  for the resource  owner,  since  12 percent
would be equal to mineral's  share in value added.  This would also
imply  0 percent for the  producer  since  the  producer  does not own the
resource  in the  ground.- 32  -
multiplication  of the  rate  times  the  person's  share  of total  revenue. Thus
the higher the discounted  price the greater  the deduction  given output.
Finally, the present value of the total deductions  under percentage
depletion  can  be greater  than or less  than the  person's  economic  interest
in the  property. This fact  can reduce  or raise  the  effective  tax  rate  on
mineral  investments  relative  to  other  sectors.
2.27  The discussion  has three kinds of implications  for Sub-Saharan
African  (and other)  resource  rich economies.  First,  the  neutrality  of a
pure  profits  tax  is  maintained  only in  a  partial  equilibrium  framework. If
the effective  tax  rate on  mineral  investments  is  higher  (lower)  than  other
sectors  then capital  may flow between  sectors  generating  a welfare  cost
even when there are no allocative  effects within the industry.  The
effective  tax  rate may also affect  the  inter-jurisdictional  allocation  of
resources. 26 For instance,  a country  (being  a  price  taker)  could  design  a
pure rent tax to collect  50 percent  of the  rents  and  a foreign  firm  would
prefer  to invest  in  another  country  %here  the  tax  on pure  rent  is less  than
50  percent.
2.28  Second,  the tax treatment  of exploration,  davelopment  and other
intangible expenses is related to overall business tax policy.  If a
country adopts cash flow accounting for all  sectors then immediate
expensing is appropriate.  Also no depletion  allowance  of any type is
needed.  If accrual  accounting  is the  established  norm for  tax  policy  then
all  pre-production  expenses  should  be capitalized  and  amortized  during  the
life  of the  project.
26/  This statement may be qualified because of international  tax and
foreign  tax credit  considerations  which affect  the  effective  tax rate
for  many  multinational  investments.- 33 -
2.29  Third,  the operator's  basis for depletion  should  be limited  to
bonus  payments,  exploration,  development  and other  expenses. This is true
because the government holds  title to the resources.  That is, the
government  itself  should  account  for depletion  of the resource  base, not
the  producer. 27 Cost  depletion  could  be employed. Alternatively  a  method
could  be implemented  where the deduction  is independent  of production  to
remove the allocative  incentive  created  by cost depletion.  There is a
trade-off  in  developing  an alternative  to  cost  depletion,  however. If this
method  is not determined  correctly  then  the effective  tax  rate on mineral
investments  could  be higher  (or lower)  than  anticipated  creating
intersectoral  incentives. Thus, the policymaker  must weigh the relative
incentives  created  by cost  depletion  to some  alternative  method.
D.  Progressive  Taxes
2.30  Three types of progressive  (or  variable  rate) taxes  have been
employed  in  recent years,  i.e., per  unit, ad valorem and  profit.
Justifications for the use of these instruments  include a desire to
preserve  net  of inflation  tax  revenue  and/or  to capture  "windfall"  returns. 28
Design  of each tax requires  the choice  of at least  three  variables: the
base tax (or rate), the rate of growth through time (or the rate of
progression  in any time period)  and an economic  variable  which  determines
the rate.  Rates of growth  can be a function  of output  prices (or  some
substitute),  present value, current profits or the rate of return on
investment.  A number  of allocative  incentives  may  be created,  depending  on
the  nature  of the  specific  tax.
27/  A method for computing depletion  and the use of these  revenues  is
discussed  in  Chapter  4.
28/  Such  taxes  have  been imposed  in the  United  States,  Indonesia,  Jamaica,
Papa  New  Guinea  and  Canada.- 34 -
2.31  Variable  output related taxes tend to reduce the level of
recoverable  reserves  (i.e.,  increase  the  cut-off  grade). There  is also  an
incentive to reallocate extraction between periods depending on the
relationship  between  the  marginal  tax  rate  with  nominal  prices  and  the  time
path of discounted prices.  Variables rate income taxes will have no
marginal  effects  on either  the  intertemporal  gride  selection  profile  or the
cut-off  grade  (given  investment).  However,  other  intertemporal  allocative
incentives  are present.  The marginal  tax rate is an endogenous  variable
under  a progressive income tax.  Thus the firm hab an incentive to
reallocate  extraction  from  periods  with high  marginal  tax  rates  to  periods
with lower  marginal  rates.  The firm can smooth  the time  path of nominal
taxable profit, avoid being in high marginal  brackets and reduce the
present  value  of tax  payments  by following  such  a strategy.
IV.  TAXATION  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY
2.32  Uncertainty  can alter the results  of the previous  section.  The
nature  of the incentives  created  by taxation  will depend  on the miner's
preferences  toward  risk taking.  If the miner is risk neutral then the
results  in the  last  section  are  applicable. 29 If the  miner  is risk  averse
then the tax incentives  could  be different. Below two  simple  models  are
summarized  which  show  the  nature  of the  effects.
29/  This section  is  based  on Conrad  (1987b). The  analytical  basis  for  the
discussion  which follows  can  be found  in Appendix  4.  It is commonly
assumed  that  corporate  managers  should  be risk  neutral. The empirical
validity  of this  assumption  will not be discussed  here.  Rather,  the
analysis  is  presented  so that  comprehensive  results  are  available.- 35 -
A.  Cut-off  Grades
2.33  Economically  recoverable  reserves  are important  components  of the
size  of investment  made  by the  miner.  Cut-off  grades  (and  thus  estimated
recoverable  reserves)  must  be adjusted  for  uncertainty  in  prices  and  costs.
A risk  averse  miner  will compute  cut-off  grades  which  are  higher  than  those
which would be computed  using the mean values of prices and costs. 30
Recoverable  reserve  estimates  and  thus  investment  will  be smaller  than  they
would  be if  mean values  were employed. The introduction  of a tax in this
environment  could  offset  or complement  the  effects  of uncertainty  depending
on  how the  tax  affects  the  mean  present  value  and  the  risk  perceived  by the
miner. Table  2.2  contains  the  sign  of the  incentive  created  by three  taxes
(ad rem, ad valorem,  and profit) 31 in an uncertain  environment  with two
assumptions  regarding  the miner's risk preferences:  constant and
decreasing  absolute  risk aversion. 32 Note an increase  in the cut-off
grade and thus a fall in exp'ected  extraction  is indicated  by a positive
sign.
2.34  Both ad rem and ad valorem output taxes increase  the cut-off
grades  in a manner  similar  to the  miner's  behavior  whan all  variables  are
known, regardless  of the type of risk aversion.  Both taxes decrease
30/  This  result  is  based  on the  concavity  of the  expected  utility  function.
31/  Variable  rate  taxes  have  the  same  general  incentives  as their  flat-rate
counterparts  discussed above.  These taxes are not discussed  here
because of  the similarities,  Profits taxes with no loss  offset
provision  will generally,  but not always,  follow  the same  pattern  as
profits taxes with perfect loss offsets.  See Conrad (1987b) for
further  discussions.
32/  Absolute  risk aversion  is defined  as (U"  /U'), i.e. the ratio  of the
second derivative to the first derivative  of the expected  utility
function  with respect  to wealth.  Constant  (decreasing)  absolute  risk
aversion  implies  that the  difference  between  actuarially  fair  odds  and
the odds which the miner would be willing to accept a gamble is
independent  (a  decreasing  function)  of  wealth.- 36 -
expected  revenue  while  not  affecting  costs. Thus,  other  things  equal,  the
risk averse  miner will plan to extract  a lower quantity.  Some "risk-
sharing"  is  present  under  an ad valorem  tax  wnich is  not  present  under  the
ad rem  tax.  However,  down-side  risks  are  increased  under  both taxes  since
costs  are  not  considered.
2.35  A pure income  tax  will  also  increase  the  cut-off  grade,  regardless
of the  type  of risk  aversion. This  result  is  in  contrast  to the  absence  of
allocative effects under perfect certainty.  There is complete  "risk-
sharing"  under the income tax since loss-offsets  are assumed and all
components  of profit  compose  the tax base.  However,  expected  wealth is
also reduced  by reducing  after tax profits  when they are positive. The
reduction  in  expected  wealth  accounts  for  the  fall  in  planned  extraction.
Table  2.2: Effects  of  Taxes  on Cut-Off  Grade  Under  Uncertainty
Constant  Absolute  Decreasing  Absolute
Tax  a/  Risk  Aversion  Risk  Aversion
Ad Rem  +  +
Ad Valorem  +  +
Profits  +  +
Al  A positive  sign indicates  an increase  in the  cut-off  grade  and thus  a
decreas in  recovery.
B.  Intertemporal  Allocative  Incentives
2.36  Intertemporal  incentives  are  found  in Table  2.3.  The effect  of a
tax  on first  period  extracti. is the  most important  incentive  for  present
purposes. What is  planned  for  extraction  in the  early  periods  will  not  be
available  in  later  periods. 33 The  effect  on first  period  extraction  will
33/  The results  apply to planned  extraction. Actual  extraction  in later
periods  will be different  than  planned  because  uncertainty  is resolved
through  time.- 37 -
be influenced  by the producer's  perception  of the scarcity  value of the
resource. If all the resource  Is planned  to  be extracted  then  there  will
exist  an intertemporal  trade-off. This  trade-off  is  absent  when less  than
total  reserves  are planned  for  extraction. Results  are thus reported  for
both cases.  Finally,  two  different  assumpti.ons  regarding  uncertainty  are
used:  (1)  all of next  period  prices  (including  interest  rates)  are  known
while all prices in the more distant future  are unknown;  and (2) all
economic  variables  are  unknown.
TabLe  2.3.  Effects  of  Taxes  on First  Period  Extraction
Under  Uncertainty
Constant  Absolute  Decreasing  Absolute
Tax  Risk  Aversion  Risk  Aversion




B.  Resource  Constraint  Expected  to  be Binding:
First  Period  Prices  Known
Ad Rem
Ad Valorem  ?  ?
Profits  +  +
C.  Resource  Constraint  Expected  to  Be Binding:
First  Period  Prices  Unknown
Ad Rem  ?  ?
Ad Valorem  ?  ?
Profits  ?  ?
2.37  All  three  taxes  induce  the  producer  to reduce  extraction  when the
resource  constraint  is not  perceived  to  be binding,  regardless  of the  type
of absolute risk aversion.  These results  correspond  to the incentives
created  to change the cut-off  grade.  That is,  -each tax  will induce  the- 38 -
miner to reduce  planned  extraction. The results  are different  when the
resource  constraint  is binding.  If first  period  prices  are known then  a
per unit tax  will reduce  extraction  in early  periods  if constant  absolute
risk  aversion  prevails  and  the  income  tax  will increase  extraction  in  early
periods  regardless  of the  type  of risk  aversion. The  remaining  results  are
ambiguous.
2.38  Per  unit taxes  create  an incentive  to defer  extract!c.i.  However
uncertainty  about  future  prices  and  costs  will tend  to increase  extraction
in  early  periods  if  there  is  certainty  in  the  early  periods. The  effect  of
uncertainty  in future  periods  is mitigated  when absolute  risk aversion  is
constant. This incentive  is not mitigated  when absolute  risk aversion  is
decreasing.
2.39  The  ad valorem tax will induce the producer to reallocate
extraction  to the  period  with the  highest  discounted  price  when certainty
prevails. This incentive  is still  present  if future  prices  are  uncertain.
However,  the  condition  must now  be modified  to state  that  the  direction  of
change  depends  on the  difference  in risk  adjusted  prices. Thus, if known
prices  in early  periods  are lower  than the  risk  adjusted  present  value  of
future prices, extraction  will rise in early periods.  The result is
ambiguous  if risk adjusted  discounted  future  prices  are lower  than known
present  prices.
2.40  The income  tax results  imply  that the  risk averse  producer  will
trade  certainty  for uncertainty  when this  tax is increased. That is, the
firm  would prefer  to increase  extraction  in early  periods  and pay higher
taxes  than  to defer  extraction  to the  future  even  with the  presence  of risk
sharing  in the  income  tax.
2.41  Allocative  incentives  are  ambiguous  when  uncertainty  regarding  the
time path of all prices  and costs  is introo'uced.  The general  tendencies- 39 -
remain.  That is, per unit taxes tend to decrease  extraction  early,  ad
valorem  taxes will create incentives relative to the  time path of
discounted  risk adjusted  prices,  and the income  tax  will generate  wealth
effects.  These incentives  are offset  by the additional  uncertainty  of
early  period  prices  and  costs. The  producer  trades  an uncertain  near term
for  an uncertain  future. How this  trade-off  is resolved  will  depend  on the
structure of uncertainty in each period and  the preferences  of the
producer.
2.42  The results  presented  above indicate  that government  tax policy
can  affect  the  risks  perceived  by the  producer  in  addition  to  affecting  the
expected  value  of extraction.  The  perceived  risks  can  complement  or offset
the incentives  created  by the tax on the expected  values.  Tax policy
development  must incorporate  both incentives  in order to have the  desired
effects.
V.  TAX LIKE  INSTRUMENTS  VIA GOVERNMENT  POLICY  AND/OR
CONTRACT  DESIGN
2.43  A  number  of instruments  used by government  can create  incentives
similar  to  those  of  taxes.  These  instruments  are  used as a matter of
fiscal  pnlicy  or  contract  design. Some  of these  are  discussed  below.34
A.  Foreign  Exchange  Controls
2.44  Foreign  exchange  controls  can  be one  of two  general  forms: direct
allocation or multiple tiers.  Foreign exchange controls can create
significant  incentives  in  mining,  since  mining  is  relatively
capital-intensive  and  depends  on imported  materials. Direct  allocation  can
increase the price of imported inputs (in extreme cases to infinity)
34/  Also see  the  analysis  in  Chapter  3.- 40 -
retarding  development  and  extraction.  The  opposite  incentive  is  created  in
cases  where the  mining  firm  must surrender  foreign  exchange  at less than
the market  rate.  If the surrender  rate is lower  than the official  rate
then the relative  price  of imports  to domestic  goods is decreased. This
occurs  because  most  revenue  accrues  to mining  firms  in the  form  of foreign
exchange  (via  exports). If the firm receives  less domestic  currency  for
each unit of foreign  exchange  relative  to the free market  rate an import
bias is  created. 35 There  is a clear  incentive  for  the  firm  to substitute
imported  capital  for  domestic  labor.
B.  Eauitv  Participation
2.45  Government may require either free equity or the option to
purchase equity at lower than market prices  from the investor.  These
schemes are in effect profits taxes; e.g., 30 percent free equity is
equivalent  to a 30 percent  net-of-all-other-tax  reduction  in the  return  to
the  firm. Tax-like  effects  may  not  be present  when  equity  is  purchased  for
a value  close  to the  asset's  value  but there  is a clear  shift  in the  risk
structure. 36 In extreme  cases  national  ownership  becomes  complete  (e.g.,
Zambia), the investor  becomes an operating firm whose payment may be
independent  of profits. This increases  the country's  exposure  to changes
in relative profitability  in mining.  Two points should  be noted here
First,  many  major  multinational  firms maybe more diversified than
developing  countries.  A  "resource  rich" country  is relatively  poor in
renewable  capital.  Multinational  firms are not limited  to one resource
base or even to one field  of endeavor  and the firm  may have less costly
35/  This type  of substitution  occurred  in  Jamaica. See  Conrad  (1984).
36/  See  Chapter  3 for  further  discussion.- 41  -
access  to  world  capital  markets. Thus the  cost  of "risk  bearing"  for  these
firms  may  be lower  than the  country. Second,  there  is an opportunity  cost
to the  purchase  of equity  in  mineral  investments  over  and  above  the  capital
held  as resources  in  the  ground. These  investments  are  made  at the  expense
of diversification  either  through  other internal  investments  or in the
world  capital  market. In effect,  the  government  is taking  a long  position
in one market which limits its flexibility  to respond  to declines (or
increases) in mineral prices and/or profits.  For  these reasons a
government  must  weigh  the  costs  of requiring  equity  participation  relative
to any  perceived  benefits. 37
C.  Speeding  Recovery
2.46  Governments  have historically  been eager  to bring  the  benefits  of
the mineral development  forward  in time when minerals  are discovered. 38
For instance, Liberia imposed  penalties  equal to 'estimated  taxes"  for
delays  in  development  and  extraction. Two counteracting  forceb  need to  be
examined  in  order  to  evaluate  the  net  effect  of such  strategies.  First,  it
might  be in the  interest  of the  producer  to leave  reserves  undeveloped  for
periods  longer  than  socially  optimal. Such  behavior  may  occur  when  mineral
markets  are  controlled  by producers  concerned  with the strategic  value  of
reserves.  In this case, a government  could induce  the firm to begin
extraction  earlier  than it  would  have  with little  or no social  cost. This
benefit may be offset  by the potential  cost of losing  investment,  lower
investment  or premature  development. The discovery  of minerals  does not
necessarily imply that rapid development is socially optimal.  The
37/  See  Chapters  3  a,  4 for  further  discussion.
38/  See Smith  and  Wells  (1974)  for  a complete  development  of this  issued.- 42 -
contribution  of mineral  production  to social  benefits  is related  to the
time path of relative  prices  and costs.  Assets  in the ground  are still
assets  with potential  value.  Thus,  government  must weigh  the  benefits  of
rapid  development  relative  to loses  in future  revenues  and  relative  to the
overall  development  portfolio  of the  economy  as a  whole.
D.  Allocations  for  Domestic  Use
2.47  Contracts  often  contain  provisions  which  require  the investor  to
provide  a certain  quantity  or proportion  of output  for  domestic  use.  This
requirement  could  be equivalent  to an ad valorem  output  tax  when domestic
prices  are controlled  at levels  below  world  prices  or where the investor
must "yield"  the required  quantity  for  domestic  use independent  of market
prices (e.g.,  by being reimbursed  merely the cost of production). The
difference  between  the  market  value  of the  mineral  and the  value  paid for
domestic  use is equal  to an output  tax  on production  which the  government
does  not collect. Additional  uncertainty  for  the firm is also created  if
domestic  prices  are  controlled.  A low  domestic  price  relative  to  the  world
price may artificially  increase  the rate of growth  of local demand  for
output  through  time (assuming  the commodity  is a normal  good  and real  per
capita  income  rises). Thus,  the  investor  will  be concerned  about  pressure
from the government to increased the share of output devoted to the
domestic  market  through  time.
E.  Downstream  Investments
2.48  Government may  require the producer to invest in downstream
activities  related  to the  mineral  extracted  (e.g.,  refining  and  marketing)
or even in other  industries. This requirement  is similar  to an entry  fee
combined  with a marginal  tax.  The entry  fee (the  additional  investment)
may reduce  the total  return  to the  project  if  downstream  activities  do  not
meet the  firm's  investment  criteria. The  marginal  tax  will  be equal  to thecost differential,  if any, from domestic  production  of downstream  goods
relative  to  another  location.
2.49  If an  investor comuplies  with these provisions there will be
portfolio effects for the country similar  to those described  for free
equity. Such effects  may include  lower  diversification  for  the  country  as
a whole.  The long position  in minerals  is increased  by attempting  to
capture the additional value added at world  prices from downstream
processing.
F.  Foreign  Taxes
2.50  The interaction  of domestic  and foreign  taxes  is important  when
investments  are  made  by non-resident  firms  or  domestic  subsidiaries  of  non-
resident  firms.  The foreign  tax credit  system  is one important  component
of this interaction. A  foreign  firm is generally  allowed  a credit  for
taxes  paid  to the  host  government  if the  taxes  are income  taxes  or  payments
"in lieu of"  income taxes.  A credit is not allowed for royalties,
production  shares,  and all commodity  specific  taxes.  Such payments  are,
however,  generally  allowed  as a deduction  in the,  home country  since  they
are  defined  as  a cost  of doing  business  in  the  host  country. The  credit  is
further  limited  by the  amount  of taxes  due the  home country  on the  firm's
foreign  source  income. 39
2.51  "Net profits interest" and/or production sharing have become
significant  components  of government  revenues  in countries  where mineral
rights are held by the state (particularly  in petroleum).  It is thus
difficult  to determine  what proportion  of government  payments  are income
39/  Two methods are used to compute  the credit limitation. A separate
limitation  is computed  by country  under the per country  limitation.
Foreign  taxes  are  pooled  and  a single  limitation  is computed  under  the
overall limitation.  In addition, there are provisions  for carry-
forward  (back)  of  excess  credits.- 44  -
taxes (i.e., taxes for which there is no "tangible  benefit received")
relative  to payments  for the right to extract the resource.  The
distinction  is important  since  tax  credits  are  allowed  only for  the  income
tax component  of host government  revenue. Developing  countries  generally
impose  a minimum  of two types  of payments  in an effort  to distinguish  the
income tax from the resource  payment. 40 The first,  a royalty,  is a
payment  for  the right  to extract  the  reserves  and legally  it is a payment
to the owner of the resource.  The second payment, an income  tax or
payments  in lieu of income  tax, is defined  to be a tax on the return  to
invested  capital  for  which  the  foreign  tax  credit  is available.
2.52  In general, there is a desire for foreign firms to have all
payments  made to the host government  available  for foreign  tax credits.
There  is some  justification  for  host countries  to accommodate  this  desire.
A firm  with a deficit  of foreign  tax  credits  can increase  its  payments  to
the  host  country  with  no allocative  effects  since  the  payment  is  a transfer
from the home country's  treasury  to the host country.  Such a strategy
might  require  lower  royalties  and  higher  income  taxes. The  extent  to  which
a host country can accommodate  such a change  must be tempered  by two
factors. First,  the  host  country  must  be able  to separate  the  value  of the
resource  from  taxes  in order  to efficiently  allocate  the resource. 41 If
such accounting can be handled then accommodating  the desires of the
foreign investor is less difficult.  Second, a change in the payment
structure  can change  the nature  of risks  borne  by the host country.  For
instance,  a decrease  in an ad valorem  royalty  with a compensating  increase
in income taxes will increase  the variability  of revenues  to the host
40/  See  Appendix  3.
41/  See  Chapters  3  and  4, and  Conrad  (1987a).- 45 -
country  regardless  of foreign  tax credit  effects.  Accommodation  is not
costless  to the  host country  and thus  host governments  should  be prepared
to explicitly  trade-off  various  cost and benefits  in developing  policies
for  foreign  investors.
VI.  ENEs
2.53  Tax and tax-like  instruments  can create incentives  which affect
recovery,  investment  and  the  intertemporal  allocation  of the  resource  base.
The nature  of these  incentives  may  vary when uncertainty  is present. Tax
policymakers  should  be aware  of these  incentives  when policy  is  made.  It
should be emphasized that the discussion to this point has assumed  a
separation  of tax policy from factor  payment policy.  Any efficiency
implications  (or  welfare  costs)  described  in  this  chapter  are  relevant  only
for instruments  unrelated  to ownership  of the resource.  Factor  payment
policy  will be discussed  in the next chapter.  Coordination  of tax and
factor  payment  policy  will  be deferred  until  the  concluding  chapter.-46-
Chapter  3:  OWNERSHIP  PAYMENTS  AND  CONTRACTS
I.  INTRODUCTIp'
3.1  The last chapter  was devoted  to a discussion  of the incentive
effects  of taxes.  This chapter  contains  one method  of determining  the
proper role of fiscal  policy  when the government  must simultaneously
determine  tax  policy  and  resource  investment  policy. 1 Such  a discussion
would  not  be  necessary  if mineral  rights were  held  privately.
Government,  having  no  ownership  claim  to the  resource,  would  impose  taxes
on  both  mineral  owners  and  producers. The  incidence  of these  taxes  would
be determined  via  market  transactions.  Standard  tax  analysis  is  all  that
would  be required  in  such  a context.
3.2  The countries under study have, however,  chosen to vest the
mineral  rights  in the  state. This implies  that  government  must  wear two
hats:  resource  owner  and  tax  collector. Government  must  be responsible
for  the  development  of the  natural  resource  base in  order  to  maximize  the
economic benefits to the economy.  This role requires  government  to
develop  factor  payment  policies  for the  mineral sector  consistent  with
welfare  maximization.  That  is,  government  must  determine  the  opoortunity
cost  of mineral  extraction  and ensure  that it receives  the  value  of the
marginal product of its factor input.  As tax collector,  government
imposes  taxes on all sectors  of the economy  including  natural  resource
projects.  Revenue  objectives,  distributional considerations and
efficiency  costs  are  factors  which  influence  the  tax  structure.
3.3  Government's  dual  role  may create  confusion  about  fiscal  policy
in the  mineral  sector  because  two  different  types  of  payments  may  be made
1/  This  analysis  will provide the basis  for the recommendations
contained  in  Chapter  4.-47-
to the  same  entity. 2 This  confusion  is  enhanced  when government  zeports
all mineral revenues as government revenues attributed to general
accounts. Government,  however,  must  be able to "separately  account"  for
the components  of mineral  revenues  (at least  at the margin) to ensure
that society receives a competitive  return  on its resources  and the
appropriate  share  of taxes.
3.4  The analysis which follows is based on the assumption  that
"separate  accounting"  for resource  factor  payments  is necessary  for the
orderly  development  of natural  resource  policy.  Two justifications  are
offered for this premise.  First, government as factor owner must
de-ermine  whether  the  payments  received  from  extraction  are  sufficient  to
cover the  the  permanent  loss  of an asset,  to cover  the  opportunity  cost
of lower  output  in other  sectors  (e.g.  Dutch  Disease),  and to cover  the
cost  of risk  bearing,  if  any is  present. That  is,  government  must  ensure
that  it receives  a competitive  return  on its  natural  resource  endowment
adjusted for risk.  Second, government as tax collector should be
concerned  about the  allocative  effects  of its  overall  tax  policy.  This
impl'es  that  other  things  equal  the  mineral  sector  is  not  over-  or under-
taxed  relative  to other  sectors  of the economy,  after  the oavments  for
the resource  endowment  are  made.  That is,  government  needs  to  determine
the  intersectoral  effects  of  its  tax policy  after  (or at least
simultaneously with) the determination  of a  factor payment policy.
Efficiency  cost  measures  and the  relative  incentives  of taxes  on capital
in the mineral sector  can be computed  only after the deduction  of all
other  factor  inputs.
2/  Such  confusion  is  not  present  when  mineral  rights  are  held  by private
individuals  and  government  collects  taxes.-48-
3.5  Terms  *such  as "rent"  and "natural  resource  rent"  have common
connotations  which are often  confusing.  For this reason  the following
definitions  will  be employed  ir.  the  analysis. 3
Natural  Resource  Rent:
The  payment  (explicit  or implicit)  which  accrues  from  either
the scarcity value or ownership (or both) of a mineral
resource.  In a market  economy  this  value  will be equal to
the  "user  cost"  or the  flow  price  to the  resource  owner.  In
equilibrium,  natural  resource  rent  will  be equal  to the  value
of the  marginal  product  of the  resource  as an input  into  the
production  process  at each  point  in time. In effect,  natural
resource  rent  is  a waje  RAd  for  a factor  input.
Economic  Rent (or  Rent):
Any  payment  above  the  minimum  necessary  to obtain  a
particular  supply  of an factor  input  or output.
Wind-Fall  Gains  and  Losses:
A  change in the return to anX asset resulting from an
unanticipated  change  in relative  prices.
3.6  These  definitions  have  the  following  implications:
- The natural resource does not have to be exhausted  in a
physical  sense  for  natural  resource  rents  to accrue. Rather,
user cost includes  both the physical  exhaustion  value plus
replacement  cost,  if  any,  for  obtaining  additional  inputs.
- In a competiti.e  economy  natural  resource  "rents"  are n
economic  rents.  Rather,  the opportunity  cost of extraction
today relative  to the future  and the decision  to allocate
3/  In practice  it  m.ay  be difficult  to  compute  the  value  of each  separate
componert  either  ex ante  or ex post.  However,  clear  definitions  are
necessary  in  order  to provide  a consisteri_  framework  for  analysis.-49-
portfolio shares to mineral tracts is determined  by the
presence  of natural  resource  rents.  In effect,  competition
will lead to  a situation  where the "natural  resource"  rent
are  only sufficient  to cover  the  opportunity  of investing  in
mineral properties  and extracting the deposit.  That is,
competition  will lead to a  situation  where no "economic
rents"  are present. 4 This implies  that natural  resource
rents serve an "allocative" function and not merely a
distributive  function.
- Unlike "wind-falls",  natural resource  rents can be present
even in  the  presence  of  perfect  certainty.
3.7  Defining  natural  resource  rent as a wage is completely  consistent
with traditional  natural  resource  theory  dating  from  Hotelling  (1931). The
efficient  allocation  of a fixed  stock  of a resource  requires  a flow  payment
equal to the intertemporal  opportunity  cost of extraction  at different
points in time.  If this payment is absent  or not calculated  then an
efficient  development  profile  cannot  be computed. Treating  this  payment  as
a  wage is also consistent  with standard  economic  theory.  Workers  with
different  skills  will allocate  themselves  between  different  sectors  based
on wage differentials. The presence  of a wage is necessary  to determine
the  opportunity  cost  of  employment. In  a similar  manner,  "natural  resource
rent" is a signal  to investors  regarding  the  value  of mineral  investments
relative  to investments  in other  sectors. The fact that  minerals  are an
endowment  which  may  not  be  replaceable does not  alter this  fact.
Furthermore,  the  fact that  government  (or  resource  owners  in general)  have
not paid for the mineral  before discovery  does not imply that the flow
4/  See  Conrad  and  Gillis  (1984)  and  Feldstein  (1982)  for  a discussion
of this  issue.-50-
price of mineral extraction should be  independent  of market forces.
Rather,  the  value  of  minerals,  "the  natural  resource  rent"  is  necessary  for
resource  owners, including  government,  to hold and develop  the resource
base.
3.8  Finally,  natural  resource  rent  accrues  to the  resource  owner  in a
market  economy.  For  a government  resource  owner 'taxing  natural  resource
rent'  is a misnomer. Labor  does  not 'tax'  firms  by demanding  compensation
for  the  scarcity  value  of its  services  and  natural  resource  owners  are  not
'taxing'  resource  producers  who do not own title  to another  factor  input.
In summary,  'natural  resource  rent'  is a price  necessary  to determine  the
opportunity  cost  of extraction  and the  value  of the  marginal  product  of an
input. The value  of this input  will be determined  by the laws  of derived
demand  in an identical  fashion  to the  determination  of wages  for labor  and
other  factor  inputs. 5
II.  OUTLINE  OF  A MODE,
3.9  Every mineral investment requires two types of capital, the
enclave natural resource and physical machinery. 6 These stocks are
combined  with labor  to generate  the  cash flows  from the investment. When
physical capital  and the natural  resource  stock are owned by different
parties  two separate  evaluations  of the  project  are required. First,  the
5/  The confusion  regarding  the role of 'user  cost' in minerals  may be
related to classical rent theory dating from Ricardo and given
significant  emphasis in George.  In neoclassical  economic  theory  a
distinction  must  be made  between  payments  above  the  amount  necessary  to
bring  forth  an additional  unit  of a factor  input  and  the total  cost  of
that  input.  Additional  confusion  may have  been generated  by emphasis
on the  nature  of the intertemporal  allocation  of a fixed  stock  of the
resource.  However, such confusion is not  warranted when it is
understood that  'natural resource rent'  is the efficiency price
necessary  to determine  the  optimal  extraction  profile  and the optimal
allocation  of investment  in  stocks  at different  points  in time.
6/  The model  discussed  in this  section  is developed  extensively  in Conrad
(1987a). Proofs,  etc.  can  be found  in that  paper.  Emphasis  will thus
be placed  on the  implications  of the  modLl  in the  present  discussion.-51-
resource  producer  must determine  whethez  the  physical  capital  employed  in
the operation  receives  a  competitive  return  adjusted  for risk after the
deduction of payments to all third parties including  taxes,  wages and
factor  payments  for  the  resource. Second,  the  resource  owner  must  evaluate
whether  the  return  from  supplying  a factor  input  is  sufficient  to  cover  any
opportunity  costs of alternative  uses adjusted for risk.  The latter
computation  is important for the resource owner.  If the return from
extraction  is  below  the  competitive  return  then  the  resource  owner  would  be
better off by holding reproduc.ble  capital rather  than minerals.  This
implies either  the resource owner  "paid too much" for the resource
endowment  and  has experienced  a  capital  loss,  or that  future  investments  in
mineral  resources  will be lower  (or  at a lower  price).  This result  holds
even if the resource  owner  did not pay anything  for the minerals  in the
ground. The funds  generated  via  extraction  can  be used for  inv.astments  in
other  sectors. If the  present  value  of the  payments  is  below  that  of  other
investments  then the  resource  owner  would  be better-off  simply  selling  the
rights  at.d  investing  the  proceeds  in  other  assets. 7
3.10  A contract  must generally  be negotiated  when the  physical  capital
and the natural resource  are owned  by different  parties.  This contract
will determine how the cash flows from the investment  will be divided
between  the two parties.  A contract  can be modeled  as a principal  agent
problem  from  an economic  perspective. For  present  purposes,  the  principal
7/  This is an.  extreme  form of bringing  extraction  forward  in time.  An
outright  sell  of the  mineral  rights  is  equivalent  to  extracting  all  the
reserves  today from the perspective  of the resource  owner.  She  has
gotten  all her capital  out in the present  period.  If the sell  price
could  be used to generate  a competitive  return  in other sectors  then
the  resource  owner  will  experience  a real  gain  in  wealth  by selling  the
rights  and investing  in  other  sectors.-52-
will  be defined  to  be the  resource  owner  and  the  agent  the  producer. 8 The
principal  (the  resource  owner)  wants  the  agent  to  maximize  the  returns  from
the  resource  base.  The  agent  (the  owner  of the  capitai)  wants  to  maximize
the  return  to invested  capital  net  of resourct,  payments. Thus,  there  is  a
natural  conflict  of interest  between  the parties.  Other things  equal,  a
dollar  paid to the resource  owner  will reduce  the present  value of the
project  to the producer.  Finally,  the resource  producer  will enter the
contract  if and  only if he is no worse  off  by doing  so.  Self-interest  on
the  part of the producer  thus  constrains  the  latitude  of the  principal  in
developing  contract  terms  only  for  the  principal's  benefit. 9 The issue  is
to determine  a contract  which will maximize  the total  benefits  from the
contract. That is,  a contract  will  be defined  as "efficient"  if the  total
value of the project is maximized adjusted for risk and both parties
willingly  agree  to  terms. 10
3.11  The preceding  discussion  can be represented  with more precision
mathematically.  Define  the  owner's  expected  welfare  of the  resource  as:
8/  The designation of who is the principal and who  is the agent is
arbitrary  and has no effect on the results.  The use of a welfare
constraint  on the  agent  is necessary  in order  to avoid  ambiguity  with
respect  to the sharing  of excess  returns.  The entire  contract  curve
can  be derived  by changing  the  value  of  agent's  expected  welfare.
9/  The producer's welfare constraint implies that any surplus, i.e.
economic  rent  will accrue  to the  resource  owner.
10/  When the  resource  owner  and  the  investor  are  the  same  agent  there  is  no
necessary  conflict. However,  the  resource  owner  must  still  develop  an
extraction profile and an  investment  plan consistent  with wealth
maximization.  This implies  that  the  owner-investor  must "shadow-price"
the resource  endowment  in order to determine  the optimal  extraction
profile.  In effect, the owner-investor  creates an implied  contract
where an implicit  price for the resource  is determined. If perfect
certainty  prevails  then  this shadow  price  will be equal to the  price
paid by the resource  producer  to the resource  owner in an "optimal
contract".-53-
EW  - EW[G[xu,a]  +  H[xw,a]]  (3.1)
where  EW  - expected  welfare  of the  owner
G[-]  - present  value  of other  assets
held  by the  resource  owner
H[-]  - present  value  of resource  payments  to
the  owner
xW  - quantity  of the  resource  sold
to the  producer
a  - quantity  of other  inputs  used
by the  producer
xUj  - quantity  of the  resouirce  used
by the  producerll
3.12  Expected welfare is used since all contracts are negotiated
without  complete  information  regarding  the future.  The function  H[-] is
the payment schedule  determined  by the parties.  The function  G[ ], the
present  value  of all  other  assets  held  by the resource  owner,  is included
because  a resource  discovery  could  affect  the value  of these  assets.  In
the present  context,  this function  will represent  the  opportunity  cost of
extraction  for  the  resource  owner. An example  is "Dutch  Disease"  discussed
in Chapter 1.  A developing  economy  must examine the "net  benefits"  of
resource  extraction.  If Dutch  Disease  is created  by mineral  development
then  the  value  of G[-]  will  be lower.
3.13  The  resource  producer's  welfare  function  is  defined  by12
11/  For a development  of why xw may be greater  than or equal to xU, see
Conrad  1987a.
12/  This formulation  of the  problem  implies  that  the  resource  producer  will
get the residual  from the project  after  payments  to all factors  of
production  including  payments  for  the  resource  base.-54-
EU  - EU[V[xu,al  - H(xW,a]l  (3.2)
where  EU  - expected  welfare  of the  resource  producer
V[-]  - Present  value  of the  project
3.14  Given present assumptions, the resource owner will choose a
payment  schedule  H[-]  and  an  extraction  profile  xw to  maximize  her  welfare.
There  are constraints  on the  resource  owner  however. First,  the  resource
producer  must be willing to enter the contract.  This implies  that the
producer's  expected  welfare  must  be at least  as large  as it would  be from
not  entering  the contract at all.  Second, the resource owner  is
constrained by  the producer's response to the payment schedule and
extraction  profile.  The  producer  will choose  his actions,  a, to maximize
his welfare given a particular  payment schedule. 13 A change  in the
payment structure  may affect the producer's other actions (e.g.  lower
investment).  This response  might  lower  the  welfare  of the  resource  owner.
Third,  the  quantity  of the  resource  supplied  by the  owner  must  be at least
as great  as the  quantity  demanded  by the  producer. Otherwise  the  producer
will  be constrained  further. Finally,  the  quantity  supplied  by the  owner
cannot  exceed  the  quantity  of reserves  in the  ground.
3.15  A  complete development  of this model is contained in Conrad
(1987a)  and will not be repeated  here.  The conditions  for an efficient
contract  are:
- The quantity  of the resource  supplied  by the owner  will be
equal  to  the  quantity  demanded  by the  producer;  i.e.  xw - xu.
- The marginal  payment  to the  resource  owner  for the resource
will  be equal  to the  scarcity  value  of the  resource  plus the
13/  This implies  the resource  producer  will equate  risk  adjusted  marginal
revenue with risk adjusted  marginal  cost for each factor  under his
control. This formulation  also implies  that  the  resource  owner  is not
able to control  all the  activities  of the  firm,  that is,  the resource
owner  cannot  choose  the  quantity  of labor,  etc.  which  the  firm  hires.-55-
marginal value of any additional  opportunity  cost; i.e.
EW'H'x - A  - EWUG'x,  where GC' 5 0 and p  is defined to be the
user  cost  of the  resource.
- Risk adjusted  marginal  revenue  for the producer  will equal
risk  adjusted  marginal  cost  where  marginal  cost  is  defined  to
include  both factor  payments  to third  parties (e.g.  labor)
plus payments to the resource owner:  i.e. EW (VI - H') - 0.
3.16  The last two conditions  imply that each party is compensated
just enough  at the  margin  to make additional  gains  equal  to the  cost  of
further  activity.  These conditions  combined  with the first  imply  that
gains from trade  are exhausted. The implications  of these  results  for
efficient  contracts  will  be explored  in the  discussion  which  follows.
III.  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  CONTRACT  TERMS
3. 7  A major implication  of this  model-  is that  the  resource  producer
must take three things  into account  when determining  natural resource
contract  policy: (1) the opportunity  cost of the resource; (2) the
opportunity  cost  to  other  sectors;  and (3)  the  cost  of risk  bearing. The
model  structure  also  implies  that  three  different  payments  can  be used to
identify  and  measure  each  cost.  That is,  the  contract  can  contain  three
readily identified  payments serving three different functions.  For
convenience  these three  payments  are defined  as:  R for resource  rent
payment;  0 for opportunity  cost  payment;  and D for  risk  sharing  payment.
Each payment  is discussed  below.  It is important  to remember  that  the
form  of any  one  payment  can  affect  the  structure  of the  other  two. This
fact  will  become  clear  as the  discussion  proceeds.
A.  The  Resource  Rent  Payment  (R)
3.18  The  purpose  of this payment  is to reimburse  the  resource  owner
for the sale of an input from her inventoe,.  Tt  is  demonstrated  in.56-
Conrad  (1987aj  that  the  optimal  payment  can take  the  form  of a fixed  fee
per ton  of output. For  example,  an optimal  contract  can  state  that the
producer  will  pay  the  owner  $1.00  per  ton  of natural  resource  sold. This
payment  is equivalent  to a wage contract  where  the  worker  accepts  a job
for a fixed  wage per hour.  This fixed  fee does not imply  absence  of
variability  with respect  to the owner's total  payments.  Variability
could  be present  in  the  risk  sharing  and  opportunity  cost  components.
3.19  This payment structure has  two implications.  First, the
producer  will treat the resource supply  as perfectly  elastic.  This
implies  that  no natural  resource  rent  will  be captured  by the  producer.
Second,  this  is the  only  payment  required  if the  resource  owner  does  not
want to bear any risk,  no Dutch  Disease (or  some other form of wealth
reducing  effect)  is present  and there  are constant  returns  to scale  in
production. This  payment  captures  all the risks  adJusted  present  value
in excess  of the minimum  necessary  to induce  the  producer  to sign the
contract. If decreasing  returns  to scale  exist  another  payment  for  risk
sharing  might  be required. This  point  can  be illustrated  by considering
the  case of perfect  certainty. The present  value  of the  entire  project
would  be equal  to the  natural  resource  rent  if  constant  returns  to scale
are  present.  Thus,  a fixed  fee  per ton is  equal  to 100%  of the  present
value  if  determined  optimally.
3.20  Second,  two  components  comprise  the  positive  present  value  when
production  exhibits  decreasing  returns  to scale:  the user cost of the
resource  ana  producer  surplus;  i.e.  pure rent.  The  only function  served
by the resource  factor  payment  is to capture  the  user cost leaving  the
rest for the  producer. If the resource  owner  wants to capture  the  rent
component  then  she  could  engage  in  profit  sharing,  but this  would  require
an additional  payment.  When uncertainty  is present,  the resource  rent-57-
payment  would  be equal to 100% of the project's  risk adjusted  present
value without  additional  risk sharing,  with constant  returns  to scale.
That is,  the  resource  rent  payment  and  a 100%  profit  share (e.g.  a "tax"
with  a 100%  rate)  would  have the  same  present  value  of revenues  (holding
other things  constant),  but the risks  would be different. 14 A 100%
profits interest  implies that the resource  owner  bears all the risk,
while  the fixed  fee  per ton implies  that  the  owner  bears  risks  only  with
respect  to the  quantity  and  quality  of  ore  found.
3.21  Other  methods  could  be used  to capture  the  risk  adjusted  natural
resource  rent, including  a fixed  or variable  ad valorem  royalty,  a flat
or variable  rate profit share,  and the Resource  Rent Tax proposed  by
Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1975,  1979, 1983).  Each of these methods
combine  risk  sharing  and  natural  resource  rent. Ad  valorem  royalties  are
coumonly  used and the current  model  has two implications  for their  use.
Frr.st,  nat=back.  pr.icig C3n  be  uzed
the tax.  Net-back  pricing  is commonly  used to compute  the mine-mouth
(well-head)  value of the resource.  This value is then adjusted  for
variable  lifting  cost to determine  the  net  value  of the resource. This
procedure  may be optimal  since  the  purpose  of the  resource  rent payment
'- to C3tr  --  - - :1alu-o  th-  resource and not any other component of
value  added. 15
3.22  Flat  rate or variable  rate  income  shares  can  be used to  capture
the  resource  rent. More  risk  is  borne  by the  owner  for  the  same  expected
revenue  with this system.  Also,  negative  payments  are required  by the
14/  Other  things  would  not  be equal  in  the  final  contract. Total  output,
etc.  may be different  because  the resource  producer  will respond  to
the  different  levels  of  perceived  risk.
15/  Net-back  pricing  would  be optimal  if the  net-back  could  be computed
without  error.  Note also that the  fixed  fee  per ton  would  be equal
co cne enrire  difference  between  the mine-mouth  value and variable
lifting  cost.-58-
resource  owner.  Income  sharing  is not  equivalent  to an income  tax  with
no loss  offset  in this  context. That is,  free  equity  is  not implied  by
this  system. Rather  full  equity  participation  is required  similar  to  the
system  employed  in the Cameroon. 16 A difficulty  with these  schemes  is
that  the  purpose  of the  payment  may  become  confused. There  is  no way to
identify the resource  rent payment independently  of the Ask  sharing
component.  This raises the possibility  that the owner may be under
compensated  for the  resource  itself. The dilemma  can  be seen  by noting
that a 100% equity  share is required  to capture  all the resource  rent
when  there is perfect certainty and constant returns to scale are
present.  When uncertainty is present there is a trade-off  between
additional  risk  bearing  via equity  shares  and  the  natural  resource  rent,
The resource  owner  bears the risk of having  all the resource  extracted
and paying  the firm for extracting  it.  Such a strategy  may be optimal
for the owner, but clear recognition  of the fact that at least two
objectives are being served  by one instrument  with these schemes  in
practice  is  necessary.
3.23  The  Resource  Rent  Tax (RRT)  proposed  by Garnaut  and  Clunies  Ross
has received  increasing  attention. 17 The  RRT is structured  so that  the
producer  bears  all  risk  when the  present  value  of the  project  is  zero  or
negative.  Positive present values are shared  between the owner and
producer. 18 The rate  applied  to  positive  present  values  may  be constant
or variable.  It can be shown  that this scheme  is optimal  when used as
16/  See  Chapter  I  and  Appendix  1.
17/  See  Virmani  1985  and  1986a,b.
18/  Garnaut  and Clunies  Ross appear  to place emphasis  on risk adjusted
discount rates.  No such assumption is made here or in Conrad
(1987a). Knowledge  of real  interest  rates  is  not  required  for  any  of
the  results  present  here..59  -
the  only  instrument  if  the  following  conditions  are  satisfied.1 9
EJDRxII  > 0  Ek  +  CUDW#  (3.3)
EU'l  'I  >  O  Ek  +  CU,RA|D  >  0
where  EU'*Il >  O - risk  adjusted  marginal  profit
for  input  g  - a,x  conditional
on  positive  present  value
Ek  - expected  share  rate
C  - covariance
x  - present  value  of  cash  flow
3.24  These  conditions  imply  that the  share  rate  must  be variable. A
constant share rate would have no covariance  with the risk adjusted
marginal  profit  of inputs,  other  than  the  resource,  and  unless  the  share
rate is zero the second  condition  will be violated.  In addition  the
covariance  between  the share  rate and risk adjusted  marginal  profit  for
other inputs  must be negative.  If the share  rate is progressive  then
risk adjusted  marginal  profit  must be decreasing. Thir result  implies
that if the resource  owner is risk neutral  a progressive  RRT is not
optimal. 20 This implies  that the resource  owner  must be risk averse
before  the  RRT  can  be optimal. Optimality  of the  RRT is implied  by this
discussion,  but  only under  certain  circumstances.  The  general
applicability  of this  scheme  cannot  be demonstrated.
19/  See  Conrad  (1987a).
20/  Marginal  profit  is increasing  in  wealth;  i.e.  higher  profits  implies
higher  marginal  profit.  Thus the covariance  between  the  share  rate
and  marginal  profit  will  be positive. Note  that  this  result  does  not
violate the results of Virmani (1985, 1986 a,b).  Virmani  shows
welfare  gains  from  the  RRT  relative  to  other  schemes  when  all  parties
are  risk  neutral.  However, Virmani did not  account for the
opportunity cost of extraction and  the analysis of gains was
determined  relative  to a distorted  base since  exploration  costs  were
never  deductible  in  his  base  case.-60-
3.25  In summary,  the  resource  rent  payment  is  the  wage  for  the  input.
It is equivalent  to the  wage  paid  per  unit  of labor. This  payment  can  be
combined  with  risk  sharing  components  (e.g.  RRT's,  shares,  and  ad  valorem
royalties),  if  the  owner  clearly  understands  the  combined  function  of the
payment. Finally,  if  the  resource  owner  operates  in  a competitive  market
then  the  resource  rent  payment  adjusted  for  risk  would  equal  the  price  of
the resource  at the  next highest  cost mine.  That is,  the  value  of the
resource  itself  might be market  determined. The producer  will not be
willing to pay  a risk adjusted price in excess of the next best
alternative. 21 This implies  that both risk and competitive  pressure
from resource producers will determine the efficient price for the
resource.
3.26  These results also indicate that free equity is not ih  the
interest  of the resource  owner,  while schemes  such as the RRT may be
appropriate  under  certain  conditions. The  most important  implication  of
this analysis is that it is imperative  for the resource  owner (the
governments  of the countries in Sub-Saharan  Africa in this present
context)  to determine  the  minimum  amount  they  are  willing  to accept  for
each and  every ton  of the  resource  extracted. A resource  owner  without
this  knowledge  will  not  know  whether  the  return  generated  by any  contract
will  be sufficient  to cover  this  basic  cost.
B.  ORRortunitv  Cost  Pavment  (0)
3.27  This payment  represents  compensation  for the wealth  reduction
experience  in  other  sectors  due  to  mineral  development.  Dutch  Disease  is
commonly  associated  with  mineral  development  and this  phenomenon  will  be
21/ In effect,  the user cost may be an exogenous  variable  to both the
owner  and  producer.-61-
used  to illustrate  the  nature  of this  payment. 22 Dutch  Disease  has  been
interpreted  to be an increase  in the real exchange  rate leading  to a
decrease in the value of traditional  exports  or lower production  of
import  substitutes. The function  for  other  wealth,  G, in this  case  can
be defined  as:
G - PeY  (3.5)
where  G - present  value  of  value  added  in  traditional
sectors  in real  domestic  prices
P - Price of output
e  - inverse  of real  exchange  rate
Y - quantity  of  output  from  traditional  sectors
3.28  If  Dutch  disease  is  present  then  increased  mineral  activity  will
cause the real exchange rate to rise; i.e. e' < 0.23  The issue
confronted  by  the  resource  owner  is  to  determine  what  aspects  of  mit,aral
development  are  rcsponsible  for  the  increase  in the real exchange  rate
and  to  determine  whether  the  change  represents  a marginal  or total  cost.
If  the  resource  payments  are sufficient  to enable  the  resource  owner  to
be better  with G-O then  no marginal  payments  are necessary. There  are
reasons  why this is not the case in developing  countries.  First,  the
total  lcss  ir.  traditional  exports  would  reduce  the  diversification  in the
economy.  If the  country  does  not  have complete  access  to world  capital
markets  then lower diversification  is costly.  Second,  there  may be a
22/  Other examples would include the reduction in agricultural  land
resulting  from resource  development,  the loss of fisheries  for off
shore  development,  and the increased  administrative  costs  to attract
labor  from  other  sectors.
23/  This formulation  of the problem  is for illustrative  purposes  only,
since  it is assumed  that  the  quantity  of out-ut,  'Y',  is fixed. One
would  expect  additional  effects  in terms  of  output  and  capital  losses
to sector  specific  human  and  physical  capital. The general  results
still  apply  in this  case.-62-
distributional  issue.  A mineral discovery can increase  the overall
wealth  of the  economy  but make labor  and capital  in traditional  sectors
worse-off. These  sectors  have  been owned  by predominantly  lower  income
groups,  particularly  small  holder  agriculture. Non-recognition  of these
costs could lead to adverse distributional  consequences. 24 Third,
mineral development  will not last forever.  Thus, the economy must
prepare  for  the  transition  from  its  comparative  advantage  in  resources  (a
negative Dutch Disease).  If the traditional  export sector is not
maintained or an ample substitute  developed then the economy could
experience  significant  adjustment  costs  as the  resources  are  depleted.
3.29  Dutch  Disease  is commonly  associated  with increases  in mineral
prices.  If mineral  prices are the sole factor  responsible  for Dutch
Disease  and  this  relationship  is linear  then:
G  - -PYbPM  - PYe'  (3.6)
where  PM  World  Price  of  minerals
3.30  The  owner  would  include  in the  contract  a payment  equal  to:  pP
- PYbPM for every ton of the resource  extracted.  While this payment
resembles  an ad valorem  output  tax its purpose is entirely  different.
This  payment  is compensation  for  oRgortunity  cost  and thus  no efficiency
costs are present.  The economic  response  would  be the same as a tax.
For instance,  if discounted  prices  were lower  in the future  then output
would be reallocated  to the future in the case of perfect  certainty.
However,  this  would  be an efficient  welfare  improving  response  given  the
nature  of the  costs.
3.31  It is clear  that  one factor  creating  a change  in real  exchange
rate is mineral  prices.  Other  factors  could  contribute  as well.  For
24/  This may be  an issue for expenditure  analysis.  However funds
collected  from the  contract  could  be a source  of payments  to offset
distributional  impacts.-63-
instance,  if the  real  exchange  rate  were  a function  of the  present  value
of mineral  development  then a profit  share  might  be  appropriate. The
resource  owner  must be responslble  for determining  the  nature  of these
opportunity  costs  and incorporating  them  into the  contract. Failure  to
incorporate  such factors  could lead to a net decrease  in the economy's
wealth  adjusted  for  risk.
C.  Risk  Sharing  Paxment  (D)
3.32  The  third  component  of an  efficient mineral contract  is
compensation  for risk  bearing. 25 The resource  owner  may be willing  to
bear some risk if both total and marginal  compensation  is sufficient.
This  payment  is  conceptually  unrelated  to the  other  two  payments. 26 The
resource  owner  must decide  how much  risk to  bear  and  at what  price  after
a  determination  has been made of the owner's  opportunity  costs.  The
extent to which  the owner is willing to bear risk will depend on
preferences  and the ability  to offset  risks  via diversification. The
condition  for  an efficient  contract  is that  risk  adjusted  marginal  profit
for the producer  net of all other factor  payments  be unaffected  by the
risk sharing  scheme. The simplest  form  of risk sharing  would  be equity
investments  by the  resource  owner  equal  to  k% of the  total. The  base  of
the share  would then be revenues  less all costs including  opportunity
cost  paid the  resource  owner: i.e.
D  - k(Rev  - Cost - 0 - R)  (3.7)
3.33  The marginal  independence  requirement  highlights  the insurance
aspect  of the  risk sharing  and a flat rate  profit  share  can  be optimal
25/  For a complete discussion  of risk sharing  see Leland (1978)  and
Conrad  (1987a).
26/  The  preferences  of the  various  parties  and  the  co-variation  in prices
and costs  may imply  a statistical  relationship,  but risk sharing  is
'I1' a  lff'-t  r-nf  :_  the  contract.-64-
since  the resource  owner  is paid  a "premium"  in good times  and  pays the
producer  in "bad" times.  Other  factor  payments  made to the owner are
deductible  since they are a cost of doing business  and the insurar:ce
aspect of risk sharing is related only to the producer's return.
Deductibility  is not necessary. However,  the share  rate 'k'  cannot  be
determined independently  of the other payments  when deductibility  is
absent. 27
3.34  Other types  of risk sharing  include  free equity  and the RRT.
These schemes may be optimal,  but additional  conditions  are required
which  are not  necessary  with equity  participation. 28 These  conditions
are related  to the  covariation  between  risk  adjusted  marginal  profit  and
the  share  rate.  They are the same  general  form  as equation  3.3. These
restrictions  may imply  that  the  RRT  and  free  equity  are  not  as applicable
as a flat rate  equity  share.  For instance,  neither  free equity  nor the
RRT  are  optimal  if  the  resource  owner  is  risk  neutral. This implies  that
the  resource  owner  could-  capture  larger  total  expected  payments  with flat
rate  equity  participation  than  either  of these  two  schemes.
IV.  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  GOVERNMENT  POLICY
3.35  The preceding  analysis  contains  a number of implications  for
government  policy  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. Three  points  deserve  emphasis.
First,  governments  which  are  resource  owners  should  collect  payments  for
the  permanent  loss  of the  economy's  endowment. Second,  these  payment  are
n=$ taxes  any  more than the  wage paid to a manufacturing  worker  or the
price of a machine.  These countries  have chosen to vest the mineral
27/  See  Conrad  (1987a)  for  the  conditions  for  optimal  risk  sharing  in  the
non-deductible  case.
28/  Flat rate or variable  rate output  levies  which  are always  positive
are  never  optimal.  Variable  rate  output  levies  which  have negative
components  may  be optimal. See  Conrad  (1987a).-65-
rights  in the state  and the state  thus  has a responsibility  to collect
factor  payments. The incentives  created  by these  payments  may  have tax-
like  effects  on the  behavior  of the  producer,  in a manner  similar  to an
overall  increase  in the  wage  paid  to labor. However,  these  incentives  do
not  decrease welfare, but  increase it since they result from the
application  of efficient  contract  terms.
3.36  Third,  government  in Sub-Saharan Africa  should  consider
separating  the various  aspects  of mineral  development  in evaluating  its
mineral policy.  The government  may act as insurance  agent for both
traditional  exports  via compensation  for  Dutch  Disease  and the  producer.
The extent  to which government  can accommodate  these  functions  without
incorporating  them into a contract  will depend  on the diversity  of its
revenue  base.
3.37  Development  of minerals  policy  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  depends  on
sufficient  information  and the  ability  to make  rational  trade-offs.  The
remainder  of this  chapter  contains  some  of the  aspects  which  can  be used
in  mineral  policy  evaluation.
A.  Factors  Important  To Investors
3.38  Investors,  foreign,  domestic  or SOE's,  use a variety  of  methods
to evaluate  mineral  investments.  The  methods  may  affect  the  size  of the
present value and the degree  of risk the investor  may be willing to
accept.  Other  information about the nature of the firm (and its
shareholders)  is an important  input  into  government's  contract  strategy.
Some  of these  factors  are  noted  below.
3.39  The internal  rate  of  return  criteria  is  used  by  firms  to  varying
degrees.  This criterion is known to give inconsistent  results for
projects  such as  minerals,  which  may  have large  cash  outflows  at the  end
of the  project  for  reclamation  and  closing. Thii  criterion  may  also  give-66-
inconsistent  rankings  for  alternative  mining  projects  relative  to the  net
present  value rule.  Government  should  be in a position  to compute  the
internal  rate of return  for  the  project  from  the investor's  perspective
in order  to understand  how different  contract  provisions  may affect  the
cash  flows  to the  investor. Government  should  also  be able to  point  out
any inconsistencies  with respect to the use of the internal  rate of
return  rule.
3.40  Some firms  also  employ  what is known  as the  "Divisional  Cost  of
Capital". This  method  is used  to allocate  funds  between  departments  and
subsidiaries. In general,  the  "cost  of capital"  for  departments  such  as
exploration  are higher  than the average  ra es  for the firm as a whole.
This approach  also  contains  a potentially  severe  limitation. A project
under  consideration  by a 'high  risk"  division  may  ultimately  become  part
of a "low risk"  division. For instance,  the exploration  division  will
evaluate  a project  and  the  production  division  will  assume  responsibility
of a successful  discovery. However,  the  exploration  division  may  employ
a uniform  high discount  rate for the entire  operation  when making  its
initial  evaluation.  This  procedure  can  generate  internal  inconsistencies
within the firm:  e.g. the present  value of extraction  will be lower
using  the exploration  department's  rate than  using the  rate assigned  to
the  production  division. 29
3.41  Government  should  be aware  of these  methods  used  by firms. For
instance,  the  present  value  of a project  could  be higher  under  an equity
or RRT system  than an ad valorem system  if a uniformly  high rate is
29/  If risk adjusted  discount  rates are to be used then it would be
better  for the  exploration  department  to use two  rates,  not one.  A
high rate could  be used during  the exploration  period  and a lower
rate for the production  period.  This procedure  is justified  since
geological  uncertainty  is resolved  via exploration. Using a high
rate for the production period implies that such risk is not
resolved.-67-
employed  by the  division  responsible  for  contracts  in  the  country. This
results because an ad valorem  royalty  will require  the firm to make
payments earlier in the project's life relative to income related
schemes.  If a correction  is made for the use of high discount  rates
during  the  production  period  the firm could  have a higher  present  value
under  the  royalty. Such  a change  could  affect  the  firm's  perceptions  of
the  government's  compensation. 30
3.42  Well diversified  firms are generally willing to take higher
risks relative to less diversified  firms,  other things  equal.  This
implies  that  large  multinational  firms  might  be willing  to  pay  government
more than local  firms  or SOE's for the same project.  Local  firms  and
SOE's  may  not  be  willing  to  undertake  extensive  high  risk  operations  such
as exploration  which large  well diversified  multinational  firms  would
undertake. This type  of  behavior  could  affect  the  ability  of government
to negotiate  the same terms  with different  producing  firms  and affect
government's  share  of risk  bearing.
3.43  Diversified  investors  seek  to  recover  losses  from  non-productive
or low  return  investments  with discoveries  yielding  abnormal  returns  (ex
post).  This implies  that an RRT type scheme  may discourage  high risk
exploration  in a country. That is,  a country  with  a progressive  ex-post
share  system may become non-competitive  relative to other resource
producing  countries.
3.44  All  investors prefer stability in contracts.  The risk of
contract  changes (or nationalization)  increases  the total risk to the
30/  For  example,  suppose  a royalty  would  pay 500  each for  2 years  while
an equity  share  would  pay 1040 in  year 2 and  zero  in  year 1.  If the
discount  rate is 10%, the present  value is 954 for the royalty  and
945 for the  profit  share.  The firm  would  prefer  the  equity  sharing
arrangement  since the present  value of payments  to government  is
lover.  If a 5  discount  rate is used then the  answer  is reversed:
i.e.  976  for  the  royalty  and  990  for  the  equity  share.-68-
investor. Other  things  equal,  an investor  would  be willing  to pay more
for  a stable  contract  environment. This requires  stability  on the  part
of government  both with respect  to general  policy  and mining  contract
policy.
3.45  Cash flow methods used by  investors may  include different
elements.  Some investors may  include items such as depreciation,
overheads  and  administrative  allocations  from  other  departments.  Many  of
these  items  should  be  eliminated  from  the  cash  flow  analysis.
Depreciation  is  not  a cash  outflow  and  should  be excluded. Overheads  and
inter-departmental  allocations  should  be eliminated  if such  costs  would
be  incurred absent the project.  Government should be capable of
developing its own cash flow profiles for both  the firm and the
government.  This approach will ensure consistency in government's
approach. The  understanding  gained  from  such  analysis  will  also  identify
sources  of conflict  between  the  parties.
3.46  Foreign investors  would generally prefer a resource factor
payment  which  can  be legally  described  as an income  tax for foreign  tax
credit  purposes.  Such accommodations  can  be made by government  to the
extent  possible.  However,  government  should  be aware of the costs of
such accommodation. For instance,  the replacement  of a royalty  with an
equal  yield  income  share  could  increase  the  country's  risk  exposure.
B.  What  Government  Decision  Makers  Need  tc  Know
3.47  Government,  as resource  owner,  must evaluate  several  factors  in
developing  a natural resource  policy.  A paramount  requirement  is an
understanding  of the  nature  of natural  resource  rents. Natural  resources
in the ground  are part of the capital  stoc  of any economy.  "Natural
resource  rents"  thus  serve  an important  allocative  function  and they  are
necessary  to induce  any member  of the economy,  including  government,  to-69-
hold  this type of capital.  Like dividends from the ownership of
corporate  stock  or wages paid to labor,  "natural  resource  rents"  are a
signal  of the "opportunity  cost"  of alternative  investments  or current
consumption. Government  has a legal  and economic  right to these  rents
adjusted  for risk via ownership  in a manner  similar  to legal  title to
wages for work effort.  It must be clear that government  payments  for
mineral rights and extraction  are not taxes.  Taxes, in addition  to
factor  payments,  may affect  the total  return  to the project  and create
various efficiency costs.  However, no efficiency  costs should be
generated  via  well  designed  contracts  with  government.
3.48  Government  must  determine  its opportunity  cost of  funds
(adjusted  for  risk)  before  it can  develoo  a rational  minerals  Rolicy. A
standard to determine the relative profitability  (either  private or
social)  of alternative  mineral  policies  is not available  without this
benchmark.  A  relative  standard  for government  to compare  projects  is
essential  for even risk neutral  governments  concerned  only with revenue
maximization  since  the  revenues  will accrue  at  different  points  in time.
3.49  Revenue  maximization  may not be the sole criterion  when risk
aversion  and  other  opportunity  costs  are  present. Guvernment  may  have to
evaluate  how much risk it is willing  to bear.  This decision  should  be
based  on a  number  of factors  including:
- The real per capita  income  of the country  and the rate of
growth  of  per  capita  income.
- The degree  of diversification  in the  economy  with respect  to
its  asset base and how the returns  o.a  this portfolio  vary
with  mineral  returns.
The economy's  access to capital  -markets. Constitutionally
the  mineral  rights  are  held  by the  state.  In a real sense,-70-
this implies  that each citizen  is an equity  holder in the
mineral  assets.  However,  government ownership unlike
universal  ownership  of  equity  shares  may  restrict  the  ability
of the citizens to diversify.  Citizens  are not able to
increase  or decrease  their  participation  in government  held
mineral rights,  unless  access to world capital  markets is
complete. 31 This restriction  could be mitigated  if the
individuals  have access  to efficient  capital  markets  which
would enable  them to diversify  their  holdings.  Such access
is generally  not available  to all  individuals  in Sub-Saharan
countries  due to 'ow incomes,  high transactions  costs and
other barriers to the world capital market.  Therefore,
governments  which  hold the  mineral  rights  in non-diversified
less  developed  economies  must  take  the  lack  of
diversification  (both  private  and social)  into  account  when
assessing  the  risks  of alternative  strategies.
Lack  of diversifIcation  is  related  to Dutch  Disease  and  other
changes  in comparative  advantage generated by mineral
development. The present  analysis  has contained  one method
to explicit',  incorporate  such  effects  in developing  mineral
policy.
3.50  Risk neutral behavior  is often considered appropriate  for
government.  This  judgment  is  based  on the  "Arrow-Lind  Theorem" 32 or on
31/  No  value  judgment  should  be attached  to this  statement. Rather  it
is a positive statement  which is a consequence  of government
mineral ownership and restricted assess to capital markets.
Citizens  with access  to  capital  markets  can  diversify  even if  they
cannot  sell their  equity. A citizen  could,  in theory,  develop  a
portfolio  to offset  changes  in government  activity  by changes  in
mineral  policy.
32/  Arrow  and  Lind (1960).-71-
assumptions  upon which chis theorem is based.  This theorem  can be
applied  only in cases  where  a project  is "small"  relative  to GDP  and  the
returns from che project are independent  of the returns from other
sectors of  the economy (in the sense of  co-variability).  These
conditions  are not satisfied  for  any economy  with mineral  endowments  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Minerals  are a significant  proportion  of GNP and
exports in Sub-Saharar.  Africa.  The potential  for "Dutch  Disease"  or
other  factors affecting traditional  exports resulting from mineral
developments indicate the presence of co-variation.  Therefore,  the
assumption  of risk neutrality  and consequent  revenue  maximization  from
mineral  investments  may  be neither  in the  short  or long term  interest  of
these  economies.
3.51  The  effects  of inadequate  diversification  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
are apparent  from an analysis  of Table 3.1.  The shares  of minerals  in
CDP and the mineral  export  shares  for 1981 are reported  in the table.
Each  country  is ranked  by the  perceived  riskiness  of its  mineral  revenue
policies.  This  ranking is based on the differential in standard
corporate  income  tax, the mineral  income  tax  rates,  accounting  methods,
the use of royalties  (a low risk strategy),  and the  use of production
sharing agreements  where the investor  recovers their capital before
substantial  payments  are made to the government. 33 Zambia  and Zaire
form  the  'High"  risk  group. Government  owns  100%  of the  non-fuel  mineral
investments  in  these  countries  which  implies  complete  exposure  to  all  the
33/  High risk in this context may  imply full government ownership
(regardless  of  whether  the  operation  is  a state  owned  enterprise).  A
somewhat  less aggressive  strategy  is extensive  reliance  on resource
rent instruments,  production  sharing,  and equity  sharing  with high
rates.  These instruments  expose  the country  to substaiitial  risk
because  the  mineral  wealth  of the  economy  can  be developed,  extracted
and exported  with the society  never receiving  any payment for the
factor  input. Finally,  low  risk  is  defined  as extensive  use  of fixed
fees (or  bids) and royalties  combined  with traditional  income  type
taxes  imposed  on all  sectors,  including  minerals.-72
risks associated  with mineral production.  The  "Medium" risk group
consists of the oil producers plus  Liberia.  While Liberia employs
royalties to some extent, there are provisions for 50% government
participation. Botswana  is a member  of the "Low"  risk group  because  it
does not impose  a supplemental  tax above the regular  corporate  income
tax,  royalties  are  used  extensively,  operations  are  maintained  by foreign
operators,  and equity  sharing,  while  used,  is not as important  relative
to other  instruments. 34
Table  3.1: Ranking  of  Riskiness  in  Natural  Resource  Revenue  Systems
Mineral  Shares
in  GDP  alb/  in  Exgorts  a/b/  in  Revenue  a/b/  Riskiness  c/
Botswana  16.6  65.8  28.7  Low
Cameroon  11.7  66.9  53.8  Medium
Gabon  52.8  78.2  65.5  Medium
Liberia  20.8  70.7  2.1  Medium
Nigeria  21.8  95.4  65.6  Medium
Zaire  11.5  92.5  10.5  High
Zambia  11.0  92.3  0.0  High
Zimbabwe  4.2  26.5  NA  Low
t/  See text and Appendix 1 for definitions  used and tax-revenue
systems.
b/  1982. See  Chapter  1  and  References  for  sources.
c/  The  ranking  is  subjective.  However,  it  gives  an indication  of the
degree  of exposure  to international  market  conditions  due  to lack
of diversification  in  economic  and  revenue  structure.
3.52  While  no normative  judgments  should  be reached  from this  table,
it is  clear  that  the "high"  risk  strategy  adopted  by Zambia  and  Zaire  is
responsible,  in part, for their current  economic  situation.  Lack of
diversification  combined  with full exposure to the risks of mineral
development  have contributed  to the  balance  of payments  and  debt service
difficulties  wlhich  arose  when mineral  prices  fell.  Nigeria's  situation
is similar  to Zambia's  and Zaire's.  Nigeria is also one of the less
diversified  economies  in the region  measured  in terms  of GDP shares  and
34/  See  Appendix  3.-73-
exports  shares. These  countries  may serve  as illustrations  of aggressive
government  mineral policies.  The more aggressive  a country's  mineral
policy  the  greater  the  down  side  risk  for  a non-diversified  economy. 35
C.  Integration  with  Other  Taxes
3.53  The factor  payment  method(s)  chosen  by the  government  should  be
designed  to recover  "natural  resource  rents",  other  opportunity  costs  and
the  cost  of risk  bearing. Taxation  may  create  additional  incentives.  In
general, tax policy should be designed for the economy as a whole.
Mineral  producers  should  not  be treated  differently  than other  sectors,
if the  factor  payment  is  well  designed. This implies  that  tax  policy  and
mineral policy  have different  implications. Taxation's  purpose  is to
transfer  real resources  from the private to the public sector,  while
factor payment policy is intended to capture the return from the
ownership  of an asset. Rational  tax  policy  should  be determined  relative
to  the  efficiency  cost  of the  tax  within  and  between  sectors. 36
35/  No claim  is made that all the problems in these countries are
attributable  to the  effects  cited  above. However,  these  effects  have
been contributing  factors.
36/  The distribution  of the tax burden is an incidence  issue.  In an
open-economy  the  incidence  of capital  taxes  will  be borne  by domestic
labor, owners of domestic land, and owners of domestic natural
resource deposits.  This implies that factor payments made to
government  could  fall  as  a result  of a neutral  income  tax. This  does
not indicate  that separation  of tax and factor  payment  policy is
artificial. For instance  government  could  impose  only the  generally
applicable  income  (or  cash-flow)  taxes  with  no factor  payments: i.e.
give  the resource  away.  In this  case,  some (or  all)  of the  value  of
the natural  resource  rents  will accrue  to domestic  nationals  in the
form of higher wages and the government  may recoup some of the
natural resource  rents via the tax.  Such an approach  would risk
misallocation  of resources  on two accounts.  First,  there  could  be
intersectoral  misallocation  of investment: e.g. too  much investment
in  natural  resources  relative  to  other  sectors. Second,  the  "supply-
price"  of reserves  would  not  be known. Thus,  the  development  profile
may not be socially  optimal.  Therefore  it is important  to separate
tax  from factor  payment  policies. Neither  the  welfare  cost  of a tax
nor its  incidence  can  be determined  without  knowledge  of the  value  of
the  resource.  For a further  discussion  of the interactions  between
general  taxes  and  resource  payments  see  Virmani  (1985  and  1986  a,b).-74-
3.54  Equality  of marginal  effective  tax rates  across  all sectors  may
be one  objective  of t:ax  policy. The  choice  of instrument  (either  income
or consumption  taxes)  is an econo'mic  policy  decision. If the  government
desires to tax "income" then complete neutrality  would require the
following  provisions  for  the  taxation  of minerals.
- Deduction  of interest.
- Deduction  of all  mineral  factor payments,  regardless of
structure.
- Deduction  of "Real  Economic  Depreciation".
- Complete  indexation  for  inflation.
3.55  Factor  payments  to  government  for  the  resource,  other
opportunity  costs and risk bearing should  be deductible  since these
payments  are  a cost of accruing income.  ImmediLate  expensing of
exploration and development  expenses should not be allowed.  These
expenses  should  be capitalized  and  subject  to an "exogenously  determined
amortization schedule" similar to the depreciation deductions for
machines and equipment.  The schedule  should  be exogenous  because an
endogenous  depreciation  schedule  (e.g.  based  on production)  may create
allocative incentives. 37 Resource producers should not be allowed
depletion  for the simple fact that they do not own the asset in the
ground.  Granting depletion to a resource  producer  is equivalent  to
granting  depreciation  to an  agent  who rents  a  machine. Since  legally  and
economically  speaking,  depreciation  should  be equal  to the reduction  in
the  market  value  of the  asset,  this  deduction  should  be available  only  to
the  party  with an  ownership  interest  in the  asset.
37/  See Chapter  2  and Appendix  2.  Arbitrary  measures  will be used in
practice,  similar  to the arbicrary  depreciation  rules for machines
and equipment, since it is impossible  to'measure true economic
depreciation.  However, if some assets are allowed endogenous
depreciation  and others are not (e.g.  buildings)  then there is a
clear  additional  incentive  to  change  the  pattern  of investment.-75-
3.56  If cash-flow  taxes (consumption  taxes)  are employed  in other
sectors  of the  economy,  then  different  mineral  tax  policies  are  required
to ensure  neutrality. Specific  provisions  would  include  a deduction  for
resource  factor  payments  (regardless  of type),  no interest  deductions,
and immediate  expensing  of all assets.  Inflation  adjustments  are not
necessary  since  cash-flow  taxes  are  made  on a current  basis.
3.57  It has been noted that the choice  of cash flow relative  to an
income  tax is a general  tax  policy  decision. The  marginal  effective  tax
rate on capital is zero for a consumption  tax, while an income  tax
captures part of the capital's return.  Both instruments  "capture
economic rents" (ex post).  Economic rents accrue to all economic
sectors. Thus,  there  is no justification  for  excessive  concentration  on
economic  rents in one sector  such as minerals.  If there  are economic
rents in the system  then the government  can capture  them with either
instrument and regardless of industry.  If government employs an
instrument  which captures some rents from all sectors,  the need for
additional  "rent"  taxes on the mineral sector  is mitigated  if a well
designed  resource  policy  is  in  place.
3.58  Finally,  there  is little  economic  justification  foi  output  taxes
in  the  minerals  sector  absent  proven  externalities  and  the  presence  of an
integrated  valued  added  tax system. Royalties  may  be appropriately  used
as a  factor payment, but additional  taxes  of this nature  will deter
investment,  change  intertemporal  extraction  profiles  and  create  excessive
welfare losses  to the  economy  as a whole.  For this reason,  such taxes
should  not  be used for  revenue  purposes. Output  taxes  may  be considered
in the case of proven  externalities.  The social  cost of extraction  may
be greater  than  the  factor  payments  due  to  pollution,  erosion,  etc.  and  a
well designed  output (or input  tax, if the input  is the source  of the
externality)  tax  may  be appropriate.-76-
V.  SUh(Y  AND  SUGGESTED  STRATEGY
3.59  One  strategy  for  development  and  evaluation  of natural  resource
policy  is offered  below.  The strategy  should  be considered  a flexible
framework  which  can  be varied  to the  needs  of a particular  country. The
strategy  is  based  on the  preceding  analysis  and  emphasis  is  placed  on the
identification  of  particular  revenue  instruments  for apecific  objectives.
More than one objective  could  be served  by one instrument  in practice
(e.g. an ad valorem output level for both risk sharing and  rent
collections).  However,  a clear  delineation  of objectives  is facilitated
with  separation of objectives  and instruments.  Multiple objective
instruments  should  be used only  after  the  objectives  for  which  they  will
be used  are  clearly  delineated.
3.60  A  portfolio  approach  to mineral contract  development is
suggested  by the previous  analysis.  This approach  would contain  five
elements  in addition  to the generally  applicable  business  income  tax:  a
fixed  fee (or  bonus),  a royalty  (either  ad rem  or ad valorem),  an equity
share,  a "surplus"  scheme  and an adjustment  cost function.  The bonus
could  be computed  via competitive  bidding  or negotiation. Two functions
are served  by the  bonus.  First,  the  bonus  would compensate  government
for  the  opportunity  cost  of the  mineral  rights  during  the  exploration  and
development  period.  Government  forgoes  the right to land use and the
right of allowing  other  parties to use the mineral  rights  during  this
period. Thus reasonable  compensation  is  required  for  government  to  forgo
other  options.  Second,  the  bonus  can  be used to capture  any  additional
risk adjusted  surplus  which the  producer  would  be willing  to pay.  The
amount  of  additional  surplus  will  depend  on the  entire  contract  strucOtre
including  all  risk  sharing  elemerts.
3.61  The royalty  is the instrument  to capttire  the value of natural
resource  rent.  This  payment  should  be used to  compensate  government  for-77-
mineral's  share  of  value  added  in the  production  process. In theory,
this  share  could  be computed  as the  difference  between  the  net-back  price
to the mine mouth less all extraction  costs.  That is, the difference
between  price  and cost would  equal resource rent at the margin.
Practical  considerations  and  measurement  error  will  prohibit  the  accurate
measurement  of such a margin.  Thus an ad valorem instrument  combined
with the net-back  computation  to arrive  at a reasonable  computation  may
be sufficient. A risk sharing  element  is introduced  with an ad valorem
system.,  Offsetting  or complementary  adjustments  may then  be required  in
other  instruments  to  account  for  the  presence  of risk  sharing.
3.62  The "equity"  share should  be fully funded,  purchased  equity:
i.e.,  no free equity.  Equity  participation  provides  the risk sharing
function. It should  be emphasized  that  the insurance  function  served  by
equity  participation  is insurance  for  the  producers. Government  assumes
profit  risk  and thus  acts  as an insurance  agent.  The  base of the  share
should be defined by allowing  a deduction  for all other payments  to
government,  since they are a cost of doing  business.  This base would
clearly  delineate  the function  of this payment  as insurance,  avoiding
unnecessary  ambiguity  and  computational  complications  in determining  the
appropriate  rate.
3.63  An additional  benefit  of equLty  sh.  ing  is  government's  right  to
influence  the producer's  decisions. Efficient  contract  design  requires
joint  and  mutually  advantageous  decisions  by producer  and  owner.  Equity
participation  is  a transparent  means  of achieving  this  objective. 38
38/  The government,  being sovereign,  always  has some right  to influence
decisions regardless  of the payment method.  Efficient  contracts
would also contain provisions  where the rate of extraction and
recovery are mutually agreed absent equity participation.  For
instance,  a contract  containing  a royalty  and  mutual  agreement  on the
rate of extraction  could work as well as equity  sharing.  In this
sense  the  benefit  of  equity  sharing  is  solely  its  transparency  to all
parties.-78-
3.64  The "surplus"  scheme is an additional  form of risk sharing
combined  with capture  of ex post economic  rents,  not natural resouirc
rents.  The decision  to employ  a scheme  such  as a variable  rate royalty
or RRT should be tempered  by the presence  of the equity share, the
presence  of the  generally  applicable  business  income  tax  and  perceptions
regarding nature of uncertainty.  Equity sharing and the generally
applicable  income tax are also instruments  which can capture ex post
economic  rent. An additional  surplus  scheme  could  deter  investment.  For
instance,  if the  government  employs  funded  equity  at a rate  of 40%  and  a
corporate  income  tax  of 50%  the  combined  rate  would  be 60%  of the  present
value assuming  the equity  share is deductible  from the corporate  tax.
This example  highlights  the need to ensure  that all contract  and tax
elements  are coordinated  so that effective  rates  are commensurate  with
risks  and  expected  returns.
3.65  The adjustment cost element would serve as compensation  for
'Dutch  Disease'  and other general  equilibrium  effects  on the economy.
The exact form of this payment  will depend  on how mineral  development
affects  the  comparative  advantage  and real  exchange  rate  of a particular
economy. The  world  price  of output  would  generally  be one  element  of the
base.  An ad valorem  rate (either  flat rate  or variable)  might then  be
applied  to the  value of production  in this case.  This payment is not
constructed  to be a supplemental  levy or tax.  Rather,  this element  is
one  component  of the  economy's  natural  resource  supply  curve. Government
will  not  be compensated  efficiently  if terms  of trade  effects  and  related
factors  are  omitted.
3.66  The  weights  applied  to  each  element  of the  factor  payment  policy
will reflect the degree  of risk government  is willing to bear.  For
instance,  if the  government  was  willing  to  bear little  or no risk then  a-79-
combination  of fixed fee and royalty  could  be used exclusively,  absent
terms  of trade  effects.  If government  is  willing  to bear all risk then
complete  equity  would  be appropriate.  It should  be emphas.zed  that  risk
of collecting  negative  revenue  is presant,  even though  natural  resource
rents  exist  under  the  latter  scheme.
3.67  It is the authors'  view that  government  should  not exclusively
employ  an equity sharing,  production  sharing,  or resource  rent schemes
for factor  payments. Such  schemes  are  equivalent  to  workers  agreeing  to
work for a manufacturing  firm for no wage and only the hope of future
gains  (through  profit  sharing  schemes). It is common  for  all factors  of
production  to charge  a rate  per  unit  of input  which  is at least  equal  to
their  opportunity  cost.  Given the common  use of this  method  for other
factors  of production,  there  is little  justification  for resource  owners
to  behave  differently. 39 In  addition,  adopting  such  schemes  may inhibit
the computation  of the country's  supply  price for the resource.  This
view is based  also  on the  lack  of diversification  present  in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the lack of complete  access  to worl4 capital  markets and the
apparent  effects  of changes  in mineral  prices  on government  revenue  and
terms of  trade.  For these reasons, a per unit royalty may be an
essential  part of  any  resource  development  scheme. Positive  revenue  will
accrue  as long as extraction  takes  place.  In addition,  government  must
confront the issue of the intertemporal  opportunity  cost of resource
development  and the supply price of its resource  base.  There is a
tendency  to treat the revenues  from other schemes  as "taxes'  without
regard for the opportunity  cost of extraction.  However,  extraction
39/  Of course,  charging  a rate per unit of output  includes  the risk of
unemployment. However,  this risk is included  in the  computation  of
the rate itself and it seems economically  irrational  for factor
owners  to  be willing  to  lower  their  rate  to  zero in  order  to  be fully
employed.-80-
Rermanently  reduces the wealth of the countrv  and this loss requires
reasonable  compensation.  The royalty would be  a signal to  both
government  and producers regarding the implicit (or explicit) value
placed  on the  decrease  in  capital  value. 40
3.68  In  summary,  there  is  no "unique"  resource  development  policy  for
any country. The correct  policy  for  a given  country  will depend  on the
extent  the government  is willing  to bear the risk, given the existing
portfolio of assets held by the economy as a whole.  The strategy
outlined  above  provides  a sound  framework  for analysis. Policy  makers
are forced  to address  each  component  of mineral  development;  opportunity
cost, adjustment  costs,  risk  bearing  and taxes  in a unified  framework.
Consistent  application  of the strategy  will  aid government  and  producers
understand  the  nature  of various  instruments,  the structure  of risk,  the
objectives  and  the  constraints  of each  party. Such  understanding  can  aid
in developing  contracts  which  are  mutually  advantageous  and  less  subject
to  dispute  at later  dates.
40/  Governments  which choose  not to use output related  levies  should
still  account  for  the  opportunity  cost  of extraction.  No measure  of
social  gains  and  losses  from  alternative  schemes  can  be made  without
properly pricing the resource.  Low weight may be given to the
royalty with  the major  revenue source being equity sharing or
"surplus"  payments  such  as the  RRT.- 81 -
Chapter  4:  A  FRAMEVORI  FOR  REFORM
I.  INTRODUCTION
4.1  An evaluation  of the  tax/natural  resource  policies  is  contained  in
this chapter.  Alternatives are discussed relative to the framework
developed  in  chapter  3.  The systems  used  by the  Sub-Saharan  countries  are
comparable to international  standards. 1 The countries  employ income
related levies, production sharing, rent schemes and output levies.
Comparability  with other  countries  does  not imply  economic  efficiency. A
number  of problems  have been noted with the tax/resource  policy  systems
commonly  used  by most  mining  nations  and  alternatives  have  been  developed. 2
4.2  The perspective  of this chapter  differs  from the standard  public
finance  approach  usually  adopted  for evaluation  in this area.  Emphasis
will be placed  on the  distinction  between  taxes  on the return  to invested
physical capital and payments  made to the resource  owner for a factor
input.  These payments may be combined in an economy where the tax
collector is also the resource  owner.  However,  tax policy  and mineral
development  policy, while related,  serve two different  functions.  The
economic  objective  served by  tax policy  is to generate sufficient
government  revenue  in  a manner  which  minimizes  the  efficiency  costs  to the
economy. The role  of mineral  development  policy  is to ensure  that  mineral
development  is  consistent  with  national  objectives,  when the  resource  owner
is the  government,  and  to ensure  that  the  receipts  from  mineral  development
compensate  the  country  for  the  risk  adjusted  valued  of the  resource  net of
1/  See  the  discussion  in  Chapter  2.
2/  See  Chapters  2 and  3  of this  report. Alternative  evaluations  have  been
offered by Conrad and Hool (1980) and Conrad and Convery (1981),
Virmani  (1985)  and (1986  a,b)  and  Garnaut  and  Clunies  Ross (1983).82 -
all  economic  costs. Mixing  objectives  in  practice,  combined  with ambiguity
regarding  the  difference  between  ex-ante  economic  rent  and  natural  resource
rent may have contributed to a confusion about the proper role of
government  mineral  development  policy. This  confusion  may  be responsible,
in part, for  policy  developments  which  are less  than  optimal. Thus, this
chapter is organized so the differences  and similarities  of the two
policies  are  highlighted.
II.  MINERAL-CONTRACT  POLICY
4.3  Government  as  a  resource  owner  must  determine  the  following
factors  before  a rational  mineral  development  policy  can  be developed:
- The value government,  as owner, places  on the opportunity
cost  of the  minerals;
- The amount  of risk  government  is willing  to bear in mineral
development;
- The  degree  of access  to  world  capital  markets;
- The potential  economic  effects  of mineral  development  on the
economy's  terms of trade  and the economic  effects  on other
sectors.
A.  Oo,ortunit!  Cost  of Mineral  Ownershil
4.4  Government  evaluation  of the  minerals  in  place  will determine  the
opportunity  cost of extraction  at different  points  in time.  This value
will determine  the  minimum  amount  that  government  is  willing  to accept  for
the resource.  This computation  is equivalent  to computing  the initial
basis  for  any  asset. Cost  is the  generally  accepted  economic  basis  for  any
asset; for example,  if a firm pays $100 for a machine  then the initial- 83 -
basis  is  $100. 3 The difficulty  with  computing  the  opportunity  cost for  a
mineral  resource  is no purchase  has taken  place  since  the endowment  is a
gift from  nature. However,  this  does not imply  that the  opportunity  cost
of  mineral  development  is  zero.
4.5  Two computations  may be required  for  determining  the  government's
basis.  First,  a computation  of the  value  of alternatives  uses of mineral
bearing lands may be computed.  This value will determine  government's
opportunity cost based  on next best  use.  Appraisal techniques are
available  to  compute  this  value. 4
4.6  Second,  government  should  compute  the  present  value  of the  deposit
assuming  that  government  will  exclusively  develop  the  deposit. 5 No taxes,
levies,  etc.,  should  be included  in this  computation  since  the  purpose  of
the exercise is to determine the value government places  on the self
development  option. 6 Different assumptions  might be used since this
computation  will  be an expected  value.7
3/  This basis would be equal to the true economic  value in a market
economy.
4/  Minerals  are  generally  found  in remote  areas  or off-shore. Again,  this
fact does not imply zero opportunity  cost.  Zero opportunity  cost
implies  that  governmer.t,  or any  land  owner  would  be willing  to  give  the
land  away. This  might  be possible,  but it is  highly  unlikely.
5/  Both the methodology and technology are available to make these
computations.  For  instance,  the  methods  used  by Kalter,  et.  al. (1974)
and  Virmani  (1985  and  1986a,  b) could  be adapted  for  this  purpose. The
parameters  for  estimation  could  be adapted  .o the  country's  particular
circumstances.  This computation  could be performed on behalf of
government  by international  institutions  *uch  as the  World  Bank,  etc.,
or  by private  firms  If  skilled  manpower  is  not  locally  available.
6/  This computation  will include  both natural  resource  rent and producer
surplus  if decreasing  returns  to scale  are  present. The resource  rent
can be separated  by computing  the difference  between  price  and cost,
including  capital  cost  at the  optimal  level  of output.
7/  For instance,  risk  neutrality  could  be assumed  initially  to  provide  an
upper  bound.  Then  various  degrees of  risk  aversion could be
introduced.- 84 -
4.7  The final  step  is to  compare  the  present  value  of self  development
with the assessed  value of the land without minerals.  The higher value
should be used for all subsequent  portions of the analysis, since the
option with  the highest value represents the best alternative use by
government.  That  is,  the highest  alternative  value  for exclusive
government  use will equal the  minimum  amount  government  will be willing  to
accept  for  the  outright  sale  of the  proparties. 8 This  value  will serve  as
the  benchmark  to compare  any other  mineral  development  strategy  considered
by  the  government.  Note  should  be  taken  of  the  fact  that  these
computations  are only estimates  and are subject  to error.  This does not
imply that the benchmark has no value.  The process used to make the
computations will  force government to confront directly the costs of
alternatives  in a systematic  way.  Methods are also available  to adjust
errors in estimates. 9 Advantage  should  be taken of such methods  to the
extent  they  are  cost-effective.
4.8  The  measures  of  opportunity  cost  computed  by these  procedures  will
serve  as the  basis for  determining  the  return,  both  total  and  marginal,  for
8/  The  fact  that government may be constitutionally prohibited from
selling part of the country to a  third party, either domestic or
foreign..  is irrelevant,  since  the  purpose  of the  exercise  is to compute
the  value of one option  available  to government. That is, government
always has the option of self-development  and it needs to know the
value  of this  option.
9/  More  sophisticated  Monte  Carlo  techniques can be  used to attach
standard  errors to the estimates.  It should also be noted that the
amount  of effort  expended  on this  exercise  will  depend  on the  amount  of
information  available  for  any point in time.  However,  information  has
a value  and  systematic  evaluation  is  preferred  to  no evaluation  at all.
It should  also be noted that this  method  can be used to determine  the
value of additional information.  For instance,  Garnaut and Clunies
Ross  (1983) suggest that government, perhaps with aid from donors
engage in preliminary  or extensive  exploration.  Whether this is a
rational  strategy  will depend  on the  preferences  of government  for  risk
taking relative to the cost.  Exploration,  etc. performed  by or on
behalf of government  reduces the risk to private investor.  Thus,
risk-reward  trade-offs  are present and it is not clear that such a
strategy  is in the  interest  of government  a priori.- 85 -
any mineral  strategy and/or contract terms considered by  government.
Contract  terms which generate present  values below (in excess of) total
opportunity  cost, adjusted  for risk, should  be excluded  from (be included
in) the  possible  set  of options. Alternative  extraction  profiles  can also
be  evaluated once  this value  is determined.  If the present value of
deferred  extraction  per ton is  greater  (less  than)  additional  extraction  in
early periods then extraction  should be deferred (accelerated)  from the
social point  of  view.  In effect,  the measure  of opportunity  cost
approximates  the increased wealth  from mineral development since the
measures  are computed  as potential  market  values  of the  stocks. 10
B.  Risk  Evaluation
4.9  Risk evaluation,  access  to capital  markets  and degree  of economic
diversification  are related.  The risk of mineral development that the
government  is willing to bear will depend  on its access to world capital
markets and the extent of the economy's  diversification. The evaluation
should  contain  an analysis  of  mineral  risk  in relation  to other  risks  borne
by the  economy  relative  to existing  wealth.  Risk  neutrality  should  not be
assumed  a priori. Risk neutrality  could  be a result  if the  economy  is  well
diversified  and  potential  mineral wealth  is small relative to other
economic  sectors. 11 Some degree of risk aversion  may be appropriate  in
other  circumstances.l2
10/  If outright sale is not constitutionally  allowed then the negative
difference  between  the  risk adjusted  return  from  the next best
alternative  and sale  wnul.d  equal  the  economic  cost  of the  prohibition.
11/  Objective  methods  are available  to determine  the degree  of exposure  to
risks, diversification,  etc.  For instance,  the covariance  matrix of
returns  in  the  economy  could  be computed. This  covariance  matrix  could
be computed with and without mineral investments to determine the
contribution  of mineral  Investments  to the  overall  risk  to the  economy.
12/  The determination of any risk aversion  parameter for government is
ultimately  subjective.  Indications  of risk aversion  can be inferred
from  prior  behavior  regarding  government  investment  policy,  etc.  Such
inferences  could  be employed  as initial  indicators.- 86 -
4.10  Access  to capital  markets  will aid government  in determining  the
degree  of risk sharing  which  might  be contained  in  mineral  contracts. For
instance,  if access  to world  capital  markets  is complete  and costless  for
both  government  and  private  citizens  then  almost  any  degree  of risk  sharing
(even  100% full  equity  ow.nership  by government)  can  be included  in  mineral
contracts.  Each agent  can determine  the level  of mineral  risks  they are
willing to bear via adjustments  in their respective  portfolios  in this
case.  Costless complete access to world capital markets may be the
exception rather than the rule for Sub-Saharan economies.  Thus a
determination  of risk sharing  strategies  will  generally  be part  of mineral
contracts  with  third  parties  (or  SOE's  and/or  other  government
departments).
C.  Terms  of Trade  and  Other  Effecta
4.11  Emphasis  has been placed  on 'Dutch  Disease"  and other terms  of
trade effects throughout this.  study.  Government should not evaluate
mineral investments as separable projects when there is significant
potential for general equilibrium adjustments in the economy.  The
transition  to and from a relatively  mineral-intensive  economy  can affect
the terms of trade and the structure  of relative  prices in the economy.
These adjustments  can be costly  and estimates  of the size and timing  of
these  costs  should  be included  in  government's  evaluation.
4.12  The  procedures  used to evaluate  these  costs  vary.  Simple  methods
would include  reduced  form forecasting  equations  where the real exchange
rate is estimated  as a function  of world  mineral  prices  and other  mineral
related  economic  variables  (e.g.  world  price  of imported  inputs,  quantities
extracted  and/or  total  reserves). Complex  methods  include  development  of
computable  general  equilibrium  systems  designed  to estimate  how mineral- 87 -
developments  change  the  structure  of relative  prices. 13 Portfolio  effects
could  be estimated  in a manner  similar  to methods  described  in the last
section:  e.g.  computation  of the  covariance  matrix  of prices  and  cost in
the economy.  The appropriate  method to employ  and the extent  of the
analysis  will depend  on the  potential  (or  realized)  importance  of minerals
and  the  resources  available. 14
4.13  Real externalities  such  as pollution,  environmental  hazards,  etc.
should  also  be part  of this  process. Pricing  externalities  is important  if
the social  cost of real  externalities  is  high.  Estimates  of these  social
costs  will determine  socially  optimal  adjustments  to extraction  profiles,
recovery  ar.d  corrective  pricing  methods.
4.14  The extent  to which the general  equilibrium  effects  of mineral
development  should  be incorporated  into specific  mineral contracts  will
depend on  the degree of diversification, distributional objectives,
government  expenditure  policy and wealth.  If government  has sufficient
resources from other sectors to compensate those harmed by mineral
development  via changes in comparative  advantage  then expenditure  policy
can be used without recourse  to incorporating  specific  contract  terms.
Some recognition  of these  factors  should  be incorporated  in contracts  due
to lack of complete  access  to capital  markets and the mineral-specific
risks  society  might  bear.
D.  Poliec  Development
4.15  The factors  discussed  above  are some  of the  elements  essential  to
determine mineral development/tax  policy.  Policy development  or re-
13/  For  example  of the computable general equilibrium methods see:
Benjamin  and  Devarajan  ('.985  a,b)  and  Benjamin  et.  al..  (1985).
14/  Such  activities  could  be  undertaken  by donors  such  as the  World  Bank  on
behalf of government.  The methods described in this section are
extensions  of standard  project  evaluation  techniques. It is possible
for the  Bank to  engage  in this  activity  as part  of its  country  studies
and/or  as a  part  of the  Bank's  review  process.- 88 -
evaluation  will require  a social  evaluation  of different  alternatives  to
measure  the gains  and losses  of each strategy. Some  factors  which  should
be considered  in  policy  development  are  discussed  below.
4.16  The cost of risk bearing should  be explicitly  considered. The
cost of risk  bearing  is more readily  identified  if the  strategy  discussed
above is used.  Government ownership of both the resource  base and a
portion  of the  means  of production  will increase  the  economy's  exposure  to
mineral risks.  The payment  structure  selected  by government  will also
affect  the degree  of risk exposure. The difference  between  the  value  of
outright sale and the present value of alternative  contract  schedules
discounted  at a risk free rate  will  provide  in estimate  of the  gains  from
risk bearing.  A reasonable  analysis  will incorporate  the structure  of
project  specific  risks  relative  to payment  structure. 15
4.17  One popular  method for risk compensation  is to compute  a risk
adjusted  discount  rate.  Estimates  of the  risk  premium  can  be obtained  by
market  analysis  commonly  applied  to mining  and other industrial  firms. 16
The risk borne  however  will depend  on the contract  structure  making  risk
adjustments  endogenous.  For instance,  an ad valorem royalty  can never
generate  negative  revenues,  while equity sharing  requires  cash outflows
which  might  never  be recovered. This implies  that  if risk  premium  methods
are used, the premium  for an ad valorem  royalty  should  .-. ever  be greater
than the premium  for an equity  share.  Risk adjustment  may also require
15/  Project-specific  risks  could  be  computed via  estimates of  the
intertemporal  covariance  matrix  of inputs  and  outputs. Minimum  risk  is
derived via a determination  of the amount  of wealth necessary  with
perfect  certainty  to  make  an  agent  no worse-off  relative  to  the  agent's
expected  welfare in the uncertain  situation. This value is known  as
the certainty  equivalent  value relative  to the risky  situation. This
notion is basic to formulations  of the "risk  premium"  derived  from
methods  such  as the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model.
16/  See  Copeland  and  Weston  (1980)  for  methods  of estimating  risk  premiums
in  a variety  of contexts.- 89 -
different  risk  premiums at different  points in time. 17 An example  will
aid to clarify this point.  Suppose that project prices and costs are
intertemporally  independent  and that the government  employs  the RRT.  The
presence  of the RRT will create  potential  serial  correlation  of otherwise
statistically  independent  variables.  This occurs  because realizations  of
high  (low) cash  flows in early periods will affect the RRT base  (and
perhaps the rate) in later  periods.  Ad valorem  royalties  and production
shares with no loss offset provisions  do not induce serial correlation
since  the  base  of each  payment  are  period-specific  only.  This implies  that
different  premiums  might  be present  at different  points  in time  for  the  RRT
which  would  not  be needed  for  other  levy  structures. 18
4.18  Integration  of taxes  in  addition  to  mineral-specific  levies  should
be part of this process.  The introduction  of corporate income taxes,
output taxes, etc. can complicate the analysis from the social point of
view.  Government as resource owner and tax collector has two choice
variables in the mineral area relative  to the one, tax policy,  which it
employs  in other  sectors. 19 This implies  that  government  potentially  can
compensate  for the  adverse  incentives  created  by one instrument  via  changes
in the  second.  For  instance,  export  taxes  can  be reduced  with  compensating
increases  in ad valorem royalties  in contracts  with no net change in the
17/  In  general,  certainty  equivalence  adjustments  can be  made  via
adjustments  in  the discount  rate.  llove-.er,  it  is  important to
understand that the nature of the adjustment is derived from the
minimum ex ante compensation,  both totai and marginal, necessary to
induce  agents  to  bear  risk.
18/  This result  should  not  be considered  a cost  of the  RRT.  Rather,  proper
adjustment  for  the  serial  correlation  introduced  by the  RRT is  required
before the net benefits of the RRT relative  to other schemes  can be
determined.
19/  In reality,  government  has numerous  instruments  including  regulation,
price  control,  etc.  However,  the  point  emphasized  in the  text  is still
valid.- 90 -
incentives  faced  by the  investor.  Such  adjustments  may  be appropriate  if
proper  identification  of  cost  and  benefits  are  maintained.
4.19  One approach  to this type of problem  is to compute  the risk
adjusted  returns  to government  as resource  owner  with  and  without  various
taxes.  The different  values  and extraction  profiles  will indi_-  e the
partial  equilibrium  efficiency  costs  imposed  by the tax  system. 20 If
compensating  adjustments  in  contract  terms  are  deemed  appropriate  then  this
procedure  will  indicate  the  risk  adjusted  gains  and  losses  to  each  party  to
the  contract.
4.20  Tax policy, corporate tax policy in particular,  should  be
considered  part of the general economic  policy of government.  If
compensating  adjustments  are contemplated  in mineral contracts  then
intersectoral  effects  should  be considered.  It is  not  clear  ex ante  that
exemption  from  all  taxes  with  compensating  adjustments  in contract  terms
will  be welfare  improving. 21 If the  effective  tax  rate  in  other  sectors
is higher  or lower relative  to th'e  minerals  sector  then intersectoral
allocations  can  be created  reducing  the  efficiency  of the  entire  economy.
For  this  reason  adjustments  in  tax  policy  to  accommodate  mineral  producers
should  be done with care to ensure that all important  factors are
incorporated.
4.21  The final point relates to the use of the present value
computations  for  the  final  contract  terms.  The  present  value  o,f  government
payments,  net  of taxes,  should  be considered  the  governments  oasis  in  the
minerals  in place  adjusted  for risk.  This value should  be kept and
20/  If  perfect  certainty  and  an  open  economy  is  assumed,  the  difference  in
the  two  present  values  may  be exactly  equal  to  the  tax  revenues.
21/  Compensating  adjustments  identical  to those  in the  tax  law  would  have
no  effect.- 91  -
adjusted  for  resource  depletion  as the  resource  is  developed  and  extracted. 22
Two functions  are served  by this  procedure.  First,  reduction  in present
value  via  extraction  will  indicate  the  loss  in  capital  value  to the  economy
which may lower  living  standards  if not replaced  by other investments. 23
Second,  proper  record  keeping  for  lost  value  will  aid  in  ex  post  evaluation
and reformulation  of mineral  policy  should  the  need  arise.  For instance,
accounting  for  depletion  enables  a computation  vf the opportunity  cost of
timing  differences  resulting  from  levies  such  as the  RRT.  It is important
for government to keep these accounts even if output levies are not
charged. Government  must price the  resource  to  determine  the  opportunity
cost of extraction  and charge itself for inventory  reductions  for each
saje.  If  a price  is  not  determined  then  government  will  have  no method  to
evaluate  either  the  costs  or benefits  of its  mineral  policies.
III. EVALUATIOW  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
4.22  There is reason  to believe that the resource/tax policies in Sub-
Saharan  Africa  can  be improved. A clear  distinction  between  the  various
roles of government in this sector is not apparent from the policies
discussed  in this report. 24 There is little  evidence  that the resource
22/  Depletion accounting for government is entirely appropriate and
necessary  since  title  to the  resource  is  held  by this  agent.  The type
of depletion discussed here and  in Section 4  assumes government
ownership and is different  from the producer's  depletion  which was
criticized  in Chapter  2.
23/  One method for computing  depletion  is present in Section  4 of this
chapter.
24/  A possibie  exception  is  Cameroon  which  has  the  benefit  of experience  in
other  countries  since  mineral  development  there  is relatively  recent.
No attempt  is made to second  guess  or read the  minds  of policy  makers
in these  countries.  Ex ante, the  policies  which have evolved  could
have resulted  from direct  application  cf  the methods  described  in the
last  section. However,  I do  not  believe  this  was the  case.- 92 -
base  is  priced  or that  the  cost  of  adjustment  via  changes  in  terms  of trade
is  priced  explicitly. Emphasis  has  been  placed  instead  on rent  collection
schemes (e.g.  free equity and complete  ownership)  without appropriately
considering the risk or the differences  between natural resource and
economic rents.  Finally, no explicit policy has been  noted which
in;.'orates  depletion  and  consistent  internal  government  accounting. 25
4.23  These  concerns  foster  the  conjecture  that  some  of these  economies
have developed  policies  which undercompensate  them for both the natural
resource  rent and the taxes  on investment  capital  adjusted  for  risk.  The
basis for this conjecture  is examined  below and alternatives  are offered
for  consideration.
A.  Incoma  Related  Ch&rans
4.24  In  an economy  where  the  mineral  rights  are  vested  in  private  hands
there  is no prima facia  case for the taxation  of capital  invested  in the
mining  sector  to  be any  different  than  capital  invested  in  other  sectors  of
the economy. That is, the marginal  effective  tax  rate on capital  in the
mining  sector  should  be the  same  as the  effective  rate  on any  other  sector.
Given the structure  of mineral  income  taxes  worldwide  (Sub-Saharan  Africa
in  particular)  there  are reasons  to  believe  that  the  effective  tax  rate  on
invested  capital  in the  mineral  sector  is  below  that  in  other  sectors. 26
4.25  The reasons for lower marginal effective tax rates in mining
include:
25/  This  does  not imply  that  such  mechanisms  are  absent. However,  lack  of
explicit  policies  raises  doubt.
26/  This statement  is restricted  to the income  tax and does not include
output  taxes. See  Shoven  (1982),  Conrad  (1983)  and  Gravelle  (1983)  for
estimates  which show that the  marginal  effective  income  tax rates  on
mining  are  below  those  of other  sectors  in the  United  States.- 93 -
- Expensing  of  all  exploration  costs  implies  that  the  effective
marginal  tax rate on this  activity  is zero  on an all  equity
investment.
- Expensing  of development  implies  a  zero effective  rate on
this  activity  as well.
- The share of exploration  and development  in total capital
expenditures  in  mining  is large  (sometimes  in excess  of 80%).
Thus, even if the other  capital  expenditures  on mining  are
subject  to standard  depreciation,  the  effective  tax rate on
total  investment  would  be lower  than  other  sectors.
- Allowance  for  interest  deductions  (even  with  thin
capitalization  and  transfer  pricing  rules  enforced)  may  imply
a further  reduction  in the  effective  tax  rate when combined
with expensing of large components  of investment. These
factors  could  create  negative  effective  rates  in this  sector. 27
- To the extent  that  percentage  depletion  is still  used it is
possible  that the  firm  can  deduct  an amount  greater  than  its
initial  basis in present  value terms.  This would further
decrease  the  effective  tax  rate. 28
4.26  In summary,  expensing  a large share of the investment  combined
with interest  deductions  and other incentives  suggests  that the effective
tax rate on invested  capital  might in fact be oubstantially  lower than
27/  Negative  effective  marginal  rates  may or may not be present  depending
on the rate of inflation.  However,  there iR little  doubt that the
mining sector's effective rate is lower than other sectors,  other
things  equal.
28/  See  Harberger  (1960)  and Conrad  (1983)  for  a discussion  of this issue.
Recall  that  depletion  in  excess  of the  capitalized  basis  of  exploration
and  development  (which  may  be zero)  should  not  be granted  to the  owner
of physical  capital.  The producer  purchases  the resource  from the
resource  owner  and  thus  the  producer  should  receive  a deduction  for  the
cost of this  input. Allowing  a deduction  for  royalties,  regardless  of
form,  and  a  aepletion  allowance  is  double  counting.- 94 -
statutory.  tax rates.  It is important  to emphasize  that a high tax rate
(such  as 65% in Zambia  or 85%  in  Nigeria)  is  no indicator  of the  effective
taxation  of investment  in  the  industry. 29 Absent  compensating  adjustments
in other parts of the tax/contract  system,  capital  will be misallocated
economy-wide  with too much capital  allocated  to the mining  sector. This
could make  the economy more dependent on natural resources than is
appropriate.30
4.27  Justifications  for expensing combined  with interest  deductions
include  the high front end expenditures  necessary  to explore  and develop
minerals;  the risks  of exploration  and development;  the long lead times
between  initial  exploration  and generation  of positive  cash flow;  and the
need  for  financing,  often  over  long periods  of  time.3 1 These
considerations  have little  foundation  in the  context  of overall  tax/natural
29/  High statutory  rates  could  even increase  the  negative  effective  rate.
Again,  these  claims  relate  only  to the  income  tax  and  not  the  total  tax
bill which includes  output  taxes,  export  and import  taxes,  etc.  The
case for low effective  rates is stronger  when exemptions  from import
duties  which  are  common  in  many  mineral  agreements  are ircluded.
30/  The presence  of natural  resource  rents  might  lead  a country  to reduce
the  effective  tax on other  investments. See Conrad  (1984). However,
if the  contract  system  does  not compensate  for the lost  revenues  from
the tax incentives in the  income tax then the present value of
government  revenues  (tax  plus factor  payments)  might  be lower  or even
negative. One factor  contributing  to the  current  debt  and  balance  of
payments problems in some of these countries  could be a policy  of
reduced  taxation  of other  sectors, whether  by  law  or  reduced
administrative effort, without due consideration  for the "lower"
present  value of the tax  revenues  (adjusted  for risk)  from  the  mining
sector  created  by all these incentives. This issue  deserves  further
investigation  and indicates that the role of mining taxes is best
addressed  in the context  of overall  tax reform.  If adjustments  have
been made in natural resource  policy  to adjust  for these incentives
then the statements  in the text should  be tempered.  The issue is
whether  such  adjustments  have  been  made  and  the  form  they  have taken.
31/  A type of identification  problem  is present  here.  It is not clear
whether  large  amounts  of debt  are  necessary  to finance  mineral  projects
or whether equity  holders  are attempting  to shift the risk of large
investments  onto  debt.- 95  -
resource  policy.  Explicit  risk sharing provisions  can be included  in
natural  resource  contracts. Such  terms  should  be included  where it is in
government's  interest  to do so.  Explicit  consideration  of .eisk  in the
contract  process should mitigate the need for additional  risk sharing
implicit  by discriminatory  incentives  in the income  tax.  The explicit
inclusion  of risks  in natural  resource  policy  will force  policy  makers  to
confront  the  trade-off  between  the  risks  borne  by a particular  firm  against
the risk and long lead  times  necessary  to diversify  and develop  an entire
economy.
4.28  The  need  for  reform  is  indicated  from  this  discassion.  The  income
taxation  of mineral investments  must be placed into the context  of the
overall  tax system  and its  objectives  to ensure  consistency. A complete
discussion  of tax reform  is  beyond  the scope  of this study. However,  the
following  considerations  could  be incorporated  into  a reasonable  income  tax
which  might  be compatible  with  the  overall  objectives  of the  mineral  sector
and the  tax  system  for  the  economy  as  a  whole.
4.29  Given the large cash flow component  in existing  mineral income
taxes,  consideration  could  be given  to the  development  of complete  cash-
flow taxation  (i.e.  full expensing). Under such a system  all investment
expenditures  would be immediately  expensed.  There would  be no need for
inflation  indexing  and depreciation  rates,  which  are  ultimately  estimates,
urner  cash-flow  rules. Also,  rules  for  other  expenses  such  as intangibles
would  not be necessary.  Interest  deductions,  however,  would  not  be allowed
under this system  (this  would avoid  negative  marginal  effective  tax rates
which  arise  from double counting of capital expenditures  due to the
provision  of immediate  expensing  of assets  plus the  allowance  of interest
deduction).
4.30  A potential problem with a correctly  designed  system  of full-
expensing  is that the effective  marginal  tax rate on invested  capital  is- 96 -
zero.  That is, it is possible  for  the  present  value  of taxes  paid  by the
marginal  firm  to  be zero. 32 Unless  other  sectors  of the  economy  are  also
treated as cash-flow taxpayers then the mining sector will have more
favorable  tax  treatment  with a  consequent  reduction  in the  present  value  of
government revenues. 3 3 In response, the following points deserve
consideration.  First, the cash-flow tax is an efficient method for
collecting rent regardless  of type (i.e.  natural  resource  rents,  rents
accruing  from market  power  or inframarginal  rents  present  when production
exhibits decreasing  returns to scale).  Rents not captured  within the
context of the contract  would be captured  by this tax.  Second,  risk
sharing in the context  of the tax would be clarified.  Some agreements
require  the  mining  firm  to  bear all  exploration  and  development  risk.  The
firm is then  allowed  to recover  much of its  capital  cost  before  the  tax  or
contract  provisions  become  operative. Cash-flow  taxation  will make such
risk sharing  explicit  in the  tax law itself  without  any concern  regarding
the  debt structure. Third,  new investments  in  mining  have large  front  end
negative  cash flows.  Unlimited  loss carry forwards  would allow  firms  to
retain  part of the  expensing  benefit.  Loss carry forwards  will increase
the effective  tax rate since  the firm  will lose the present  value  of the
expense  between  the  date  of  expenditure  and  the  date  of realization.
4.31  Comprehensive  income  tax concepts  could  be retained  under  a cash
flow  system  at the  corporate  level  if "withholding  taxes"  are  continued  and
32/  As stated  above it is not  clear  at this point  whether  a zero  marginal
effective rate would increase or decrease the effective tax rate
currently  in  existence  in  some  of the  Sub-Saharan  countries.
33/  In addition,  holding  total  tax  revenue  constant  the  move toward  cash-
flow taxation  would  require  an increase  in the effective  tax rate on
consumption.  See  Break,  Holland  and  McLure  (1986).- 97
expanded.34  Withholding  taxes  should  be imposed  on all  distributions  made
by the  firm to related  or to third  oarties  to obtain  this  objective: i.e.
withholding taxes should be imposed on interest,  dividends,  management
fees,  royalties  for technology,  etc.  The withholding  tax rate should  be
uniform  across  categories  to  minimize  the  incentive  to  engage  in  artificial
pricing.  For instance,  thin capitalization  rules  would not be necessary
since interest  is not deductible  and both interest  and dividend  payments
would  bear withholding  at a uniform  rate. 35 Withholding  taxes  should  be
applied  at the firm level  and regardless  of payee.  If the payee is a
domestic  national  then the government  could choose to allow credits  for
these  taxes paid at  the individual level depending on the overall
objectives  of the general  tax policy.  If the  payee is a foreign  person
then  the  withholding  tax  is  the  "final  payment"  from  the  perspective  of the
host government. 36
4.32  In summary,  the  combination  of a cash-flow  tax  with a  withholding
tax  offers  the  potential  for  the  country  to impose  both a tax  on rent  and  a
tax  on the  return  to capital  (via  the  withholding  tax)  which is  consistent
with  current risk sharing arrangements and  is not dependent on the
corporate  structure. The effective  tax rate on domestic  capital  will be
determined  by provisions  at the  individual  level.
34/  The effective  tax rate on capital  can  be computed  only after  personal
and corporate  tax  provisions  are integrated. Cash-flow  prlnciples  at
the  corporate  level  do not necessarily  imply  consumption  taxation  for
the  economy  as a whole.
35/  The absolute incentive to reduce tax liabilities  will always be
present.
36/  However,  withholding  taxes  are creditable  in the  home country  so the
economic  incentives  created  by the  tax  on capital  may  be mitigated,  in
part,  via  the  foreign  tax  credit.- 98 -
B.  LLIaxiU
4.33  A well-designed  royalty  can  capture  the  share  of  value  added  which
is  attributable  to the  mineral. Minerals  in  the  ground  are  inputs  intc  the
production  process  and the  demand  for these  minerals  is determined  by the
laws of derived demand for output of the finished  products  which the
minerals  are used to produced. The importance  of government  determining
the  minimum  price  it requires  for the resource  base cannot  be overstated.
Without  such  prices  it is impossible  for rational  government  policy  to  be
developed or to collect the full potential of the user cost of the
resource.  Once the  price  is computed  by government  it  will  be apparent  why
the price should be charged and the payment collected  It will be
efficient  to  do so as long  as contract  terms  are  consistan
4.34  Price determination  on a per unit basis implics e  government
decision  (explicit  or implicit)  regarding  the  supply  curve  of the  mineral
sales  from  its  inventory  in the  ground. The  payment  on a per  unit  basis  is
the foundation  Af  the pricing  system  for all consumption  goods and  other
inputs such as labor, materials and capital and there is no economic
justification to exclude minerals from this practice.  Intertemporal
considerations  should  be considered  since  a resource  sale  today  will  not  be
available in the future.  This implies that the price charged should
reflect  the social  cost of capital. In theory,  government  should  set its
output levy so that it is indifferent  between a firm extracting the
marginal  ton  of the  resource  today  and  any  date  in the  future. That is  the
payment  should  reflect  both the  current  value  added  of the  resource  and the
loss in present  value  terms  from.  the  value  added  which  would  have accrued
had the  marginal  ton  been left  in the  ground.
4.35  - The use of ad valorem royalties  has a long history.  Such a
royalty  will create  no adverse  incentives  when constant  returns  to scale
are  present  and  real  relative  prices  of outputs  and  inputs  are  constant. A- 99  -
firm is indifferent  between  paying  workers  $5.00/hr  or 10%  of value  added
if 10%  of value  added  is  equal  to $5.00/hr. The  same is  true  for  minerals
under  t:.ese  assumptions  if the  rate  is determined  by the  share  of minerals
in total  value added. 37 Thus, ad valorem  royalties  may be a workable
approximation  to the  share  of  value  added  attributable  to  minerals.
4.36  The  major  difference  between  an ad valorem  payment  and  a per  unit
payment  psr ton (in  real terms)  is the risk sharing  component  present  in
the  ad valorem  payment. If  profitability  rises  or falls  due to changes  in
output  prices  the  resource  owner  will share  in the  gains  and losses. This
risk  sharing  feature  is  not  available  with  a per  unit  payment. 38 Thus  two
of the  features  of  contract  design  are  present  with  this  levy. 39
4.37  A reasonable  ad valorem levy could be considered  part of the
overall  mineral  development  compensation  scheme  adopted  by government.  The
country  will receive  a payment  for each  and every  ton  of productive  input
and  like  any  factor  input  it  will  bear the  risks  of changes  in its  relative
value.  A well designed  output  levy is relatively  easy to administer  with
the major complication being  the determination  of the output price.
However,  the  same  price  used for  the income  tax  can  be used for  the  output
tax.  Thus  there  is  no need  to replicate  effort  in  the  determination  of the
value  of output.
37/  Alternatively,  the  ad valorem  royalty  could  be considered  equivalent  to
the resource  owner's  share  of the "total  capital  investment". If the
royalty is 10% of the value of output and the rate of return  on
investments  is 8% real then in equilibrium  both invested  capital  and
capital  in the ground  will earn an 8% return  (i.e.,  the 10% royalty
would  be equal  to  an 8% return  on capital).
38/  If profitability  rises or falls because of changes in other input
prices the resource owner will not capture any of these gains or
losses.
39/  A third  component  could  be included  if  gains  or losses  in other  sectors
are  proportional  to output  prices. The  ad valorem  royalty  would  serve
as compensation  for "Dutch Disease" if the real exchange rate is
proportional  to  output  prices.- 100  -
4.38  The following points should  be considered  with respect to ad
valorem  levy  design:
It is redundant  to  have  more than  one ad  valorem  tax  for the
same  purpose.  It  would  be redundant  to impose  an export  tax
and a production  levy  when there  are  no export  externalities
and  most production  is exported. The effective  tax rate is
the  combined  rate  of the  two  payments  in this  case.  Separate
payments  may also produce  confusion  regarding  the economic
intent  of the levy. 40 Also,  a supplemental  ad valorem  tax
over  and  above  opportunity  cost may  not  accrue  much
additLonal  revenue  because  of the  incentives  created.
There is no economic  reason  for the output  levy to be the
same  across  mines.  Uniform  levies  might  prevent  the  capture
of  sizable  gains  from  rich  deposits  or  the  loss  of
development  of low grade-high  cost deposits.  On the other
hand, administrative  difficulties  might  be present  if rates
vary across mines.  However,  these costs might be small,
since the number of mines in a country is small and each
operation  may  be operating  under  different  contract  terms. 41
- For  a given  operation,  the  rate  should  be constant. The  use
of progressive  rates in a royalty  system  creates  additional
40/  Separation  might be appropriate  when a levy of 5% is imposed  for
resource  compensation  and an additional  3% is imposed  as compensation
of external  effects.
41/  An optimal  royalty  will  vary  with  the  geological  and  cost  conditions  of
a specific  mine.  Since  ore  deposits  are  heterogenoous  both within  and
between  deposits  it might  be the  case that  differing  royalty  rates  are
necessary  to ensure  a constant  rate  of return  across  deposits  to the
government  as well  as yield  a more  consistent  ordering  of development.
See  Conrad  (1984).- 101  -
economic  incentives  and there  is little  evidence  to suggest
that progressive rates capture any type of wind-fall. 42
Rates  might be changed  through  time in light  of changes  in
the  economic  and  geological  environment. 43 Clear  procedures
should  be established  1;.  ze  contract  if such char-es  are
contemplated.
The royalty  should  be deductible  for  income  tax  purposes. A
royalty  is a payment  for an input  and thus it is a cost of
doing  business. In addition,  the  royalty  should  not be used
as credit  against  income  taxes. This is  the  current  practice
in Zambia.  The income  tax and royalty  generally  should  be
used for different objectives.  A royalty credit system
effectively  limits the number of instruments  available  to
government.  As a  result risk sharing is not generally
efficient  and  mixed  economic  signals are  sent to  the
producer.  Royalties and income -xes  induce different
responses  by  the producer and a  royalty-credit system
42/  Efficient  risk sharing  via ad -alorem  royalties  might  require  variable
rates including  negative rates.  See Conrad (1987a).  The royalty
discussed above is primarily intended for compensation  of nkAtural
resource rent however.  Additional  risk sharing  or offsetting  risk
sharing  can  be accommodated  in  other  contract  terms.
43/  For instance, in the latter parts of a mine's life it might be
desirable  for  both employment  and  foreign  exchange  reasons  to lower  the
output  levy in  order  to  prolong  the  life  of the  operation  and  increase
recovery.- 102 -
effectively  communicates  inconsistent  policy  by government. 44
- Output  levies  should  be considered  in the  context  of overall
mineral  policy.  Ad valorem  royalties  may be used for risk
sharing,  collection  of  natural  resource  rent  and  the  recovery
of costs imposed  by mining to other economic  sectors.  A
clear  statement  of objectives  is necessary  to ensure
consistent  applica:ion. Other  aspects  of the  mineral  policy
can  be  adjusted  to ensure that the overall policy is
consistent.  For  instance,  the  appropriate  level  of
government  risk sharing  can  be adjusted  by changes  in income
tax  or equity  sharing  rates.
C.  State  Owned Enter2rises
4.39  State owned enterprises  (SOE's)  play an important  role in each
country  under review.  This role  varies  from joint  ventures  with foreign
firms (e.g. Cameroon) to ownership of entire invested capital (e.g.
Zambia).  The development  of SOE's is one empirical  outcome  of public
ownership  of  minerals.  The  SOE  facilitates  centra.Lzation  of
decision-making  in the mining  sector  and enables  all the diverse  talents
required  to operate  the sector  (e.g.,  engineering,  geology,  economics)  to
44/  In comments  on an earlier  draft  of this document  it was pointed  out
that  the  justification  of  this system was  to prevent the de-
capitalization  of the  mining  operations  in  Zambia. We are  grateful  for
this insight,  but are  not  convinced  that  a royalty-credit  system  is an
appropriate  means  to accomplish  this  objective. The mixed  signals  may
create  more instability  since  downside  risks  are clearly  increased  by
this system  relative  to an income  tax with the royalty  deductible.
Alternatives  to the  mixed  system  might  include  suspension  of the  income
tax,  a move to cash flow taxation  with a lower  royalty,  or a royalty
combined  with  a  type of RRT.  Each alternative would  generate
government  revenue  from the mining sector  in each time period  while
preserving  consistent  signals. The appropriate  method  will depend  on
an evaluation  of the objectives  for the sector to ensure that the
current crisis does not  induce further injury to the long term
stability  of the  industry.- 103  -
be organized  under one central  authority. These statements  do not imply
that the SOE be a separate corporation  or even a government "profit
esnter". SOE's  could  be treated  as a cost  center,  like  other  non-revenue
departments,  e.g. external  affairs.  In this case no revenues  would be
attributed  to the  SOE and regular  budgetary  allocations  would  be made for
operating  expenses.  No taxation  or mineral resource  payments  would be
required  by the  SOE  in this  case. Central  government  would  bear  the  entire
responsibility  for  policy  development  and  attribution  of revenues.
4.40  SOE's  are, however,  generally  organized as  separate legal
entities.  In such cases,  important  constraints  are required  to ensure
efficient SOE behavior.  The SOE structure should be treated as a
"subsidiary"  which is one component of the overall  portfolio  of firms
(activities)  operated  by the government. Investment  decisions  and other
resource  allocation  decisions  for the  SOE  should  then  reflect  the  need for
overall portfolio balance by government.  Mineral renource  policy and
-axation  can  play  an important  allocative  function  in  this  context. First,
it is important  for  government  to send  coLrect  pricing  signals  to the  SOE.
Therefore  it is imperAtive  that the SOE  be charged  the social  opportunity
cost of the resource which implies charging a royalty of some form.
Inconsistent  policies  and signals  can be generated  if the computation  of
opportunity  cost is  left  to the  SOE. Society  as  a whole  owns  the  resource,
not the  SOE  and  thus  government  must  be responsible  for  computing  the  price
of this scarce  commodity. The SOE should  be treated  as an allocator  and
not a price maker.  An exogenous  resource  price will aid in developing
incentives  which  induce  the  SOE  to  respond  to  social  values  and  not  private
ones.- 104 -
4.41  There  is  a  weaker  economic  case  for  the  other  forms  of taxation  of
SOEs.  It is  well  known  that  government  should  allocate  resourc^s  relative
to  social  prices. 45 Adjustments  by government  and the  SOE  may  be required
to account  for taxes  imposed  on the  SOE.  Such  adjustments  may  not  be made
in practice. There  is  also  a tendency  for  mining  SOE's  to  become  involved
in other  aspects  of social  policy  (e.g.  infrastructure  and  other types  of
expenditures),  given their relative  size and political  influence.  Such
investments  may not be socially  optimal  and could  decrease  the  efficiency
of the economy  if left  unchecked.  SOEs may also be established  .lly
prior  to the  manpower  development  necessary  to administer  such  firms. The
inexperiesce  of the  domestic  nationals  who control  the  operations  combined
with the  political  influence  which  comes  with state  status  can (and  does)
lead  to inconsistent  and/or  inefficient  decisions. 46
4.42  In this practical  context  taxation  of  SOE's can  impose a
discipline  on the  firm  and  it's  decision  makers. Consistent  application  of
income  tax  rules  will aid the development  of accounting  systems  which are
necessary for rational decisions.  The scrutiny  of a third party (the
Treasury) which  is responsible for revenue collections can aid the
development of a healthy sense of responsibility  and accountability.
Revenue  collection  via taxation  will  reduce  the  economic  power  of the  SOE.
Use of withholding  taxes  to third  parties  (including  director  fees,  etc.)
can limit  the  discretion  of the  SOE  managers  to pursue  their  own economic
interest. For  these  reasons  it is important  that  the  SOE  be subject  to the
same  taxation system as private t.rms.  Such treatment provides the
incentives  necessary  for  rational  management  and  can  limit  the  economic  and
45/  Diamond  and  Mirrlees  (1976).
46/  Gillis  (1977).- 105 -
political  power  of the SOE.  Distortionary  incentives  created  by taxation
could be reduced  or eliminated  via government  investment  policy.  This
implies  that investment  ard financing  decislons  should  not necessarlly  be
made internally,  but by a board  of directors  which ls responslble  for the
overall  performance  of all  government  investments.
4.43  Thls process  may  appear  redundant  and somewhat arbitrary.
However,  two  points  should  be noted.  Flrst,  the decislon  to have  a state
owned  enterprise  with any  type  of decislon-maklng  power  is ltself  somewhat
arbitrary.  The SOE should be treated as a subsidlary  and not as an
independent  entity  in the  first  instance. Second,  correct  signals  combined
with  checks  and  balances  are  required  to capture the benefits of
decentralized  decision making.  SOE's in the mineral sector  may be a
natural  outcome  of speclalization,  but lt is lmportant  that  both  political
and  economic  discipline  be imposed  to  minimize  potential  waste.
IV.  USE  OF REVENUES
4.44  All Sub-Saharan  countries  will ultlmately  lose their  comparative
advantage  in mineral  production.  Depletlon  of economic  reserves  can be
expected  ln ten to twenty  years in Cameroon,  Gabon and Zambia. Resource
depletlon and the loss in the comparatlve  advantage imply that these
economies  will have to adjust  to a new structure  where minerals  will be
less  important  in  both  the  internal  and  external  accounts. This  adjustment
could  be more difficult  as a consequence  of any type of "Dutch  Disease"
created  by the  development  of the  minerals  in  the  first  instance.
4.45  Nir.Aral  discoveries  increase  the  economy's  "wealth"  by the  present
value of the cash flows retained.  That is, the stock of savings  is
increased with a consequent  increase  in the economy  wide capital/labor
ratio.  The capital/labor  ratio  may well increase  further  because  of the- 106  -
capital intensive nature of resource extraction.  This implies that
resource  depletion  wi 4.h  no replacement  investment  amounts  to "dis-saving".
The  value  of minerals  in  place  is  not  part  of common  measures  of savings  or
capital  in government  accounts  and  depletion  of this  stock  is  not recorded
in net income. 47 Thus,  no accounting  mechanism  is available  to measure
the  lost  capital  value  from  mineral  extraction. Lack  of information  could
imply that economy  wide saving  may not be sufficient  for replacement  of
both  physical  and  resource  capital.
4.46  A number  of issues  are reised  by the  loss of wealth  from  mineral
extraction.  First,  compensation  for the user cost is not tax revenue.
Such revenues  should  be recorded  as separate  items in budget accounts.
Second,  it  may  be appropriate  to treat  mineral  revenue  as transitory  rather
than permanent income.  If some  (all) mineral income is treated as
transitory  then the income  should  be 'invested"  in reproducible  capital
either  in the form of human capital  or investments  in the world capital
markets.  This would ensure  that the reduction  in the capital  stock  via
deple.ion  would  be offset  by investment  in  other  assets. Such  a procedure
would preserve  the economy's  total capital  stock and increase  permanent
consumption.  The  trade of na_ural resource capital for reproducible
capital  can be done in a number  of ways.  Revenues  can  be used to reduce
foreign  debt or increase  investment,  but the revenues  should  be used for
investment and not consumption. 48 Investments in the domestic or
international  markets should be based on relative social  benefits  and
portfolio  diversification  considerations.  This implies  that  at least  part
47/ Boskin  et.  al.  (1986)  have  wade  recent  attempts  to compute  the  value  of
mineral  lands  in the  United  States.
48/  This type of earmarking may be appropriate.  In general increased
revenues  are fungible.  Hawever,  sources  and uses of funds  analysis
will  aid in  ensuring  that  dis-saving  does  not  occur.- 107  -
of mineral revenues  be used for diversifying  the economv in a manner
consistent  with the long term objectives  of capital  deepening  and income
distribution.
4.47  Third,  the  mineral  resource  and  the  capital  used to  extract  it  are
sector-specific  and are not fungible  ex-post.  This implies increased
exposure  to world  markets  unless  diversification  strategies  are  developed.
Governments have sought to increase their share of value added via
increasing  interests  in operations  (e.g.,  Zambia  purchased  the share of
foreign  operations)  and  by requiring  increased  local  downstream  investment.
These gains should be tempered  by the opportunity  cost of alternative
investments  and lack  of portfolio  balance. Government's  investment  in the
physical  capital  of  mining  operations  or in domestic  processing  increase
their  exposure  to risks  in these  markets  and reducing  the ability  of the
economy to diversify. 49 The decision to increase  government's  share
should  also  be tempered  by the  fact  that  multinational  firms  generally  have
a  more diversified  portfolio  than a developing  economy.  Multi-national
mining  firms  have  investments  in a number of countries and their
stockholders  are able to diversify  economic  and political  risks  via the
world  capital  market. A developing  economy  on the  other  hand is initially
limited  to its  own  resource  base  and  access  to  world  capital  markets  San  be
costly.  The price of risk bearing  may be lower  for firms than for the
country  implying  that  the economy  might in fact  be better-off  by allowing
foreign  operations  to bear more risk.  Government  revenues  could then  be
used  for  diversification. 50
49/ See  the  analysis  in  Chapter  3.
50/  Zambia  may  be a case  in  point. Zambia  purchased  the  foreign  investor's
share  of the  mineral  operations  and it  appears  that  large  debt  was  used
to finance  the purchase.  Zambia  thus increased  its exposure  to the
risks  in the  minerals  sector  for  which  it is  now  paying  the  price.- 108  -
4.48  Fourth,  government  ownership  of minerals  combined  with imperfect
access  to capital  markets  may  restrict  the  behavior  of private  indi-iduals.
Private  individuals  may not be able  to diversify  out of or into specific
mniezal investments  because of government  ownership.  Public  ownership
without  perfect  access  to capital  markets  may increase  the risk to both
individuals  and  society.
4.49  These  factors  indicate  that  the  "permanent"  relaxation  of taxes  on
other  sectors  which has occurred  in  mineral  rich economies  may not be in
the best interest  of the economy, e.g. Nigeria.  Such actions  may be
appropriate  in economies like Saudi Arabia if sufficient  cash flow is
generated  to facilitate  diversification.  Tax reductions  may not serve
distributional objectives since the tax base  in these economies is
relati,zely  small.  Tax reductions  would  also increase  the variability  of
government  revenue.  Unexpected  revenue  short falls  could require  costly
adjustments  in  expenditure  programs. 51
4.50  There  also  may  be a need to separate  "income"  from  "depletion"  in
computing the return from mineral investments.  If perfect certainty
prevailed, then this computation  would be easy.  Given the nature  of
uncertainty,  such a separation  is difficult  to make.  However,  this does
not  imply that attempts to separate income from depletion should  be
foregone.  Lost asset  values  need to be replaced  for economic  growth  to
continue.  In order to generate  discussion  regarding  a means to properly
account  for  depletion,  the  following  simple  proposal  is  offered. 52
51/  To the  extent  that  private  sector  savings  and  public  sector  savings  are
substitutes,  taxes could in theory  be designed  to increase  domestic
savings  as the  resource  is depleted. However,  this  may imply  that  the
economy  might conside.-  an increase  in consumption  taxes relative  to
income taxes.  Such an emphasis  will encourage a  replacement  of
exhaustible  capital  for  private  sector  reproducible  capital  as  well as
offset  the changes  in relative  prices  which are attributed  to Dutch
Disease.
52/  A complete  discussion  of this  proposal  is  contained  in  Conrad  (1987c).- 109  -
4.51  The factor  payments  (royalties,  fixed fees,  shares,  or resource
net schemes)  could  be treated  in a manner  similar  to the  repayments  of a
loan. That  is,  the  factor  payments  consist  of two  parts: 1.  "income"  and
2.  payments  of principal.  The income  component  is equal to the  market
rate of interest  times the "outstanding"  principal  in any time period.
Thus,  the separation  of income  from depletion  will depend  on the interest
rate and  the  amortization  schedule. Such  a scheme  could  be implemented  in
minerals  by using  the  following  rules:
- The government  obtains  an estimate  of the  "remaining  life"  of
any  operation  or operations  and an estimate  of the  remaining
reserves.53
- ,Government  selects  an amortization  schedule  which could  be
straight  line,  declining  balance  or  unit  of  production. 54
- The  government  obtains  an  estimate  of the  current  opportunity
cost  of funds,  'r'.
4.52  Cash flow from minerals  in any period  would be related  to the
value  of the  minerals  in  place  by:
Rt  - (Mt + rt) PV
where:  PV - value  of the  minerals  in  place
x  - proportion  of  capital  repaid  this  period
r  - rate of interest
53/  The government  could  develop  this  procedure  on either  an operation  or
economy  wide  basis.
54/  Different  methods  will have different  implications  for how principal
will  be amortized. The  unit  of  production  method  is  equivalent  to  cost
depletion. Cost  depletion  has  a long  history  and  it might  be the  most
appropriate  method  to  use in  this  sector.- 110  -
4.53  Imposing  asset market equilibrium,  i.e. the present value of
principal  plus  interest  is  equal  to the  value  of  minerals  in  place,  implies
that  depletion  in any  period  is  equal  to:
Depletion  --  I  R
4.54  The  measure  of depletion  is equal  to the  minimum  amount  that  the
government  should  invest  in other forms  of capital  with a market  rate  of
return  in  order  to  keep  the  economy's  total  capital  stock  constant. 55 The
computat'on  in practice  would  not even require  an estimate  of the  present
value  of the  minerals  in  place. 56 The  procedure  also  accommodates  changes
in the basis and changes  in interest  rates.  For instance,  if interest
rates  rise (fall),  then the  proportion  of revenues  required  for  depletion
will  fall (rise). Interest  rate  increases  (decreases)  imply  capital  losses
(gains) other things equal and  thus the procedure can automatically
incorporate  realized  gains  and losses. Increases  (decreases)  in reserves
(or changes in mine life)  would also change  the proportion  of revenues
allocated to depletion  accounts  since the new information  would create
capital  gains  and  losses. 57
4.55  If this method is used by government  then the share  of mineral
revenues  allocated  to depletion  would  not be used as current  revenues  in
the government's  budgetary  accounts.  Rather,  they would  be posted  to a
55/  This would be equal teo  the amount  of investment  necessary  to keep
steady  state consumption  constant  in an economy  with zero population
growth.
56/  The  market  value  of the  property  is implied  via the  computations.
57/  The  period  where  extraction  is  positive  and  no factor  payments  are  made
then  future  payments  must  be  adjusted  to  account  for  accumulated
interest.  Zero  or  negative  factor  payments  could  occur  because  the
government  has  chosen  to  employ  share  or  resource  rent schemes. The
procedure  necessary  to  make  such  an  adjustment  is  straight  forward.
Note  that  the  current  method  serves  as another  justification  for  the
separation  of  "factor  payments"  from  "taxes".- 111ff
capital  account  to be used for  other  investments. 58 That is,  these  funds
would  be the  miDnijm  investment  necessary  in order  to  avoid  a reduction  in
the  economy's  capital  stock. 59 This  procedure,  while  an estimate,  would
ensure  that  an accounting  is  made  for  the  loss  of an asset. This  would  aid
budget and investment  planning.  In addition,  it would force decision
makers  (and  the  public)  to  confront  the  issue  of replacement  investment  and
diversification.
V.  SU,mAx
4.56  One of the insights  gained  from government  behavior  in the  past
few years has been lack of emphasis  on the transitory  nature  of mineral
wealth and confusion  regarding  the allocative  function  served  by natural
resource  rent.  These factors  combined  wich lack of diversification  and
perhaps  the  relatively  low  effective  rates  of taxation  on minerals  may  have
increased  the economies'  dependence  on one sector. This  policy  could  have
increased the effects of Dutch Disease and contributed  to the current
structural  adjustment  problems  in some  Sub-Saharan  countries,  to the  extent
that  revenues have  been used  to stimulate consumption rather than
replacement  investment  in a more diversified  asset  base.  The solutions  to
these  problems  are not simple.  The solutions  may require  a revamping  of
both  mineral  and  general  tax  policy  as  well as rigid  discipline  on the  part
of decision  makers  to ensure  that  revenues  are  not inefficiently  consumed.
However,  economic  growth  and  diversification  may  be hampered  further  unless
such discipline  is developed  with consistent  t&x signals  and expenditure
policies.
58/  The source  of funding  the  capital  account  is irrelevant.  The  point  is
that  provision  be made for  the  loss  of the  asset.
59/  If additional  mineral  revenues  are invested  then total savings  will
rise.ARRandix  I
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TAM  LAWS  OF SELECTED  COUNTRIES  IN  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
BOTSWANA
Summary of  Taxes
I.  Income  Taxes
Rate/(s):  35  percent
Allow*  rces:
Exploration:  Capital  Expenditures  expensed
Development:  Capital  Expenditures  expensed
Depreciation:  Manufacturing:  Straight  line  with asset  of
four  to ten  years.
Mining: Capital  expenditures  divided  by
number  of  years  mine  is  expected  to operate.
Maximum  depreciation  period  is  ten  years.
Depletion:  None
Losses:
Carry-forward  Manufacturing:  5  years.
Mining: Indefinite.
Carry-back  None
Other  Incentives:  Initial  allowance  if  25  percent  on certain
industrial  buildings.
Tax  holidays  and  other  incentives  are  allowed
if  approved  by the  government.ARRendix  1
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II.  Output  Taxes  (Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes)
Name  Base  Rate
Customs  Duties  Imports  0-70  percent  a/
A/  Botswana  is  a  member  of the  Southern  Africa  Customs  union
wnich  includes: South  Africa,  Lesotho  and  Swaziland.
Botswana's  share  of revenue  is  based  on a formulary  method.
III. Withholding  Taxes
Base  Rate
Interest  15  percent
Dividends  15  percent
Contracts  20  percent
Royalties  15  percent
IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
Royalties,  dividends  and  other  standard  payments.
V.  Contract  Form(s)
Government  Participation: Owns  mineral  rights  but  foreign  investors
own  much  of the  capital.
Source: IFS/GFS,  World  Bank  and  Price  Waterhouse2g*ndix  I1
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CAMEROON
Summary of  Taxes
I.  Income  Taxes





Depreciation:  Buildings  5%
Machinery  and  other  inputs  have rates  which
vary  according  to schedules
Depletion:  None
Losses:
Other  Incentives:  Tax  Holidays  of  various  lengths  depending  on
type  and  location  of industry
Reduced  import  duties
Exemptions  from  local  sales  taxes
II.  Output  Taxes  Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes
Name  Base  Rate
Export  Value  Average  rate  about  2%
Import  Value  Rates  vary  from  40  to  245%&Aoendix  I
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III. Withholding  Taxes
IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
Production  sharing  believed  to  be:
60%  lsc  15  million  barrels  of cumulative
production
65%  2nd  15  million  barrels  of cumulative
production
70%  excess  over  30  million  barrels.
V.  Contract  Forms
Governmer.t  Participation:  50%  via  State  Oil  Company  (SNH).
SNH  pays  half  of all  exploration  and
development.  SOE  paid  half of  book
value  for  its  share  of operations  for
firms  which  operated  prior  to current
contract  form.
Source: IFS/GFS  and  Barclays,  interviews  with  Bank  staff.AgRandix  I
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GABON
Summarv  of Taxes
I.  Income  Taxes
Rate(s):  Non-oil: 45% (or  1%  of turnover)  with  a
minimum  of 500,000  CFA.
Oil:  73%
Allowances:
Exploration:  Determined  by contract
Development:  Determined  by contract
Depreciation:  Not  known
Depletion:  Not  known
Losses:  Not  known
Other  Incentives:  Tax  exemptions  for  2-10  years  for  certain
new  enterprises
II.  Output  Taxes  (Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes)
Name  Base  Rate
Import  Value  2.5-15%
Turnover  tax  on
Imports  Value  10%
Stamp  duty  Value-Exports  5%,&2oendix  1
Page  6 of 18
III. Withholding  Taxes
Base  Rate
Dividends  18%
Director's  fee  20%
IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
Mineral  royalty  20%  of  base  price  which  is
computed  on average  to  be 90%
of posted  price.
There  are  some  special  tax  holidays  for  mineral  firms.
V.  Contract  Form(s)
Government  Participation:  New  contracts  are  production
sharing. Older  contracts  were
concession  with  10%  free
equity
Sources: IFS/GFS,  Price-Waterhouse,  Gillis  and  Beals  (1982),  and  Gillis
(1978).ADRendix  I
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LIBERIA
Summarv  of  Taxes
I.  Income  Taxes
Rate(s):  509  if taxable  income  is in  excess  of  L$
100,000
Allowances:
Exploration:  Not  known
Development:  Not  known
Depreciation:  If assets  have  values  it,  excess  of LS
100,000  then  depreciation  is subject  to
negotiation.  In general  for  other  items
depreciation  is  on a straight  line  basis.




Depletion:  Not  known
Losses:
Carry-forward:  5  years
Carry-back:  none
Other  Incentives:  Exemptions  for  up to 90%  of import  duties
Profits  reinvested  in fixed  assets  are
tax  exempt. One-half  of subsequent
profits  are  exempt.
Full  rebates  of duties  on inputs  for
output  which  is  exported.
II.  Output  Taxes  (Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes)
Name  Base  Rate
Import  duties  Value  and  Volume  Varies
p-.ARRandix  1
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III. Withholding  Taxes
Base  Rate
Interest  15  percent
Dividends  15  percent
Other  30  percent
IV.  Speclal  Mining  Taxes
Original  contract  had  provision  for  export  tax  whlch  was  equal  to
%005  US per  ton  exported  plus  1%  of excess  of 115%  of the  ten  year
average  price  of output.
V.  Contract  F1  i:%us)
Government  Parti_ipation:  50%  government  equity
Iron  ore  operators  work  concession  type  contracts
Sources: Gillis  (1979)  and  Price-Waterhouse.A2oendix  1
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NIGERIA
8uamarv of  Taxes





Depreciation:  Equi2ment:  32.3% first  year allowance
12.5% declining balance





Carry back:  none
Carry forward:  four years
ten  years for agriculture
Other Incentives  Pioneer Industries-Tax  exemption for 2-5 years
II.  Output Taxes (Including Import and Export Taxes)
III.  Withholding Taxes
Base  Rate
Dividends  _  12.5 percent
Interest  45 percent
- Management Fees  45 percent
Royalties  45 percent
A/  After 1979 dividends are limited to 50% of post tax profits.A&Mendix  1
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IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
Oil  Income  Tax:  65.75%  until  productioui  costs  are fully
amortized
85%  after  amortization  of  production  costs
with  deduction  for  all  royalties
Royalties;
V.  Contract  Form(s)
Production  Sharing  arrangements  in general.
Government  Participation:  Varies  with  contract
Sources: Price-Waterhouse  and  Ernst  and  Whinny  International  Series.&ggMudix  I
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ZAIRE
SummarM  of  Taxes





Depreciation:  3-5%  Buildings
10-15%  Equipment/Furniture
20-25%  Machinery
33%  Small  Tools
Depletion:  Generally  15%  of total  revenue  up to  a  maximum
of 50%  of taxable  income
Losses:
Carry  back:  none
Carry  forward:  2  years
Other  Incentives:  Export  royalty  is  a credit  for  income  tax.
Export  surtax  is  a deduction.
Periodic  re-evaluation  of assets  have  been
allowed  to account  for  changes  in  the  exchange
rate  and  for  domestic  inflation
Various  tax  holidays  and  tax  reductions  for
pre-investment  of profits.
5%  reduction  in taxes  for  re-investment6Agendix  1
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II.  Output  7;axes  (Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes)
Name  Base  Rate
Base  Royalty  Exports  of Copper  7%
(Credited  for  Income)
Progressive  Exports  of Copper  5-50%
when  price  is  above
2,500  SDR/ton
Oil  royalty  Value  of  production  12.5%
Statistical  Tax  Value  of  Exports  1%
Turn-over  Value  of Exports  7%
Customs  Duties  Value  of Imports  3%
(non-luxuries)
Import  Turnover  Value  of Imports  Vary
III. WithholdLng  Taxes
Base  Rate
Dividends  20  percent
Interest  20 percent
Royalties  20  percentA&RRendix  1
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IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
V.  Contract  Form(s)
Government  Participation:  100%  of  Non-fuel  minerals;
53%  Diamonds
Vary  by agreement  in  Petroleum
Other  Government  gets  15%  of  annual  net  tax
profits  in  petroleum.
Royalty  in  petroleum  can  be taken  in
cash  or in  kind.
Sources: IFS/GFS,  World  Bank  Reports,  Price  Waterhouse.AgpRndix  1
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ZAMBIA
SummarX  of Taxes





Depreciation:  Initial  Allowance:  10%  Industrial
Buildings
Investment  Allowance:  10%  Industrial
Buildings
20% Equipment
5-10%  (straight  line): Industrial
Building
2% (straight  line): Non-industrial
buildings
30-50%  (declining  equipment  balance):
Depletion:  None
Loses:
Carry-back:  one  year
Carry-forward:  indefinitely
Other  Incentives:  Industrial  Development  Act  allows  tax
holidays  for  at least  five  years  for
"approved"  investmentsAgoendix 
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II.  Output  Taxes  (Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes)
Name  Base  Rate
Mincral  Export  Value  of Exports  10%  plus  3% surtax
Copper  Content
Note:  This  tax  is relatively  new.  It is  allowed  as a deduction  for
income  and  mining  taxes. The  rate  has  increased  steadily  over
time.







These  rates  are  for  nonresident  corporations  and  individuals  who  are
not  citizens  of a country  with  an operative  treaty  with  Zambia.
Treaties  over-ride  the  base  rate.
IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
Mineral  Tax:  Rate:  51%  Copper
20%  Lead,  Cobalt  and  Zinc
15%  Amethyst  and  beryl
10%  all  others
Base:  Same  as income  tax.Appendix 1
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Provisions:  1.  Companies  which  are  formed  subsequent
to imposition  of the  tax  are  not
liable  until  their  initial
capitalization  and  subsequent  capital
are  fully  recovered.
2.  Firms  in  operation  prior  to
imposition  of the  tax  will  have
capital  expenditures  over  the  shorter
of  mine life  or twenty  years.
3.  Remission  of tax  is  made  when the
average  after-tax  return  to  equity
over  a three  year  period  is less  than
12%. Refunds  are  exempt  from  company
tax. This  benefit  is  not  available
for  existing  companies. In  effect,
this  tax  creates  a  variable  rate
profits  tax  which  ranges  from  0 to
73.05%  when  the  company  tax  is
included.
V.  Contract  Forms
Government  Participation:  Government  holds  100%  of equity  of
mineral  enterprises.  Foreign  investors
were  paid  for  their  equity. Ex-patriots
still  work  for  enterprises.
Sources:  IFS/GFS,  World  Bank  Country  Reports,  Price-Waterhouse,  and
Barclays  Reports.Appendlx  I
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ZIMBABWE
Summary  of Taxes
I.  Income  Taxes
Rate(s):  1982/83 45%  +  20%  surcharge  - 54%
1983/84 45%  -a  15%  surcharge  - 51.75%
Allowances:
Exploration:  Expensed
Development:  Option  to expense
Depreciation:  Self  constructed  assets  gets  special
initial  allowance  of 100%.
Item  Rate
Buildings  2.5%  straight  line
Machinery  10%  declining  balance
Vehicles  20%  declining  balance
Depletion:  5%  of sales  prior  to 1982. Rules
similar  to  U.S.  percentage  depletion.
Abolished  after  1982.
Losses:  Carry-forward:  unlimited
Other  Incentives:  15%  expensing  provision  for
investments  in rural  areas
II.  Output  Taxes (Including  Import  and  Export  Taxes)
Name  Base  RateADfl,dix  l
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III. Withholding  Taxes
Base  Rate
Dividends  20 percent
Interest  10  percent
Fees  20  percent
IV.  Special  Mining  Taxes
Not  Known
V.  Contract  Form(s)
Government  Participation:  Not  Known
Sources: World  Bank  and  Price  Waterhouse.Agnendix 2
Page  1  of 7
The  Mining  Process
1.  From an economic  perspective  the  objective  of the  mining  firm is
to extract  and process  various  minerals  so that the  present  value  of the
profits (measured  in terms of discounted  cash-flows)  are at a maximum.
Generally,  minerals  are  not  readily  accessible  and  are  difficult  to locate
and to develop.  This implies  that the  mining  firm  must engage  in a long
and  costly  process  if its  objective  is to  be achieved. 1 This  process  can





2.  Below  each  of these  components  is  described  briefly. 2
A.  Exploratlon
3.  Exploration is divided into three general segments and can last
for an average  of three  to five years.  In the first  stage,  "anomalies"
over wide areas are sought.  This search involves airborne and even
1/  The description  below  is  highly  stylized. The term "minerals"  will  be
used to  mean  both  hard  minerals  and  hydrocarbons.  While  the  techniques
used to explore  for  various  minerals  are  different,  the  process  itself
is quite  similar. It is the  general  structure  of the  process  which  is
described  in this  appendix.
2/  The  discussion  is  based  in large  part  on Conrad  (1978),  Conrad  and  Hool
(1981),  and  Convery  and  Conrad  (1981).Appendix  Z
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satellite  photography  as well as the use of maps,  surveys  and other
historical  documents  where  mining  activity  has  taken  place  in  the  past. 3
4.  On site  exploration  of promising  areas  forms  the  second  stage.
The  objective  of  this  stage  is  to  make  a preliminary  determination  of  the
size  of  the  mineralized  areas  and  to  select  the  most  pximising  areas  for
intensive  exploration  (if  any). Depending  on  the  mineral  sought,  testing
generally  proceeds  by direct observation  as well as a variety  of
geophysical  and  geochemical  techniques.
5.  The third  phase  consists  of intensive  exploration  in areas  of
potential  value. Drilling  is  generally  used  to determine  the  depth  and
extent  of  mineralization  as  well  as  to  gather  data  on  other  aspects  of  the
geology.  Based  on  these  studies  estimates  are  made  and  divided  into  three
groups:
Proven  Reserves:  Ores  that  have  been  both  delineated  and
measured;  tonnage  (volume),  and  quality
are  known  wlthin  a  5  percent  error.
Probable  reserves:  Characteristics  computed  by measurements
from widely spaced samples and from
geological projections; errors are
usually estimated at less than 20
percent.
3/ One  of the  benefits  of foreign  investment  and  aide  for  a developing
country  is  the  use  of  ex-patriot  capital  and  labor  in  the  exploration
process.  These  techniques  are  capital-intensive  and  the  capital  (both
human  and  physical)  can  be  used  in  a  variety  of  countries.  Given  the
high fixed costs of developing  internal  resources  for such a
specialized  and  technical  activity,  developing  economies  have  often  had
to  seek  aid  for  this  initial  stage  of  the  mineral  process.RR3ndLix 2
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Possible  Or*
(Mineralization): No samples  available;  estimates  based  on
inferences  from geological  structure  and
geographic  anomalies  .4
6.  Since  possible  ore is a point  estimate  with large  variance  this
classification  is not usually included in the formulation  of economic
decisions  at the development  and initial  production  stages. 5 This does
not imply that possible  ore is immaterial. At this stage,  possible  ore
contains  the  largest  tonnage  (volume)  of  mineralization  and  wtll  ultimately
determine  the  mine's  value. However,  mineralization  in this  classification
will not be recovered except in the future.  Also the uncertainties
regarding  prices,  costs  as well as volume  and quality  makes any estimate
purely  speculative. Given the costs  of obtaining  information  about  these
reserves,  the  trade-off  of more current  exploration  versus  the  benefits  of
future  uncertain  cash-flows  requires  that the firm place little  current
weight  on these  estimates  in  planning.
7.  This stage  of exploration  yields  additional  information  about  the
geological  structure  of the mineral  body.  The samples  obtained  provide
estimates  of:
4/  In most cases  exploration  is a continuing  process.  Estimates  of
the recoverable  mineralization  are constantly  being revised  as
development  and  production  begin.  Since  exploration  is a costly
activity the determination  of "proven reserves" is itself an
economic  variable  being related  to the cost of proving  reserves
"today"  which  will  mot  be developed  or extracted  until  some  future
date.  In fact, some mineral experts believe when sufficient
mineralization  is present to justify  proceeding  to development,
the measure of proven  reserves  is merely  sufficient  to convince
those outside the firm (e.g., the banks) that the firm has
sufficient  justification  for  financing.
5/  See  Thomas  (1973).Agnendix 2
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- length,  width  and  depth  of  mineralized  area,




- grade  and  other  quality  characteristics,
- nature of overburden.
8.  The technology  employed  to develop  the  deposit  is  based  on these
estimates.  The technology  includes  the type of operation  (opezt-pit  vs.
underground);  the scale  of operations;  and the process  necessary  to spare
valuable  minerals  from  ore, if  necessary. Given  projections  of prices  and
costs,  estimates  of "economically  recoverable  reserves"  are made.  At the
pre-development  level  this  measure  of reserves  is a sub-group  of the  three
classifications  described  above  and is restricted  to those  reserves  which
are  planned  for  extraction,  given  time  profiles  of  prices  and  costs. 6
B.  Development
9.  Given  successful exploration, a  determination  of the mine's
profitability  must  be made.  This  is  generally  a two  step  process. A quick
assessment  is first  made to determine  if there  is a reasonable  chance  of
success. Rules  of thumb  are  used  based  on average  values  of  quality,  costs
and prices.  The purpose of this assessment is to determine if the
6/  No mine is ever exhausted  in a "physical  sense".  Recovery  from oil
wells  is considered good if 30 percent of the mineralization  is
recovered. In hard-rock  mining,  the recovery  varies  depending  or the
grade  distribution.  See  Conrad  and  Hool (1981  and  1985).Ap7endix  2
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expenditure  for detailed  stud.ies  is economically  warranted. 7 If this
assessment  yields  promising  results,  a detailed  feasibility  study of the
project  is made.  Detailed  studies  are made to determine  the technology,
scale  of operations,  mining  methods,  sequence  of  extraction,  and  processing
methods. 8 The  engineering  studies  are  detailed  and  provide  a basis  for  a
completion  evaluation. 9
10.  These  studies  combined  with  various  marketing  and  economic  studies
are  used to generate  detailed  cash-flows. Estimates  are  changed  via  Monte
Carlo  methods  as well as different  scales  of operation  to determine  the
optimal scale of operations  and the return  on investment.  Acceptable
ranges for the return  on investment  are in the range of 15-25 percent
real-net-of-tax  at this  stage. 10
11.  If  a decision  is  made to  proceed  and  financing  is forthcoming  the
firm  proceeds  to  construction.  Before  extraction  begins  surface  facilities
for  storage,  transportation  and  processing  are  completed  in addition  to the
initial  development  areas.  Not all of the mine is developed  at once.
7/  At this  stage  the  industry  has used  a form  of the  "Hoskoid  Formula".
8/  Estimates  of recoverable  ore are  made  under  various  mining  techniques.
In addition,  estimates  of three  major  factors  are  made.  These  factors
are: extraction  (the amount  of valuable  material  per ton of volume);
extraction  either recovered or lost as a  result of  the chosen
technique; dilution  (the amount of foreign material blended with
valuable  material  resulting  from the  extraction  process),  and recovery
(the  amount  of  valuable  material  per  unit  volume  which  is recovered  per
tone  of  extraction). See  TB  .... s (1976).
9/  For  examples  and  criticisms  of this  process  see  Thomas  (1976).
10/  The  "hurdle  rates"  used  by firms  vary  across  firms  and  across  deposits.
The  estimates  stated  in  the  text  are  inferences.  from  the  examination  of
a number  of  projects.A  CDend4  2
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Major development  areas are sequenced in a manner  consistent  with the
overall  development  plan for  both  economic  and  technical  reasons.  If too
many areas relative to plant and processing capacity are developed
additional  costs would be incurred in the early years which increase
overheads  and  maintenance  for  minerals  which  may  not  be extracted  for  some
period  of time.
C.  Extraction  and  Processing
12.  At this stage the  firm is constrained by all  its previous
decisions. Capacity  is in  place  restricting  the  scale  of operations,  that
is, only developed areas can be considered for extraction.  The only
variables  the  firm  can  control  are the  rate  of extraction,  the  quantity  of
mineral extracted and  the quality (and rate) of marketable product
processed.11
13.  The cash flows  which  are generated  from this  process  are  used to
repay  debt  or returns  to equity  as well as to pay taxes.  Reinvestment  may
be in the form of new exploration,  development  or plant expansion  if
economic conditions  warrant.  How the firm allocates  these funds  will
depend  on the  expectations  about  the economic  environment  as well as the
development  of alternative  investments.
D.  Implications  for  Public  Policy
14.  Given the above description  of the problem,  it is natural that
mining  firms  have developed  a sequential  dynamic  decision-making  process
which permits frequent re-evaluation  of plans when new information  is
11/  With the exception  of some  petroleum  products  (e.g.,  natural  gas) the
raw  material  extracted  from  the  deposit  is  not  marketable.  The  mineral
is cleaned  or concentrated  to raise  the  mineral  context  to acceptable
market  levels  even  if  no other  downstream  processing  is  done.Appendix 2
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forthcoming. Given  the  long  lead  times  necessary  to develop  a project  and
the presence of both geological  and economic uncertainty  a sequential
process  enables  the  firm  to  enhance  its  flexibility  with  respect  to  changes
in information.
15.  In this  context,  public  policy  will  have  differing  effects  on the
mine's  operation  depending  on the  stage  of operations  in  which the  firm  is
operating. The policy  will affect  all future  decisions  as information  is
passed  through  the decision  structure.  Thus,  a change  in tax  policy  will
have both immediate and delayed responses.  An increase  (decrease)  in
taxation  could effect the level  of recoverable  reserves  from currently
developed  ore  bodies;  affect  the  future  level  of development;  and  provide  a
disincentive  (incentive)  to explore. Finally,  different  tax  policies  might
affect  the industry  in  varying  ways depending  on where  the  country  is with
respect  to its resource  development. That is, countries  which have had
little  or no exploration  or development  might employ  different  taxation
methods  than  countries  which  have a mature  industry  which is  beginning  to
reach geological and economic limits.  It is therefore important for
government  to  be aware  of this  decision  structure  when devising  a rational
tax  policy.Appondix 3
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INCENTIVES  CREATED  BY  TAXATION
I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  This appendix  contains  a simple  mathematical  exposition  of the
results  regarding  intertemporal  allocative  effects  cre.ted  by various  tax
instruments.  In order to highlight  the basic results,  a very simple
model  will be used.  This model is based on Conrad  (1978  a,b),  Conrad
(1982  a,b), and Conrad  and Hool (1980,  198i,  1982,  and 1984 a,b).  It
will be assumed  that the mineral  producer  (or  country)  is a price-taker
in the international  markets  for output.  Given the relative  shares  of
production  and reserves  in the countries  under investigation  this is a
reasonable  assumption. 1 Two production  periods  will be assumed. This
assumption  does  not affect  the  general  nature  of the  results. Specific
assumptions  employed  in  each  section  will  be stated  as they  arise.
II.  THE  BASIC  MODEL
2.  In this section, the model employed in the tax analysis  is
developed.  It should  be noted that if the resource  constraint  is not
binding  the  tax  analysis  of the  mining  industry  is identical  to any  other
industry. 2 Given the assumption  of a binding  resource  constraint  the
problem  to  be solved  by the  miner  is:
Max X  - POQO - Co(Qo) +  (Pl  (Q*  - Qo) - C1 (Q*  - QO))/(l+r)  (3.1)
Where:  Pt - Price of output in t  - 0,1.
Ct - Total cost function in t  - 0,1.3
J1 There  is  the  possible  exception  of Zaire.
2/  For instance, if a per unit sales tax is imposed  on output  then
output  in  all  periods  will fall.
i/  Note that the  cost functions  in either  period  do not  have to  be the
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QO - Quantity produced in t - 0
Q* - Quantity  of reserves  measured  in  terms  of
final  output. 4
r  - interest rate.
3.  It is clear given the assumptions  made that the only choice
variable  for  the  firm is the  amount  extracted  in  t-O, since  the  residual
will be  extracted in period 1.  The  first order condition which
determines  an extreme  value  is:
lrQO  - PO - C'O -(Po - C'll)/l+r  - 0.  (3.2)
4.  In  words,  this  expression  states  that  extraction  and  processing
will continue  in each  period  until the  present  value  of marginal  profit
is equal in each  period. 5 While  discounted  marginal  profits  are equal
in each  period  there  is no indication  about  the  relative  quantity  of ore
extracted. 6 The relative  size of extraction  will depend  on both the
time  path  of prices  and  costs. For  instance,  if  discounted  future  prices
are lower than present  prices  and the cost function  is constant  across
time then more ore  will be extracted  in the  present.  However,  without
more  specifics  on the  nature  of  prices  and  costs  no general  statement  can
be made  about  the  relative  size  of  extraction  in  each  period.
III. PER  UNIT  OUTPUT  TAXES
5.  These  taxes  are  a fixed  value  (usually  in  nominal  terms)  of the
quantity  produced.  This implies  that the net of tax  price received  by
g/  Note that the measure  of Q  is not "ore";  rather  the measure  is in
terms  of final  marketable  output.
.l.  This is  one form  of the  familiar  Hotelling  rule.  (Hotelling,  1932).
i/  The  second  order  condition for a maximum is:  IH|  - C'' 1 -
(C' 0 (l+r))  <  0.ADRandix  3
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the producer  falls from Pt to Pt - T  in each period,  where T is the
amount  of the  tax. A change  in  this  tax  will  affect  QO as follows:
dQo/dT  - r/IHI  <  0  (3.3)
6.  That is, this  tax  will induce  the  firm to reduce  extraction  in
early  periods  and increase  extraction  in later  periods. 7 The intuition
for this result  is that the "nominal"  value of the tax bill is fixed
because  of the fixed  output  assumption. That is, in nominal  terms  the
total  tax is exogenous. However,  the  firm  can reduce  the  present  value
of taxes  (and increase the present value of post-tax profits) by
reallocating  extraction  from  the  present  to the  future,  i.e.  more  output
in the  future  implies  a lower  tax  bill in  present  value  terms.
IV.  VARIABLE  PER  UNIT  TAlES
7.  Some governments  have employed variable rate output taxes. 8
These  taxes  have been developed  to preserve  the  "real"  value  of the tax
revenue  on account  of inflation,  and reflect  an attempt  to capture  some
of the  rents  which  accrue  to the  mining  firm.  In this  case,  a different
per  unit tax  is imposed  each  period. If  T1 is defined  as To (1+O)  where
f  is  equal  to the  (geometric)  average  rate  of growth  in  the  tax,  then:
To >  <  Tl/(l+r)
as (1+#)  <  >  (l+r)
8.  In this case, it is possible  for the tax to reverse  the time
path  of discounted  gross-of-tax  prices. In  addition,  the  government  must
set two  parameters  for  the  tax;  the  base tax  and its  rate  of growth. If
the  government  changes  the  base  tax (To)  then  the  effect  on  Qo will  be:
Z/  IHI  is the value of the Hessian matrix.  In effect, the above
expression  is a  result of Cramer's Rule.  Given  the current.
assumptions,  |HI  will  always  be negative.
t/  Jamaica  and some states  in the  United  States  have used this  type  of
tax.AgRendix 3
Page  4 of 8
dQO/dTo  - (r - 0)/IHI  (3.4)
9.  The  sign  of this  change  will  be  positive  (negative  or zero)  as r
is less than (greater  than or equal to) 8.  That is, if the rate of
change  in the  tax  is greater  than  the interest  rate  then  extraction  will
be allocated  to the  present  away  from the  future. The  case  where r  - p
is  a result  which  might  serve  as a  basis  for  advocating  this  type  of tax.
However,  the  tax  is  not neutral  when  other  decisions  are included  in the
model (e.g.  investment). Like te  fixed  nominal  fee  case the direction
of change  in extraction  will  be determined  so t.iat  tne  firm  may decrease
the present  value  of taxes.  If the rate  of growth  is greater  than the
interest  rate then a reallocation  from the future  to the present  will
reduce  the present  value  of the total  tax  bill and increase  the  present
kalue  of after  tax  profit.
10.  The incentives  created  by a change  in  P,  the rate  of growth  in
the  tax  rate,  can  be seen  by the  following  expression:
dQo/dO - - To/(l+r)IHI >  0  (3.5)
11.  This expression  implies  that an increase  in the rate of growth
in the tax  will induce  the firm  to increase  output  in the  early  periods.
Since  taxes  will increase  at a greater  rate in the  future  the  firm  will
decrease  extraction  in the  future,  in  order  to decrease  the  present  value
of total  taxes.
V.  UNIFORM  AD VALOREM  OUTPUT  TAMES
12.  This  tax  reduces  the  net  of  tax  price  received  by  a  constant
fraction  (ce)  each period.  That is the  net of tax  price receive  by the
producer  in any time  period  is:  Pt (1-ac).  An increase  in the  tax rate
will induce  the  following  comparative  static  effect:
dQo/dac  - (Po(l+r)  - Pl)/IHI  (3.6)Appendix  3
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13.  In this case if the discounted  prices are falling (rising,
constant)  then  extraction  will  be reallocated  to the  future  (present,  not
at all).  Once  again  the  firm  will attempt  to  decrease  the  present  value
of the total  tax  bill.  In this  case the  direction  of the reallocation
will  be function  of the  time  path  of discounted  prices.
VI.  VARIABLE  RATE  AD VAI.QREM  TM.  C
14.  In this case the rate of taxation  varies through  time.  This
type  of tax  has  been employed  in such  countries  as Indonesia  to capture
("wind  falls")  which  are defined  relative  to some  measure. Like  the  per
unit  tax  the  tax  rate  in t-l  can  be defined  as:
(xi  - sXo(l+P)  t
where  8  is the  (geometric)  average  rate  of growth  in the  tax  rate. Also
like the  per unit  case the  government  must set two  parameters,  the  base
tax rate and the rate of growth.  Depending  on how these factors  are
measured  the time  path of discounted  gross  of tax  prices  may or may not
correspond  to the  time  path  of net-of-tax  discounted  prices. The  effects
of a change  in the  base tax rate  on current  extraction  is determined  to
be:
dQo/da  - (Po(l+r)  - Pl(l+,8))/IHI  (X.7)
L5.  The direction  of the reallocation,  if any, will depend  on the
interaction  of the  time  paths  of "nominal"  prices  and the  growth  rate  of
the  tax  rate.  For  instance,  if nominal  prices  are constant  and the  rate
of growth  in the tax  rate  is less  than the  interest  rate  then  extraction
will  be reallocated  to  the  future. 9
16.  A change  in the growth  rate of the tax  will affect  extraction
via:
2/ Other  cases could  be examined,  but it is clear  that the allocative
effects  of this tax  will depend  on the  relative  rates  of growth  in
nominal  prices  and  the  rate  of growth  of  the  tax  rate.Aooondix  3
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dQo/dp  - -Pla/IHI  (3.S)
17.  In this case, a change  in the rate of growth  of the tax will
only increase  taxes in the future  and thus a change  in this parameter
will  reallocate  extraction  from  the  future  to  the  present.
VII.  PROFIT  TAXES
18.  It is  well  known  that  a "pure  profits"  tax  or a cash-flow  tax  is
neutral  with  respect  to allocative  incentives.  This fact is true  in the
mining sector  as well.  Since,  the tax is imposed  on total  economic
profit  the  tax  does  not  affect  the  margint'  conditions: i.e.,  the  tax  is
a tax on "pure  rent".  Note that this tax captures  all types  of rent:
rent  which  accrues  from  the  scare  resoukce  and  rent  which  accrues  because
production  is  subject  to  decreasing  returns.
19.  In general,  pure  profits  taxes  do  not  exist. In  addition  to the
known distortions  introduced  via differences  between tax and economic
depreciation,  depletion  allowances  of some  types  are  often  given. In the
case where  the depletion allowance is determined exogenously  this
allowance  will not have marginal  incentives. However, in many cases
depletion  is either  a function  of output  or the  value  of output.  Cost
depletion is a  fixed nominal  value for each ton (barrel)  of mineral
extracted. In  this  case,  after  income  tax,  profits  in  any  period  are:
w - (1  - k)(PQ  - C(Q) - fQ),  (3.9)
where  k - income  tax  rate  and  f is  the  value  per  ton  of cost  depletion. 10
Some  rearrangement  reveals  that  the  net  of tax  price  receive  by the  firm
is:
P*  - P +  (kf/(l-k))  (3.10)
20.  That is,  the  net  of tax  price,  P*, is  "increased"  because  of the
allowance.  Cost depletion is in effect a "negative"  per unit tax.
1Q/  The time subscripts  in this  section  have  been suppressed  for  ease  of
notation.DRkendix  3
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Therefore,  in this present  case there is an incentive  for the firm to
reallocate  extraction  from the  future  to the  present. The total  nominal
value  of the  subsidy  is  fixed  and  the  firm  can  increase  the  present  value
of the  subsidy  by reallocating  output  from  the  future  to the  present.
21.  Percentage  depletion  (an  allowance  based  on value)  increases  the
net-of-income  tax  price  by a constant  fraction  in  each  period: i.e.,
P* - [1 + (kh/l-k)]P,  (3.11)
where  k is the  percentage  depletion  rate  (measured  as a  proportion  of the
value). Thus,  this  type  of depletion  is in effect  a  negative  ad valorem
tax with  the  corresponding  opposite effects.  In particular, if
discounted  prices  are falling  then the firm will have an incentive  ta
reallocate  extraction  from  the  future  to the  present.
VIII.  PROGRESSIVE  PROFIT  TA%ES
22.  Several tax systems have progressive rates.  In addition,
progressive  profits  taxes  have  been  advocated  by some  economists  (Garnaut
and Ross (1977)  and Strasma  (1978))  and implemented  in some countries
(Indonesia,  Papua  New  Guinea  and  Ecuador). The claim  is made that  since
the  tax  is  on  profits  it  will  not  have any  marginal  distortions.  This is
true  only with respect  to the grade  of ore extracted  (the tax  will not
affect the cut-off grade).  Ultimate recovery and the intertemporal
extraction profile, however, might still be affected.  In order to
analyze  the  effects  of this  type  of tax  a quadratic  approximation  to the
tax  function  will  be used:
Tt - art + 1/2b(st) 2 (3.12)
where  Tt denotes  total  taxes  paid in  period  t  and  s  is gross  of tax  cash
flow.  The first  order  condition  for the  current  problem  under  this tax
regime  is:
L'Qo  (1  - a - bxo)w'o - ((1 - a -bwl)wll/(l+r))  - 0  (3.13)ARRend  3
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23.  Like other  progressive  taxes  the government  must determine  two
parameters: a and  b.  The  effect  of a change  tit  "a" (the  base tax rate
on  current  extraction  is:
dQo/da  - (nro(l+r)  - ,rhl)/IH*l  (3.14)
The  effect  of a change  in "b"  (the  rate  of  progression)  is:ll
dQo/da  - ((l-a)/b)dQo/da  (3.15)
24.  Some  manipulation  of the  first  order  conditions  reveals  that  the
reallocation  will  be from  the  future  (present)  to the  present  (future)  if
gross of tax profits (w) in the present are higher  than gross of tax
profits  in the  future. The logic  for  this  result  is that  an increase  in
the progressive tax rates will create an incentive for the firm to
reallocate  extraction  to the  period  with the  lower  gross  of tax  profits.
Such  a move  will reduce  the  marginal  rate  in  the  high  profit  year  by more
(in  present  value terms)  than the increase  in the marginal  rate in the
period  with lower  profits  gross-of-tax.
11/  IH*|  - ((1  - a  - bffl)Cl  +  b(w'2))  - (l+r)((l  - a  - bwo)C''o  +
b(xf2))  <  0ARRndix  4
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NOTES  ON RISK  AND  MINING  TAXATION
T"e models used to derive the results found in Chapter 2 are
contained in this appendix.  This appendix is brief since extensive
development  is  contained  in  Conrad  (1987b).
I.  THE  RECOlVERY  MODEL
A.  The  Model
The miner  must determine  the  quantity  of economically  recoverable
reserves  when  investment  and  extraction  decisions  are made.  For
convenience,  assume that ore qualities  are continuous  and range from a
maximum  value,  omax to zero.  The choice  variable  is defined  as,  c.  With
these  assumptions,  total,  output  is  defined  as:
Q  - J  oa  dx  (A3.1)
where:  Q - total  volume  of final  output.
Total  mineral  extracted  is  defined  as:
v  f+  ocQdx  (A3.2)
Cost is  assumed  to  be a function  of  extraction  only. That  is,  extraction
and  processing  costs  are  independent  of the  grade: i.e.  C  - C[V].
Profit  is  defined  in the  usual  way  given  these  definitions:
ff  - PQ - C[V]  (A3.3)
where:  X  - profit
P - price  of output
Expected  utility is assumed  to be a function  of profit  alone;
i.e.  EU - EU[w].  Finally,  it is assumed  that  the  grade  distribution  is
known and thus uncertainty  will be present in all other economic  and
technical  variables. The first  order  condition  for  this  problem  is:Aooendix 4




Note that  an increase  in _  reduces  output;  i.e.  an increase  in
the  cut-off  grade  will  reduce  output.
B.  Tax Incentives
Considor  the following  taxes:  1)  an ad rem  tax  on output  equal
to  d';  2) an ad valorem  output  tax  equal  to  ^'  with 0 < 0  <  1; and  3)
an income  tax  rate  t'.  The  new  cut-off  grade  for  each  case  is equal  to:
d  EU'C
_.-.....  - (A3.4)
EU'(P  -4d)
EUC -0
t  EU C
EU-P
The change  in the  cut-off  grade  for  a comparative  static  change
in  each  rate  is:
dt
- (E(RAU'IwrQ)  - EU')/Dd  (A3.5)
- (QOR U  m,  - EU'  )/Dd
A
- (E(RAUf'  PQ)  - EU'P)/DO
- (Q(ORA  U?xI  +  OR  P  +  OUm'# p)  - EU'P)/Dp
A  A' 
t
- (E(RAUWrW))/Da
- (OR Um'  +  OR  A'  +  DffC,x)/Dt
As'  AtPa&t  3 ofi
where:  s  - profit
it  - marginal profit
RA  - -(U*"/U')  the  measure  of absolute  risk  aversion
0  - covariance
D  - Denominator  of second  order  eftects  which  is
always  negative
The expression for the covariance  is determined  by the well
known  expression:
0xy - E(xy) - E(x)E(y)  (A3.6)
The results discussed  in the text can be derived from these
expressions. Note first  that  in every  case (except  the  income  tax  case)
the  terms which  are not  a function of the covariances  are always
negative.  Second, if absolute risk aversion is constant then the
covariance  terms are zero for covariances  which include  absolute  risk
aversion. Third,  if absolute  risk  aversion  is falling  (rising)  then  the
covariance  terms of absolute  risk aversion  with any other  variable  is
negative  (positive).  For  instance,  in  the  case  of the  ad  rem  output  tax,
declining  absolute  or constant  absolute  risk aversion  is sufficient  for
the  cut-off  grade  to  rise (i.e.  for  output  to fall).
II.  INTETENPORAL  EXTRACTION  MODEL
A.  heL  Model
This model is similar  to the model  used in Appendix  2 for the
certainty  case.  The major differences  are the inclusion  of expected
utility  and  the  assumption  of  homogeneous  ore. The  objective  is:
Max  J - EU[POXO  - CO[XO]  +  (PlXl  - C1[X 1])Z]  (A3.7)
X 0 ,X1jApRendix  4
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subject  to:  XO +  X1 s  X
where:  z - (l+r)-l
This formulation  is most general.  Common  special  cases  would
include  independence  of prices  at different  points  in time  and perfect
knowledge of t-O prices.  Since the problem is intertemporal  it is
reasonable  to assume that once the miner  gets to period  1, he will be
operating  with complete  certainty. However,  the  miner  must extract  in t
- 0 and the quantity extracted  will affect the amount  which can be
extracted  in  the  next  period. 1
The  first  order  conditions  for  this  problem  are:
J'  - EU'(PO - C') - p  s 0; J' p  - 0; X62 0  (A3.8)
XO  XO
J'  - EU'((P1 - C') (1+r)-l  s 0;  J' M  - 0; X12 0
X1  1  X1
3' - X - Xr - X1  a  0; A  *  0; J' p  - 0.
pA  A
where:  p  - shadow  price  of the  resource  constraint.
There  are two cases;  one where the miner  plans to extract  all
the resource over the two periods  and the second  where the resource
constraint  will not be binding.  The crucial  variable  in the present
analysis  is first  period  extraction. Thus the discussion  of taxes  will
be limited  to this  variable.
B.  Tax Incentives
Consider  the three  taxes  described  in the  previous  section  (ad
rem,  ad  valorem,  flat  rate  profits). The  comparative  static  effects  of a
change  in  each  tax  when the  resource  constraint  is  not  binding  are:
J/  Note the complete analogy to the consumption/savings  problem.  A
consumer  must allocate  a  fixed  of wealth  between  two  periods. Thus,
current  consumption  will  affect  future  consumption.AnRgendix  4
- (-E(RAU'w'  Xo) + EU ) + Jd  iX  (A3.8)
d  0
- (-XO(OR  U,w)  + EU') + Jd  X
A'  0  0
Xo' - (-E(RAU's'  - f  POXO) + EU'Po) + Jp  X
0  0  0
- (-X 0(OR  U'f'  + OR  p  + OUij,  p )  + EU'P  + Jp  X
A'  0  A' O  O'0  0
- (-E(RAU'iro  So)) +  Jt  X
t  0
- -(OR  U'r' + OR'  r  +  U#'w'  i) + Jt"X
A'  0  A'O  O'0  0
All  terms  not  involving  covariances  are positive.  The
denominator  is negative  via the  necessary  conditions  for  a maximum. All
covariance terms not involving absolute risk aversion are generally
negative.  For instance,  one would  expect  that output  prices  and  profit
to be positively  correlated,  leading  to a negative  correlation  for the
terms in the equations which do not include  absolute  risk aversion.
Thus, the sign of the derivative  will depend  on the  nature  of absolute
risk  aversion. If absolute  risk  aversion  is constant  then  no covariance
exists  between  absolute  risk aversion  and other  variables. If absolute
risk aversion  is decreasing  (increasing),  then the covariance  between
absolute  risk  aversion  is  negative  (positive).
The  comparative  statics  effects  of a change  for  the three  taxes
when the resource constraint is binding can be determined via an
examination  of the following  equations.  Only numerators  are reported
here  since  the  sign  of the  denominators  are  all  positive.ApRendix 4
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XO-  EU#f(WO - w  z)(X  + X z) + EU'(z-l)  (A3.9)
d  1  0  1
- (XO  + Xl)(OR  U,'m z - OR  U'wr)  +  EU'(z-1)
A'  0  A'  1
Xo  - (EU''(go - fiz)(PoXo  + PlzX 1) + EU'(PO - P1z)
d
- (XO  + X1)(OR  U'x' - OR  U'x'z) + Xo (OU's'  p -
0 ''1UZ P )
A'  0  A'  1  O' 0  10
+ (Xi(Cu'Wf  p z - CuDf' z,P Z) + EU'(Plz - PO)
O'  1  1  1
I  . I
X  - EU"'(wro  - Wj)(So  +  m)
- V(OR  U'i'  - OR  U'w'  z  +  0U't  ff - OU'oz,w Z)
A'  0  A'  1  O' 0  1  1
The results  discussed  in the text can be derived  from these
expressions  for various assumptions  regarding  the nature  of absolute
risk aversion  and certainty  with respect  to first  period prices and
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